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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The idea that members of a society should be treated
justly and fairly under the law is a fundamental tenant of
legal philosophy. In order to guarantee this idea of fair-
ness, the concept of due process of law has evolved. Due
process of law can be found in the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution as the framers of this great docu-
ment saw the need to restrain the Federal Government from de-
priving its citizens of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. However, the use of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a device to guarantee
other constitutional rights is of fairly recent vintage.
The importance of the due process clause today cannot
be overstated. It has been used by courts as the vehicle to
extend constitutional protection to rich and poor, black and
white, and young and old alike. Especially important in the
eyes of the highest court has been the constitutional protec-
tion of "fundamental freedoms", such as free speech, process,
religion, and assembly. Through a general expansion of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court of the United States has ruled that most aspects of the
Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution are applicable to
all citizens against state as well as federal impingement.
These far-reaching decisions mean that the rundamentai coa
"
2cepts of fairness found in the Bill of Rights are sacrosanct
and beyond any government's denial, as a matter of due pro-
cess of law.
Bernard Schwartz says of the Fourteenth Amendment, "In
the century since it became a part of the fundamental law,
the Amendment has become, practically speaking, perhaps our
most important constitutional provision - not even second in
significance to the original basic document itself.
On the subject of the due process clause, Justice Felix
Frankfurter, one of the Supreme Court's most accomplished
scholars asserted, "Due process is, perhaps the least frozen
concept of our law - the least confined to history and the
most absorptive of powerful standards of a progressive so-
ciety.'^ He also wrote that the, "Due process clause of the
Fifth and particularly of the Fourteenth Amendment comes as
close to providing a mechanism for dealing with the versatil-
ity of circumstance as is to be found in the Constitution
^
The mechanism for dealing with the versatility of cir-
cumstance, mentioned by Justice Frankfurter has given the Con-
stitution the flexibility necessary for changing times. Jus-
1. Bernard Schwartz, "The Amendment in Operation: A
Historical Overview," The 1 4 th Amendment Centennial Volume
,
Edited by Bernard Schwartz (New York: New York Press, 1970),
p. 29
.
2* Griffin v. Illinois . 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956)
3. Helen Shirlev Thomas, Felix Frankfurter , Scholar on
the Bench (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, I960;, p.150.
3tice Brandeis recognized this problem fifty years ago when he
wrote, "Our Constitution is not a straightjacket. It is a
living organism. As such it is capable of growth, of expan-
sion and of adaptation to new conditions. Growth implies
changes, political, economic, and social. Growth which is
significant manifests itself rather in intellectual and moral
conceptions than in material things." 4 This concept of
"growth" of our Constitution suggested by Justice Brandeis
has been accomplished in the area of individual rights to a
considerable extent through a broad interpretation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Whether it is a judicial philosophy of constitutional
"growth" or the use of due process as a vehicle for dealing
with versatility of circumstance, constitutional rights have
been extended to a greater number of society's members in re-
cent years. Within this broad legal framework which has seen
the blanket of constitutional protection reaching many hereto-
fore ignored, profound changes have resulted in the legal
status of school students. Once the Supreme Court declared
in the 1967 Gault case that, "Neither the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone," 5 new relation-
ships between the student and the institutions of society in-
evitably developed. Children could, after 1967, no longer be
4 „ United States v. Moreland . 258 U.S. 433 (1922)
5. !n Re Gault
,
287 U.S. 1 (1967)
4treated as non-citizens by the state. In a recent signifi-
cant case relating to schools, Justice Fortas, speaking for
the court said that, "First Amendment rights, applied in
light of the special characteristic of the school environment,
are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be ar-
gued that either students or teachers shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate. "6
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
broadly in terpretated has helped to open a door to a new body
of Constitutional law, student's constitutional rights, the
subject to be examined in this paper.
Need for the Study
Lee 0. Garber, and Newton Edwards, possibly the two most
eminent scholars in the field of school law, published a case
book on student rights in 1962, called The Law Governing Pu-
pils . In that volume, the authors point out that, lit is well
established by many court decisions that school boards have
authority to make and enforce any reasonable rules governing
the conduct of pupils. Since 1966, however, this concept has
dramatically changed as pupils have been winning suits m the
federal courts on grounds their constitutional rights were
a Tinkpr V. Des Moines Independent Community. School,
District (™89~tr Ct .~7J3~6" (19691
5violated. Since a marked change in judicial philosophy has
taken place in such a relatively short time, an analysis of
this emerging decisional law is deeemed necessary.
Literally hundreds of legal and pedagogical articles,
position papers, books, and pamphlets have dealt with various
aspects of student constitutional rights in recent years.
Voluminous writing also has appeared in the related area of
legal rights of college students. However, no study has
dealt particularly with due process as the mainspring of the
newly acquired rights of secondary school pupils. There is a
need to examine the extent to which the trend toward judicial
expansion of constitutional rights is part of a broader con-
cept of the judicial extension of due process to all. Also,
a study of student constitutional rights as they have evolved
through a broad interpretation of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment should help clarify recent court de-
cisions for administrators and teachers in public education.
Finally, conclusions drawn from this work might enhance the
development of new relationships between the student and his
educational institution, which in the long run will benefit
all.
Purpose of the Study
Recognition and expansion of student consti tutional
rights has been having a tremendous impact on the public
schools. Questions regarding the status of the law of stu-
6dent rights, school policies, and administrative regulations
affecting student freedoms have been raised with increased
frequency. The primary purpose of this study is to determine
through legal, research and analysis, the impact of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the constitu-
tional rights of public school pupils. A secondary purpose
is to update the substantive knowledge in the field of stu-
dents 1 rights which should help educators understand the con-
cept of due process as it might be made applicable to public
school administration.
The Approach
Since a broad interpretation of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment appears to have been a signifi-
cant legal key in unlocking the door to student constitution-
al rights, the approach in this study will be to concentrate
on the evolution of the due process clause as a means to
guarantee constitutional rights to all people in general and
to public school pupils in particular.
For convenience, the study will be divided into two
parts. First, secondary sources such as legal periodicals,
books, position papers, and pamphlets will be reviewed for
specific points related to the topic. Secondly, the sub-
stance of the study itself will consist of an examination of
all litigation reaching a court of record where students seek
to evoke the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
for relief against invasion of constitutional freedoms
c
7Together
,
the primary and secondary sources will provide the
basic content necessary for this study. For purposes of or-
ganization the basic substance of the study will be divided
into chapters dealing with specific constitutional provisions:
such as, First Amendment rights, searches and seizures out-
lined in the Fourth Amendment, and Fifth and Sixth Amendment
procedural rights.
Delimitations
Involved in this study will be an examination of decis-
ions of courts of record relating to the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
wherein the rights of public school pupils are adjudicated.
Cases arising in whole or in part out of the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will not be consid-
ered only when a constitutional question is raised. Further-
more, decisions involving college students will be examined
only where they are directly related to the question at hand,
the due process rights of public school pupils. Finally, the
issue of freedom of religion will not be included in this
study of student constitutional rights.
Related Literature
Prior to 1968 the major publications on the constitution-
al rights of public school pupils were annual reviews of the
important court decisions effecting their legal status. The
8XfiiU&flQji SlL -ScJiq.qI Law and The Student's Day in Court
8
per-
formed the task
,
with some editorial comment of keeping those
interested abreast of the latest court decisions on student
rights.
In 1968 Seymore Schwartz completed a doctoral disserta-
tion on the topic, The Civil Liberties of the American Public
Schoo l S t u den
t
—An Examination o f the Lega 1 Aspects of Stu—
dents 1 Rights and the Philosophical Impl ications for Curricu-
lum Development . Chapter IV, titled "Legal Findings" reviewed
and analyzed major court decisions on public school pupils'
constitutional rights. Many of his conclusions had to be
drawn without substantive legal decisions in the field of stu-
dents' rights. However, Mr. Schwartz accurately predicted
that subsequent court decisions would expand the scope of con-
stitutional protection to students in the public schools. As
the number of decisions affecting the legal status of stu-
dents' rights grew, the amount of literature relating to the
field proportionately increased.
There followed two important publications of position pa-
9pers, one by the American Civil Liberties Union, the other by
7. Lee 0. Garber and E. Edmund Reuther, Jr., The Yearbook
of School Law, Interstate publishers and printers, Inc.
TDanviile, 111., 1969-1970)
8. The Student ' s Day in Court
,
N.E.A. Research Division,
(Washington, D . C .T
'
9. Academic Freedom and Civil Li ber ties of Students in
Colleges and Universities
,
American Civil Liberties Union,
(New York, 19681
9The National Association of Secondary School Principals, 10
that summarized the legal positions of the courts of stu-
dent rights. Both papers suggested trends that have come a-
bout in the early 1970' s.
The papers offered educational administrators guide-
lines in dealing with students so that they might avoid le—
battles in court. The Reasonable Exercise of Authority
in particular offered to principals the pragmatic advice on
the legal status of student rights in 1969.
As evidence of the growing concern expressed by educa-
tors on the topic of student rights, the National Organization
of Legal Problems of Education sponsored the publication of
five volumes in a Monogram Series relating to a public school
pupil's legal and consti tutuinal rights. These five scholar-
ly publications are: Legal Aspects of Contro l of Student Ac-
tivitie s by. Public School Authorities
,
by E. Edmund Reuther,
Jr., Rights and Freedoms of Public School Students : Direc-
tions from the 1960 1 s
,
Legal Aspects of Crime
,
Investigation
in the Public Schools by William G. Buss, Legal Aspects of
Studen t Records by Henry E. Butler, Jr. and Suspension and Ex-
pulsion of Public School Students by Robert E. Phay. Of these
five publications Rights and Freedoms of Public School Stu-
dents : Directions from the 1960 '
s
and Suspension and Expul-
10. Robert L. Ackerly, The Reasonable Exercise of Author-
ity
,
The National Association of Secondary School principals
(Washington
,
D.C. 1969)
10
sion of Public School students are most important to this
study for they examine legal trends in student rights and as-
sess the status of those rights.
Numerous scholarly articles have appeared in the various
law school journals in recent months on the subject of stu-
dent constitutional rights. Many of these articles offer pe-
netrating analysis of specific aspects involving student judi-
cial controversies. Of particualr importance to this work is
Stephen R. Goldstein's "Reflections of Developing Trends in
the Law of Student Rights," 11 "Developments in the Law—Aca-
1
2
demic Freedom," "Due Process and Secondary School Dismiss-
13
als" by C. Michael Abbott, and "With Temperate Rod: Main-
taining Academic Order in Secondary Schools" 14 by Arnold
Taylor.
In a 1971 doctoral dissertation Academic Freedom in His-
torical Legal Context
.
Maurice M. Sullivan traced the devel-
opment of academic freedom in the United States and concluded
that the forces that characterize the larger society are the
controlling factors that influence academic freedom in public
11. Stephen R. Goldstein, "Reflections on Developing
Trends in the Law of Student Rights," University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review, vol. 118 (February, 1970).
12. "Developments in the Law—Academic Freedom," Harvard
Law Review
,
vol. 81 (March, 1968).
13. C. Michael Abbott, "Due Process and Secondary School
Dismissals," Case Western Reserve Law Review
,
vol. 20 (Febru-
ary, 1969.
14. Arnold Taylor, "With Temperate Rod: Maintaining A-
cademic Order in Secondary Schools," Kentucky Law Journal ,
vol. 58 (1969-1970).
11
education
.
It appears that many more studies will be published in
the coming months on student constitutional rights. These
studies will all add to the growing body of literature on the
topic of student constitutional rights, literature that is
needed at a time when the number of student legal suits in-
creases.
CHAPTER II
THE EXPANSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THROUGH THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Introduction
Our body of law is undergoing a continuous change. It un-
doubtedly reflects the social, economic, and political pres-
sures of the time. This ability in our legal system to change
does not infer instability, but, on the contrary enables the
democratic process to survive through necessary adaptations-
—
adaptations to the forces of change that have made the law
more just.
The judicial system in the twentieth century, reacting to
the forces of change, has expanded the scope of constitutional
protection to citizens heretofore denied that protection. The
major vehicle used to effect the expansion of justice has been
a broader interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privilege or immunities of Citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny any person within its jur-
isdiction the equal protection of the laws.
By insisting that the states were not allowed to deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, the courts expanded the Bill of Rights to more citizens.
In the late 1960 's the broader interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment began to be applied to public school pupils as well
13
as adults in court litigation. The result was that students
began to gam a measure of constitutional protection while at-
tending public schools. Thus, the study of student constitu-
tional rights is a study in change, change that has seen the
evolution of law leading to a more just society. Tracing the
historical development of the due process clause as a vehicle
that effected this change is important.
Historical Background of the Fourteenth Amendment
Arguments were offered at the constitutional convention
to make all the rights found in the Bill of Rights applicable
to the states. Advocates of this idea wanted to insure that
the states, as well as the national government, would not en-
croach upon an individual's fundamental rights. However, the
founding fathers rejected these suggestions because they felt
that it was the prerogative of each individual state to deter-
mine what rights should be guaranteed to their respective citi-
zens. The framers of the constitution concluded that to force
a federal bill of rights upon state governments would violate
the spirit of the newly established federal system of govern-
ment. This point was emphasized by Hamilton as he wrote in the
Federalis t. "There is one transcendent advantage belonging to
the province of the State governments, which alone suffices to
place the matter in a clear and satisfactory light—-I mean the
ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice." 1
1. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Paper (New York:
The New American Library of World Literature, Inc.), p. 120.
14
Following Hamilton's advice, the Bill of Rights, when adopted
by the convention, applied to the federal government.
The question of whether or not the Bill of Rights might
inhibit dCtions by a state arose in the courts as early as
1833, in Barron v. Baltimore
. The city of Baltimore by the
paving of its streets diverted streams from their natural
courses rendering Barron's wharf practically useless. Barron
felt he was being deprived of his property by the city of Bal-
timore without due process of law. He insisted that the Fifth
Amendment, which forbids taking private property for public
use without just compensation, ought to be construed to re-
strain the states as well as the national government. In re-
jecting Barron's contention, Chief Justice Marshall pointed
out that if the framers of the Bill of Rights had intended
them to be incumbent upon the state governments, they would
have expressed that intention.^
Prior to the Civil War citizens looked to the state con-
stitutions for protection of individual rights and liberties.
The national government was not expected to step in and pro-
tect citizens from state denials of civil rights. After the
Civil War, however, the newly enfranchised freedmen needed na-
tional protection from state abuses. A direct result of this
concern led to the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
2 . 7 Pet. 243 (1833)
15
The purposes of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished
slavery and the Fifteenth Amendment, which granted Negroes the
vote, were quite clear. What was meant by the Fourteenth A-
mendrnen t , on the other hand, became subject to question. The
task of interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment was up to the
Supreme Court. For example the Supreme Court has had to strug-
gle with such questions as: What are the privileges and im-
munities of citizens? What is meant by due process of law?
Is due process concerned only with court procedures found in
the lifth Amendment? What does equal protection mean? Final-
ly, the important question relevant to this study, does the
Fourteenth Amendment extend part or all of the civil rights
and liberties found in the Federal Bill Of Rights to the citi-
zens of the various states against state encroachment? Be-
cause of these questions and many more, there have been more
cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment than any other
phase of Constitutional Law.'
In 1873, just five years after the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted, the Court rendered its first significant interpre-
tation of the new amendment in the Slaughterhouse Cases . The
case did not concern civil rights of personal liberties but
rather dealt with the right of the State of Louisiana to grant
a monopoly to a single company in the slaughterhouse business.
3. Robert E. Cushman and Robert F. Cushman, Cases in
Constitutional Law (New York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts
,
Inc.,
1958), p. 542.
16
Plaintiffs sought a declaration that Louisiana's action was
unconstitutional on the grounds it violated the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States. The result-
ing decision was quite significant. The court distinguished
between state citizenship and national citizenship, and em-
phasized that the rights and privilege of federal citizenship
did not include the protection of ordinary civil liberties
such as freedom of speech, press, and religion. 4 The issue
of the dual system of governments was a primary consideration,
for the Court pointed out, "... [T] hese consequences are so
serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great a departure
from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the
effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by sub-
jecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of
powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the most or-
dinary and fundamental character...." As a result, the states
were to continue with the responsibility for the protection
of their respective citizens' civil rights and liberties.
A second major interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment came in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883. This time the
issue was racial discrimination. Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 in the waning days of Reconstruction to in-
sure continued federal protection of the Negro's civil rights.
4 . Ibid .
Slaughterhouse Cases
,
16 Wall. 36,78 (1833)5.
17
The law made it a crime and a civil wrong for any person to
deny anyone full and equal enjoyment of public accommodations.
Much to the chagrin of the Negro community, the Supreme Court
held the act unconstitutional. The language of the Fourteenth
Amendment was followed explicitly. The Amendment states,
"No State" shall deny equal protection of the laws or due pro-
cess of the law. The Court distinguished between "no state"
and no person". Since the Amendment designated the state and
not private persons, Congress, in passing laws to enforce the
Amendment, could not make it a crime to do what the Amendment
did not forbid. In the language of the Court: "It is State
action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individ-
ual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter
£
of the Amendment."
Again, the concern of encroachment over state prerogatives
under the federal system was evident in the Civil Rights
Cases. The court makes this point by declaring the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, "... [w] ould be to make Congress take the
n
place of State Legislatures and supersede them." Thus the
Civil Rights Cases refused to expand the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment to protect civil liberties and, furthermore,
prevented Congress from exercising control over acts of private
6. 109 U.S. 3, 10 (1883)
7 . Ibid
.
,
p. 13
.
18
racial discrimination
.
8
A thiid significant pre-twentieth century case interpret-
ing the Fourteenth Amendment, dealt squarely with the due pro-
cess clause. In Hurtado v. California
9
the defendant, Hurtado
was convicted of murder and sentenced to be hanged without
first being indicted by a grand jury. California statutes
did not require an indictment by a grand jury in all criminal
cases. Hurtado claimed the state was depriving him of his
life without due process of law. He pointed out that Article
V of the United States Constitution requires indictment by a
grand jury for federal crimes and the state should also be
bound to the same as a matter of due process. Unfortunately
for Hurtado, his contention was rejected and his conviction
was sustained.
In this case, as in the two previous cases, the Supreme
Court refused to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in such a
way as to usurp state legislative control over civil rights.
In assur ing California i t could establish criminal procedures
which differed from federal criminal procedures, the Court
said, "It follows that any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom, or newly de-
vised in the discretion of the legislative power, in further-
8. Cushman and Cushman, p. 835.
9. 110 U.S. 516 (1884)
10.
Ibid
.
,
p.537.
19
ance of the general public good, which regards and preserves
these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be
due process of law...." Hurtado is similar to the earlier
Barron decision because in each, the claimants sought to re-
quire due process in state actions. In both cases the Supreme
Court refused to apply federal standards to state court pro-
cedures. The difference rests in the fact that Hurtado sought
relief under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which was not part of the constitution when Barron v.
Baltimore was adjudicated.
In the decades following the Civil War the Fourteenth
Amendment underwent a strange metamorphosis. Instead of pro-
tecting the civil rights of the Negro, as the amendment intend-
ed, the Fourteenth Amendment became a device for big business
interests to thwart state legislative control over their ac-
tivities. As the abuses of big business, particularly the
railroad industry, became more flagrant, demands for reform
were heard from an increasingly large number of discontented
citizens. State legislators responded by enacting various
lav:s regulating such things as rates and freight. Proponents
of big business sought relief in federal courts asserting
that the states, by regulating their activities, were depriving
them of property without due process of law.
Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
11. Ibid.
20
the concept of due process of law was confined only to proce-
dures used by the federal government in bringing an offender
of the law to court. Pressure from vested interests upon the
court to accept the theory that the substance of a law itself
could be held void for want of due process of law began to in-
crease in the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century. 12 The
court did depart from the strict interpretation of "procedur-
al due process as the only kind of due process of law. At
first the majority of the Court was not in sympathy with busi-
ness as they ruled in Munn v. Illinois that the only way re-
lief could be sought from an unjust rate was to elect a new
legislature to enact a just one. 13
During the next twenty years, however, the make-up of the
court changed to members whose judicial philosophy supported
the substantive" due process idea. For example, the court a-
bandoned the Munn doctrine and declared in Chicago, M. & St
.
Co v. Minnesota
. 1890, that the court could review acts
of the legislature regulating rates in order to insure the re-
quirement that due process of law would be met.' 4 There are
literally hundreds of cases similar to this wherein the court
expanded the breadth of the due process clause to include sub-
stantive as well as procedural due process. The concept of
12. Cushman and Cushman, p. 554.
13. 94 U.S. 113 (1877)
14. 134 U.S. 418 (1890)
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substantive due process was to have significant implications
for court rulings in the Twentieth Century. Cases arising
out of the struggle for civil rights saw the Supreme Court ap-
ply the doctrine of substantive due process to individual
rights and liberties,,
In i:axv;e 1
1
v. Dow
.
Maxwell was convicted of murder by a
jury of eight
,
which was legal under the state laws in Utah.
His lawyers argued the state of Utah should be required to
provide a jury of twelve as required by the Sixth Amendment
„
Also, the Court was further urged to apply federal standards
found in all of the first ten amendments. The Court dealt
with the issue squarely.
It is now urged in substance that all the provisions
contained in the first ten amendments, so far as
they secure and recognize the fundamental rights of
the individual as against the exercise of federal
power, are by virtue of this amendment to be 4re-
garded as privileges or immunities of a citizen of
the United States, and therefore the states cannot
provide for any procedure in state courts which
could not be followed in a federal court because of
the limitations contained in those amendments . 16
The Court refused to broaden the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rejecting Maxwell's plea they stated, "...DQhen
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the abridgment by the
states of those privileges or immunities which he enjoys as
such citizen, it is not correct or reasonable to say that it
15.
16
94 U.S. 113 (1900)
Ibid
.
,
p. 587
,
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covers and extends to certain rights which he does not enjoy
by reason of his citizenship, but simply because those rights
exist in favor of all individuals as against Federal govern-
17
mental powers." Thus, it can be seen here as early as 1900
an attempt was made to have the rights in the Constitution ap-
ply to state actions. However, as seen, it was rejected by
the Supreme Court.
The last landmark decision to be considered before turn-
ing to cases that gradually shifted the pendulum toward a
broader interpretation of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is Twining v. New Jersey
.
1908. In Twining
,
the court rejected the argument that the due process clause
of the the Fourteenth Amendment was what Cushman and Cushman
concluded a "shorthand for the first eight amendments."
Twining, who after refusing to testify on his behalf, was sub-
jected to some prejudicial remarks directed to the jury from
the presiding judge, contended this violated his right to re-
main silent, a protection of the Fifth Amendment. The ques-
tion the court had to consider was an important one. Do pre-
judicial remarks by a judge when a defendant refuses to testi-
fy constitute a denial of due process of law? The question
was difficult because compulsory self-incrimination is consid-
ered particularly repugnant to our idea of what is just. In
17. Ibid
.
,
pp. 595-596.
18. Cushman and Cushman, p. 604.
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reaching the decision, the Court considered the historical
plications of due process of law and its relationship with
our judicial philosophy. The law of the land of Magna Carta
had been interpreted to mean due process of law and the prac-
tice of compulsory self-incrimination was not regarded as
part of due process of law. Finally, the court in Twining
went on to warn that the application of the due process of
law test to ancient English common law would act like a
"straightjacket" upon American jurisprudence to be unloosened
only by constitutional amendment. Incidentally, Justice
Harlan dissented sharply from the court's holding that the
protection against self-incrimination was not a "fundamental"
right which is protected against abridgment by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Growth of First Amendment Rights
By conceding the point that some "fundamental" rights
might be protected by the due process clause, the Court had
to face future cases in which "fundamental" rights were al-
legedly violated by the states. Thus, it became the task of
future justices to determine what would be so "fundamental"
that no government could violate it.
19. 211 U.S. 78 (1908)
20. Ibid.
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The first major breakthrough in expanding the liberties
in the Constitution to prevent encroachment by the states
came in Gitlow v. New York
.
1925. 21 Benjamin Gitlow, a So-
cialist, had been convicted in New York under the Criminal
Anarchy Act of 1902 for distributing a document, "The Left
Wing Manifesto," which advocated the violent overthrow of the
United States Government. Gitlow contended that the statute
was repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. His position was summed up by the Court;
The argument in support of this contention rests
primarily upon the following propositions: first,
that the 'liberty' protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the liberty of speech and of
press; and second, that while liberty of expression
'is not absolute,' it may be ‘restrained' only in
circumstances where its exercise bears a casual re-
lation with some substantive evil, consummated,
attempted, or likely; and as the statute 'takes no
account of circumstances,' it unduly restrains this
liberty, and is therefore unconstitutional . 22
The Court rejected Gitlow' s argument, because in 1925 it
was felt that advocating the overthrow of organized govern-
ment by force could not be allowed. The Court said, "That a
state, in the exercise of its police power may punish those
who abuse this freedom by utterance inimical to the public
welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime,
or disturb the public peace, is not open to question... [however
for]] more imperative reasons, a state may punish utterances
21 .
22 .
45 S. Ct. 625 (1925)
U2i&., p.629.
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endangering the foundations of organized government and threat-
ening its overthrow by unlawful means. These imperil its own
existence as a constitutional state." 23 Even though Gitlow's
appeal was adjudicated against him, the importance of this
case for the study undertaken here is the position taken by
the Court on fundamental personal rights. It was stated in
Gj_Jilj3w, For present purposes we may and do assume that free-
dom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the
First Amendment from abriagment by Congress—
—are among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment
by the states. ..." From this beginning the door was opened
for future interpretations expanding further the Bill of
Rights to all. After 1925 state statutes restricting freedom
of speech and press could be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Federal standards of speech and press would thus be applied
to the states. Federal protection of civil rights and liber-
ties had begun.
Near v. Minnesota
.
the next case to be considered here,
represents the climax of the evolution in constitutional law
whereby freedom of speech and press are at last "nationalized,"
Thereafter, federal constitutional standards governing free
speech and press would apply to the states. Near had been
23. Ibid
.
,
p.630.
24. Ibid.
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publishing a weekly expos£ on the scandalous behavior of pub-
lic officials during the prohibition era. A Minnesota statute
now known as the "Minnesota gag law", provided for the "pad-
locking, by injunctive process, of a newspaper for printing
matter which was scandalous, malicious, defamatory, or ob—
25
scene’.'. The injunction could be lifted if the publisher
could prove in court none of these conditions existed. This
process, in the view of the Supreme Court, amounted to prior
censorship and violated a long-established canon of free
speech and press. The majority of the Court felt, "... [t] hat
liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by
the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although ex-
clusively, immunity from previous restraints of censorship." 26
What is even more important to note in this study of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is the precise
statement regarding its position on speech and press. To
quote the Court. "It is no longer open to doubt that the
liberty of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty
safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
27
ment from invasion by state action." This case will also
be reviewed in a later section on "A Student's Right to a Free
25. 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931)
26. Ibid.
, P- 631.
27. Ibid
.
,
p . 628
.
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Press", for Near v. Minnesota also defines important boundaries
for the responsible press to follow.
The other liberties mentioned in the First Amendment
quickly became incorporated under federal judicial scrutiny
and discipline. In Ham i 1 ton v. Board o f Regents of the Univer—
sity of California
. 1934, freedom of religion was held to be
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, although the Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff's religious liberty was not a-
bridged by compulsory military drill as a condition of attend-
mg the state university. Freedom of assembly became effec-
tively "nationalized" in DeJonqe v. Oregon
.
1937. DeJonge
,
a Communist, had been convicted by an Oregon statute that pro-
hibited members of the Communist Party from assembling for
any reason. The Court in reaffirming its decision in Near
.
went on to include peaceful assembly as a fundamental right
no government may encroach upon only in rare and exceptional
circumstances. Again, the vehicle used to extend this right
to all was the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Freedom of speech and of the press, the Court declared,
"•••DQre fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
28. 293 U.S. 245 (1934)
29. Ibid.
30. 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
28
Constitution
. . .
.
"
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Cushman and Cushman accurately assess the judicial posi-
tion after DeJonge. The Court in case after case had been
classifying the provisions of the Bill of Rights into those
which are fundamental freedoms binding the states through the
operation of the Fourteenth Amendment and those which are not
essential to due process and not binding upon the states. In
effect, the Court had established what Cushman and Cushman
perceive as an "honor roll" of superior rights which would
bind both the state and national governments. 3 '5 Under these
circumstances the Court could pick and choose what it wanted
to "incorporate"—what provisions found in the Bill of Rights
they wanted applied to the states.
By 1947, Justice Hugo Black of the Supreme Court was call-
ing for a total incorporation of the first eight amendments.
In a vigorous dissent, in Adamson v. California
. 1947, Justice
Black stated his position. He wrote, "
. . . *Thej Court con-
cludes that although comment upon testimony in a federal court
would violate the Fifth Amendment, identical comment in a
state court does not violate today's fashion in civilized de-
cency and fundamentals and is therefore not prohibited by the
33federal constitution as amended." Black, the Court 0 s strong-
31. Ibid
.
,
p. 364.
32. Cushman and Cushman, p. 592.
33. 332 U.S. 46, 69 (1947)
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est proponent of the incorporation theory until his recent
death, could not reconcile himself to a double standard for
state and national governments where civil rights and liber-
ties were under attack. He sought to support his position by
historical analysis. Black continued in Adamson
.
My study of the historical events that culminatedm the Fourteenth Amendment, and the expressions
of those who sponsored and favored, as well as th
those who opposed its submission and passage, per-
suades me that one of the chief objects that the
provisions of the Amendment's first section, sepa-
rately, and as a whole, were intended to accom-
plish was to make the Bill of Rights applicable to
the states. 34
Black concluded his dissent by flatly stating that, "... I be-
lieve JJLtj was the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to extend to all people of the nation the complete Bill
of Rights. "
^
Black's position was challenged in a scholarly article by
Professor Charles Fairman in the Stanford Law Review. Profes-
sor Fairman noted first the strange course of evolution the
Fourteenth Amendment had taken in constitutional law since its
ratification.
No one", he stated, "could foresee that Section 2
would prove abortive-—that the most interesting fea-
ture of Section 1, the privileges and immunities
clause, v;ould^be virtually read out of the Constitu-
tion in 1873 ^Slaughterhouse CasesJ —that the due
34. Ibid
.
,
p. 71.
35 0 Ibid .
. p c 89.
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process clause would become, from the point of view
of litigation, one of the two most important claus-
es in the entire Constitution
—or that it would be
the judiciary, not the congress, that most concern-
ed itself with the protection of life, liberty, and
property. 36
In his article, he examined at length 1868 congressional com-
mittee hearings, congressional debates, state legislatures’
debates and public reactions to the amendment via newspapers
and concludes, "Certainly that evidence, fairly, presented,
counts heavily against the theory of incorporation." 37 He
continued, "If it was understood in the legislatures that con-
sidered the proposed amendment, that its adoption would im-
pose upon the state governments the provisions of the federal
Bill of Rights, then almost certainly each legislature would
take note of what the effect would be upon the constitutional
38
lav? and practice of its own state." Fairman alludes to the
point that "incorporation", or forcing the states to abide by
federal standards spelled out in the Bill of Rights, would
certainly have been rejected by the states, especially Amend-
ment VII which requires jury trial in suits at common law ex-
ceeding twenty dollars.
A survey of debates where states considered the proposed
Fourteenth Amendment centered around ratification and not in-
36. Charles Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment In-
corporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding,"
Stanford Law Review
,
Vol. 2 (December, 1949), 8-9.
37. Ibid.
,
p. 81.
38.
Ibid.
,
p. 82
.
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corporation. Professor Fairraan concluded his lengthy arti-
cle by asserting, "In his [Black's] contention that Section I
was intended and understood to impose Amendment I to VIII upon
the states, the record of history is overwhelmingly against
40him." Black retorted that as a United States Senator, he
could better interpret what really was meant in the congres-
sional committee hearings and debates.
The Warren Court
The movement for racial equality in the 1950's provided
the force that made the judiciary see the importance of ex-
tending the scope of constitutional protection to all.
The Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice
Warren, quickly made its position on civil rights known to
41
the country in the famous 1954 Brown decision. Bernard
Schwartz assessed the impact of Brown on society as equal only
to a political revolution or a military conflict.^ Cushman
and Cushman stated of Brown
,
"It is doubtful if the Supreme
Court in its entire history has rendered a decision of greater
39 . Ibid
.
,
p . 83 . *
40. Ibid
.
,
p. 139.
41. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka , 347 U.S. 483
(1954)
42. Bernard Schwartz, "The Amendment in Operation: A
Historical Overview," The 14tn Amendment Centennial Volume, Edi-
ted by Bernard Schwartz ~CNew York: New York Press), p. 32.
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social and ideological significance than this." 4 " With a
sweeping decree, the Court held invalid the "separate but
equal" doctrine which had legalized racial discrimination for
over fifty years. Where the executive and legislative branch-
es had failed to act, the Court thrust itself into the fore-
front as the guardian and perpetrator of egalitarianism. The
"equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment was the
constitutional vehicle used to deliver this historic judgement,
not the due process clause. Chief Justice Warren in rendering
the unanimous decision declared,
We conclude that in the field of education the doc-
trine of separate but equal has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated for whom the actions have been
brought are, by reason of the segregation complain-
ed of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This dis-
position makes unnecessary any discussion whether
such segregation also violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 44
Even though the due process clause was not an issue,
Brown is mentioned because it was a result of the strongest
force in current constitutional development, the demand for
racial justice. 4 '* This force has also extended the idea of
43. Cushman and Cushman, p. 793.
44. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka , 347 U.S. 483
495 (1954)
45. Archibald Cox, The Warren Court, Consti tu tional De-
cision as an Instrument of Reform TCambridge, Massachusetts:
Tfarvard University Press, 1968 ) , p. 5.
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egalitarianism to cover a state's basic obligations to its
citizens. As a result, the Court has concerned itself with
the protection of personal liberties and privacy against gov-
ernment intrusions as well as significant reforms in criminal
procedures for federal and state courts. Thus, a vigorous
period of judical activism, revived after a period of twenty
years, had begun in 1953. The Warren Court, its defenders say,
spearheaded progress in civil rights, administration of cri-
minal justice, protection of individual liberty and strength-
46
ened and extended political democracy. By the time Chief
Justice Warren retired from the highest bench sixteen years
later, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had
been held to incorporate virtually all of the Bill of Rights.
The final say in civil liberties had been effectively trans-
ferred to the federal court system thereby causing a basic
institutional change--the expansion of federal judicial power
at the expense of the states.
The W arren Court was, of course, not without critics.
The members of the highest court have been criticized for er-
ratic subjectivity of judgment, analytical laxity, intellec-
tual incoherence, and imagining too much history. Opponents
of the Warren Court assert that the failure of society to a-
bide by the school desegregation decree of 1954 is an example
46 . Ibid
.
,
p.
4
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where judicial supremacy can not work in broad areas of social
policy. For the purpose of this study of students’ constitu-
tional rights, in spite of the criticism, the Warren Court is
most significant. It was this court's determination to ex-
pand the concept of egalitarianism which ultimately came to
include school students as well as other members of society.
It was also this court that made the individual liberties found
in the Bill of Rights a reality for all citizens.
By 1960, The Supreme Court had a majority of members who
either believed in the "selective incorporation" theory or who
would vote with the theory's proponents ir/cases involving
civil liberties. As a result, in decision after decison, the
Court made various aspects of the Bill of Rights applicable
to the States. The most important decisions are reviewed here
in chronological order.
The Expansion of Constitutional Rights in the 1960's
48In 1961 Mapp v. Ohio the Court held that evidence seized
in an illegal search could not be admissible in state court
proceedings. The State of Ohio had convicted Mrs. Mapp for
knowingly having had in her possession lewd and lascivious
47. Alexander M. Bickel
,
The Supreme Court and the Idea
of Progress (New York: Harper and Row, 1970T7 p.45.
48. 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
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books, pictures, and photographs. Police officers had osten-
sibly been seeking a person in connection with a recent bomb-
ing when they forcefully entered Mrs. Mapp's home without a
search warrant. During the course of the search, pornograph-
ic material was seized and used as evidence to convict the
defendant. The Supreme Court frowned upon such action by the
saying, "... T/Tj s to the Federal Government, the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments and, as to the States, the freedom from un-
conscionable invasions of privacy... do enjoy an 'intimate re-
lation' in their perpetuation of principles of humanity and
• • 49
civil liberty...." The Court went on to say:
Moreover, our holding that the exclusionary rule is
an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments is not only the logical dictate of prior
case, but it also makes very good sense. There is
no war between the Constitution and common sense.
Presently, a federal prosecutor may make no use of
evidence illegally seized, but a State's attorney
across the street may, although he supposedly is
operating under the enforcible prohibitions of the
same Amendments. Thus, the State, by admitting
evidence unlawfully seized, serves to encourage
disobedience to the Federal Constitution which it
is bound to uphold.
The problem of the double standard in criminal justice recog-
nized by the Court was to be solved by applying federal stand-
ards to the states. It is worth examining further the Court's
reasoning in Mapp . "Federal state cooperation in the solution
of crime under constitutional standards will be promoted, if
49. Ibid
.
,
p.657.
50. Ibid.
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only by recognition of their now mutual obligation to respect
the same fundamental criteria in their approaches." 51 Here,
the Court is convinced, in the essence of justice, all law
enforcement agencies should be bound to the same standards.
Finally, the importance of due process is stressed. "The ig-
noble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to
destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on
which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recogniz-
ed that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment
is enforcible against the States... it becomes enforcible in
\
the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secur-
ed by the Due Process Clause." 52
5 3Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963 dealt with the conviction
of a Florida indigent who was denied counsel by the state.
Florida statutes provided for a state-appointed attorney only
in capital offenses. Gideon, defending himself as best he
could, was convicted of a crime. Justice Black, the most vi-
gorous proponent of the "total incorporation" theory, deliv-
ered the opinion in Gideon . He said, " . .
.
Tr] eason and re-
flection require us to recognize that in our adversary system
of criminal justice, any person hauled into court, who is too
51. Ibid
.
,
p. 658.
52 . Ibid .
,
p. 660.
53. 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
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poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him. This seems to be an obvious
truth.
"
54
Rights and liberties considered by the Court to be fun-
damental would be protected by due process as they were out-
lined earlier in Palko v. Connecticut 5
5
the Court reasoned in
G ideon . Using the Palko formula, the Court determined the
right of counsel was deemed "fundamental" and therefore guar-
anteed to all citizens as a matter of due process of law.
The Court confirmed its belief by saying, "The right of one
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
56
ours. thereafter, the right of counsel bacame a protected
right of all citizens prescribed in Article VI of the United
States Constitution.
57In Malloy v. Hogan the Supreme Court incorporated the
self incrimination section of the Fifth Amendment through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The peti-
tioner had refused to testify in a Connecticut investigation
into alleged gambling activities for fear of self-incrimination.
54. Ibid
.
,
p. 344.
55. 302 U.S. 319 (1937)
56. Gideon v. Wainwriqht
,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
378 U.S. 1 (1964)57 .
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For his refusal he was sent to jail. Justice Brennan in de-
livering the opinion of the Court, applied the Fifth Amend-
ment to cover state proceedings. He said, "We hold that the
Fourteenth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
and that under the applicable federal standard, the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court of Errors erred in holding that the privi-
lege was not properly invoked." 58
The number of rights found in the Constitution continued
to bo nationalized as the decade progressed. Nineteen sixty-
five saw the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment which allows
the accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
Pointer was arrested on a charge of robbery in Texas. Before
the trial took place the only witness against him moved and a
transcript of the account was submitted in. lieu of a personal
appearance. Pointer claimed he was being denied the right to
59confront a witness against him. The Court agreed and speak-
ing through Justice Black again, stated: "We hold today that
the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the wit-
nesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is
made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment." 50
The Court went further in its reasoning, "The fact that this
right appears in the Sixth Amendment of our Bill of Rights re-
58. Ibid
.
,
p. 3
.
59. Pointer v. Texas
,
380 U.S. 400 (1965)
60.
Ibid
.
,
p. 403.
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fleets the belief of the framers of those liberties and safe-
guards that confrontation was a fundamental right essential
to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution." 61 Here Justice
Black indicates the framers had intended this Sixth Amendment
right to be enjoyed by all. As earlier noted, this point is
historically debatable, nevertheless, federal standards in the
Sixth Amendment became applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Another landmark decision in 1965 was Griswo ld v. Connec-
6 2ticut. The case was taken on appeal from the Supreme Court
of Errors of Connecticut over the conviction of the Executive
of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut for
promoting birth control in Connecticut.
The General Statutes of Connecticut, 53-32 and 54-96
stated
:
Any person who uses any drug, medical article or in-
strument for the purpose of preventing conception
shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or im-
prisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one
year or be both fined and imprisoned.
Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes,
hires or commands another to commit any offense
may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the
principal offender.
In overturning the conviction and declaring the Connecti-
cut statutes unconstitutional on the grounds it violated the
First Amendment to the Constitution, the Supreme Court estab-
61. Ibid
.
,
p. 404.
62. 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
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lished the concept that, "The First Amendment has a penumbra
V7here privacy is protected from governmental intrusion."
63
The "penumbra doctrine" creates various zones of privacy a-
round the right of association. Webster defines the word
penumbra as "a surrounding or adjoining region in which some-
thing exists in a lesser degree." Griswold contends that the
right of association, although not mentioned in the First
Amendment, is a First Amendment right. Speaking for the Su-
preme Court, Justice Douglas delivered the opinion stating:
The right of 'association' like the right of belief|_Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 1 is
more than the right to attend a meeting; it in-
cludes the right to express one's attitudes or philo-
sophies by membership in a group or by affiliation
with it or by other lawful means. Association in
that context is a form of expression of opinion:
and while it is not expressly included in the First
Amendment its existence is necessary.^
The Supreme Court, in, fact, made privacy a "fundament-
al" right protected by the United States Constitution. The
Court in Griswold further elaborated upon the zones of pri-
vacy created by the "penumbra doctrine" in respect to other
constitutional rights of citizens.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The
right of association contained in the penumbra of
the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The
Third Amendment in its prohibition against quarter-
ing of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace
without the consent of the owner is another facet
63. Ibid
.
,
p.483.
64. Ibid.
4.1
of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitlyaffirms the right of the people to be secure in
Y
heir person, houses, papers, and effects againstunreasonable searchers and seizures. The'Fifth
Snd^Y W™ Ch ^overnmen t may not force him to sur-ren er. The enumeration in the Constitution, ofcertain rights, shall not be construed to deny ordisparage others retained by the people
Two years later in 1967, a North Carolina legal proce-
dure brought a challenge to another Sixth Amendment right,
that of a speedy trial. In the resulting case, Klopfer v.
North Carolina
,
66
the court held unconstitutional a state
procedure known as nolle prosequi
.
which allowed a prosecu-
tor to discharge a defendant and at some future day to be de-
termined by him, restore the case to the court docket. Klopf-
er, a zoology professor at Duke University had refused to
leave a restaurant when ordered. A trespassing charge result-
ed. Instead of being tried, Klopfer' s case was postponed
for eighteen months under nolle prosegui
. He tried to bring
his case to court but to no avail. The charges against him
restricted his travel and professional activities to the point
of being burdensome. Klopfer sought relief claiming that
prosequi denied him his constitutional right to a speedy
trial
.
The Supreme Court agreed, declaring that, "We hold here
that the right to a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of
65. Ibid.
66. 386 U.S. 213 (1967)
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the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment^ That right has its
roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage. 68
The Court concluded that, "History has established that it is
one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution." 69
In concurring in the IClopfer case, Justice Harlan remind-
ed the court, "I am unable to subscribe to the constitutional
premises upon which that result is based—quite evidently the
viewpoint that the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates" or "ab-
sorbs" as such all or some of the specific provisions of the
Bill of Rights." 70 He also went on to say that, "I do not
believe that this is sound constitutional doctrine." 7 ^ Even
though Justice Harlan was against the "incorporation" theory,
his concurrence in the decision helped make it a reality in
constitutional law. Incorporation of the Bill of Rights ad-
vocated by Justice Black twenty years earlier in Adamson was
being accomplished on a case by case basis.
72In Duncan v. Louisiana
,
the Supreme Court reviewed
its previous decisions that had dramatically increased the
scope of an individual's rights and liberties.
67. Ibid
. ,
p
.
223.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid
. ,
p. 226.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid
.
72. 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
43
The Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of
for guidance
;
many of the rights guaranteed
by the first eight amendments to the Constitution
have been held to be protected against state action
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. That clause now protects the rights to compen-
sation for property taken by the State; the rights
°f free from unreasonable searches and seizures and
to have excluded from criminal trials any evidence
illegally seized; the right guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to be free of compelled self-incrimination;
and the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, to a
speedy and public trial, to confrontation of oppos-
ing witnesses and to compulsory process for obtain-
ing witnesses. 1 ^
Duncan expanded the scope of nationalization of the Bill
of Rights by including the right to a jury trial. Duncan, a
black youth of nineteen, was found guilty of simple battery
and sentenced to serve sixty days in prison and was fined
$150. He was denied a jury trial in the State of Louisiana
wherein statutes provided for a jury trial only in capital
offenses or where imprisonment at hard labor could result. The
Court overturned Duncan's conviction stating, " . .
.
[b_ ecause we
believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to
the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal
cases which--were they to be tried in a federal court would
75
come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee."
73. Ibid
.
,
p. 148.
74. Witnesses testified that Duncan, a Negro, and his
two cousins, during a confrontation with four white youths,
allegedly slapped one of the white boys on the elbow which
resulted in his sentence by a Louisiana judge.
75. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)
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Summary
The Supreme Court in the Twentieth Century gradually
expanded the Bill of Rights to cover actions by the states.
This has been accomplished through a broader interpretation
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether
or not the framers of the Amendment intended it to be expand-
ed to "incorporate" the Bill of Rights is an academic argument
since that is what has occurred. The Warren Court in particu-
lar made many of the federal standards found in the Bill of
Rights applicable to the states in criminal proceedings.
The reason that the Bill of Rights has been expanded to
cover state actions is because the Supreme Court has interpre-
ted various cases in such a way to guarantee all citizens
fundamental fairness and due process of law. The insistence
by the Supreme Court that all individuals
,
non-adult as well
as adult, be accorded due process of law has led to the growth
of constitutional rights for public school pupils, the sub-
ject of Chapter Three <,
CHAPTER III
THE EVOLUTION OF STUDENT
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Societal Pressures and the Public Schools Today
Until quite recently discretion over pupil control was
very broad. Questions were raised by courts only where a
board's discretion did not meet the test of reasonableness.
The reasonableness of a rule was determined by the facts in
each case and the courts traditionally were reluctant to sub-
stitute their wisdom for a school board’s. Furthermore, the
courts never explored to see if the particular rule in ques-
tion performed a proper educational function. Finally, judg-
es tended to agree with the view of most school boards that a
definite threat to the educational process existed if all
their rules were not upheld.'*'
However, with the growth and expansion of due process
the courts today are increasingly called upon to act as arbi-
ters of disputes between students and school administrators.
The insistence by the courts that students should be accorded
a measure of due process in their relationships with schools
has provided the legal framework for judicial involvement in
these disputes. In addition, social forces acting upon the
schools have also contributed immensely to this increased in-
1. Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro, 212 N.E.
2d 468 (1965)
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volvement
.
Schools by and large have traditionally derived their au-
thority to administer control over students from a number of
sources.
2 Of primary importance is the very fact that parents
of school pupils have quite willingly sanctioned school con-
trol over their children while in school. Equally important
has been the fact that the pupils themselves have acquiesed
to the authority over them in the educational institutions they
attend. Furthermore, a school, as an agent of the state, is
backed by a legislative mandate. To put it quite succinctly,
A state school is an arm of the state, performing a public
function, exercising discretion committed to it by the legis-
lature, and regulating citizens affected by its activities by
means of combined governmental functions. 3 Legislative enact-
ments as a source of school authority can best be seen through
a typical school board enabling act.
The board shall make rules for its own government
and that of the directors, officers, teachers, and
pupils, and for the care of the schooihouse, grounds
and property of the school corporation, and aid in
the enforcement of the same, and require the per-
formance of duties by said persons imposed by law
and the rules. 4
2. Stephen R. Goldstein, “Reflections on Developing Trends
in the Law of Student Rights," University of Pennsylvania Law
Review
,
vol. 118 (February, 1970T] 613-614
.
3. Douglas Wilson, "The Emerging Law of Students' Rights,"
Arkansas Law Review
,
vol. 23 (Winter, 1970), 622.
4. Iowa Code 279.8 (1966)
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Still another source of school authority is the accepted
status of the teacher acting in a quasi- judicial capacity to
control students and to administer punishment in the mainten-
ance of order. Students who violate school rules have been
subjected to immediate punishment as proscribed by the teach-
ers. Finally, one of the most important sources of school
board authority has arisen out of the concept of
_in loco pa-
rentis
. Briefly, in loco parentis is an extension of the idea
of the state as parens patriae--the state succeeding to the
duties of the parent whenever the later is unable to attend
to them. 6
The courts obviously have had to modify and revise this
concept over the years. For example, schools can not render
medical assistance or teach religion to public school pupils.
Recently in the area of control of pupils, in loco parentis
has been challenged with increased vigor by dissatisfied stu-
dents. The basic problem of the concept centers around the
technical difficulties created by judicial interpretations of
the definition and the conflict between parents and teachers
over disciplinary approaches of teachers. 6 To put it more
bluntly, _in loco paren tis breaks down when pupils violate
school rules with parental permission. The "long hair" con-
5. Arnold Taylor, "With Temperate Rod: Maintaining
Academic Order in Secondary Schools," Kentucky Law Journal,
vo 1 . 58 (1969-1970)
6. Taylor, p. 619.
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troversy in the public schools is a case in point. Backed by
parents, students challenging in loco parentis in court, point
out that by requiring short hair in school, long hair can not
be worn once the student is again under the custody of the
parent. Thus, bn loco parentis is seen more and more as a
means to control pupil behavior merely for control's sake. In
l.°£P. parentis is being replaced by a more fundamental concept,
that of due process of law.
Today rules and regulations promulgated by schools for
controlling pupils are being judged by the courts on the grounds
of fundamental fairness. Since due process guarantees protec-
tion of the individual from governmental intrusion, then it
also would hold that the same constitutional concept protects
the individual from the state's agents, the school and its
7personnel
.
The change from the traditional sources of school author-
ity over pupils to the emerging concept of due process is a
complex one requiring an examination of the forces that have
influenced this change. There is a strong strain of auto-
Q
cracy in the American public schools atributable to two factors.
7. H. C. Hudgins, Jr., "The Discipline of Secondary Stu-
dents and Procedural Due Process: A Standard," Wake Forest Law
Review, vol. 7 (December, 1970), 35.
8. Edward T. Ladd, "Allegedly Disruptive Student Behavior
and the Legal Authority of School Officials," Journal of Public
Law
,
vol. 19 (1970), 218.
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First, there is the tradition of autocratic treatment of stu-
dents arising from New England Puritanism. Such ideas as
blind obedience to one's elders, a "middle-class" idealism that
inhibits nonconformity, and discipline for discipline's sake,
stems directly from the Protestant Ethic. Near absolute auth-
oritY i- n the public schools was therefore necessary to instil
these ideals. Secondly, there is a natural tendency of school
officials to dominate those over whose admission to the school
they have no say but for whose behavior they are held respon-
sible. Control for the maintenance of order became deeply in-
grained in educational administration.
Public school students now challenge the authoritarian
structure of educational institutions for a number of reasons.
In the broadest sense, resistance to school authority comes
from "Man's inner drive to achieve full re-cognition of his
9
rights and freedoms." The United States Office of Education
reports the major issues of student concern are: 1. Dehumani-
zation of institutional life. 2. Inequities in society. 3.
Educational irrelevancies . 4. Racial and cultural discrimina-
tion.^ Because of student concern for these issues, violence
has sometimes errupted in and around educational institutions.
9. Dale Gaddy, "Rights and Freedoms of Public School
Students: Directions from the 1960's," N. 0. L. P. E. Mono -
graph Serie s, No. 2 (1971), 1.
10. Robert E. Phay, "Suspensions and Expulsions of Pub-
lic School Students," N. O. L. P. E. Monograph Series No. 3
(1971), 1.
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The threat of disruptions and violence has prompted many edu-
cators to view the necessity for maintaining their authority
to control pupils more essential than ever.
A number of basic incidents leading to disruption of the
educational process have been identified and categorized as
the following: a. Violence arising out of racial conflicts,
b. Disruptions following political protests. c. Resentment
over dress regulations. d. Objections by students to disci-
plinary actions toward other students. e. Questioning of edu-
cational policy. 11
Others point out that educational violence is caused more
specifically in the public schools from:
!• A permissive society in which persons adopt the atti-
tude that they will obey those laws they like and ig-
nore those they do not like.
2. Substandard schools, oftentimes in the very areas
where the best teachers and facilities are needed.
3. Untrained and unqualified administrators who are un-
able to cope with such subjects as mob psychology
and guerrilla tactics.
4. Highly educated teenagers with time on their hands
and a high degree of social consciousness and impa-
tience with the slow progress in solving problems.
11 . Ibid.
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5. Professional trouble-makers who create disruptions.
6. Increasingly militant teachers who side with students.12
School officials who have sought to stand by the tradition-
al attitudes toward control over students have thus found them-
selves involved in an increasing number of legal controversies.
Courts today, particularly the federal courts, now are willing
to intervene to reverse or enjoin disciplinary actions involv-
ing public school pupils where one of the following conditions
exist. First, if there is a deprival of due process, that is,
fundamental concepts of fair play. Secondly, if there is evi-
dence of invidious discrimination, for example on account of
race or religion. Thirdly, if there exists a denial of fed-
eral rights, constitutional or statutory, protected in the aca-
demic community. Finally, if the schools exhibit clearly un-
reasonable, arbitrary, or capricious action. 13
Because of the courts' willingness to intervene in areas
heretofore reserved to the discretion of school officials, a
new body of constitutional law has emerged from their subse-
quent decisions-- the law of student constitutional rights, which
is a study in the expansion of the concept due process to in-
clude public school pupils. Through the Supreme Court's deter-
mination to expand the scope of constitutional protection to
all, public school pupils inevitably became recipients of that
12. Gaddy, p. 2.
13. "A Judicial Document of Student Discipline," Educa -
tional Record
,
vol. 50 (Winter, 1969), p. 15.
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protection. Legal scholars now assert that, "We are beyond
the point of no return in guaranteeing the applicability of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights to all, re-
gardless of age or status." 14
The vehicle used to expand constitutional protection to
public school pupils, as well as to a greater number of citi-
zens m our society, has been the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as seen in Chapter Two. Robert E. Phay
m his work S^ension and Expulsion of Public School Students
suggests that, "The main assault against school limitations is
application of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment . " The study of this new incohate body of constitution-
al law is a study of the process of replacing the archaic ideas
of school authority, especially in loco parentis
, with the
emerging concept of due process of law. The process by which
this has come about can be perceived through a case study of
the major decisions affecting the law of students' rights.
Past Judicial Attitude Toward Student Suits
Until recently public school pupils seeking judicial re-
lief from school abuses had little or no chance of successful
litigation. The legal status of student suits that challenged
14. Michael C. Abbott, "Due Process and Secondary School
Dismissals," Case Western Reserve Lav; Review, vol. 20 (Febru-
ary, 1969), p. *380.
15. Phay, p. 4.
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rules, regulations, and administrative procedures was best sum-
med up by Lee 0. Garber and Newton Edwards in the Law Governing
Pupils. The authors point out, “It is well established by many
court decisions that school boards have authority to make and
enforce any reasonable rules governing the conduct of pupils.
The reasonableness of a board rule will be determined by the
facts in each particular case. In determining the reasonable-
ness of a rule, a court will not substitute its own discretion
for that of the board; the enforcement of the rule will not be
enjoined unless the rule is clearly unreasonable. The
authors also stated that, "A board of education may discipline
a pupil for misbehavior wherever committed provided it direct-
ly affects school discipline and is calculated to impair its
efficiency." Finally, in respect to any rights the students
might have, "Unless the statute requires it, it is not neces-
sary to give the pupil notice of his suspension or a hearing
before excluding him from school." 18
The extent to which school rules were upheld by the courts
1 Qcan be seen in Pugsley v. Sellrneyer
. Miss Pugsley, an 18
16. Lee 0. Garber and Newton Edwards, The Law Governing
Pupils (Danville: Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc.,
1962 ) , p. 7.
17 . Ibid
.
,
p . 8
.
18 . Ibid
.
,
p . 9
19. 250 S.W. 539 (1923)
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year old high school student, was suspended from school be-
cause she wore talcum powder on her face. Citing the school
board rule, "The wearing of transparent hosiery, low-necked
dresses or any style of clothing tending toward immodesty in
dress, or the use of face paint or cosmetics, is prohibited,"
the principal refused to readmit Miss Pugsley until she re-
moved the powder. A lower Arkansas Court held the particular
school rule unreasonable and arbitrary. However, upon appeal
to the Arkansas Supreme Court, the lower court's decision was
overturned
.
The higher court refused to consider the substance of the
school rule or whether it performed any educational function.
Instead, the Court decided, "The question, therefore, is not
whether we approve this rule as one we would have made as di-
rectors of the district, nor are we required to find whether
it was essential to the maintenance of discipline. On the
contrary, we must uphold the rule unless we find that the di-
rectors have clearly abused their discretion, and that the
rule is not one reasonably calculated to effect the purpose in-
tended, that is, of promoting discipline in the school, and we
do so find."^
Two key points are important in considering the Court's
reasoning in this case. First, the interpretation of what de-
termines a clear abuse of discretion by the court indicates
20. Ibid
.
,
p. 539.
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they would frown upon only major acts of unreasonable, arbi-
trary and capricious rule making. Secondly, and equally im-
portant, is the Court's view that any rules promoting disci-
within the school should be upheld by the courts. Ob-
viously, almost any rule can be justified by school officials
on the grounds it promotes discipline, for most likely that
would be its original intent anyway. These points are signi-
ficant in reviewing subsequent cases.
The Pugs ley decision went further in explaining the judi-
cial philosophy at the time by pointing out that, "Courts
have other and more important functions to perform than that
of hearing the complaints of disaffected pupils of the public
schools against rules and regulations promulgated by the school
boards for the government of the schools." The judiciary's
reluctance to usurp the prerogatives of school officials is
most evident as they concluded "...that the courts hesitate to
substitute their will and judgment for that of the school
boards' which are delegated by law as the agencies to prescribe
rules for the government of the public schools of the state,
22
which are supported at the public expense."
As late as 1965, the judicial position on school rules
and regulations remained basically consistent with previous de-
21. Ibid.
22 . Ibid.
55
cisions. In Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro 23 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to consider
the validity of a school committee rule requiring male students
to wear short haircuts. The plaintiff contended such a rule
was unreasonable and arbitrary since it was in no way connect-
ed with the successful operation of a public school. The
Court rejected this notion stating, "The Court's function in
reviewing this type of ruling is limited in the light of the
broad discretionary powers which the law confers upon a school
committee. Je will not pass upon the wisdom or desirability
of a school regulation ." 2 ^ The Court went on to suggest that
any unusual hair style could disrupt and impede the mainten-
ance of a proper classroom atmosphere or decorum and conspicu-
ous departures from generally accepted customs in the matter
of haircuts could result in the distraction of other pupils. 25
This mode of judicial philosophy mentioned earlier by
Garber and Edwards began to change by the middle nineteen-
sixties. At this time forces undermining this philosophy be-
came so pervasive the courts were compelled to examine school
rules from a substantive point of view. As a result of judi-
cial intervention, rules, regulations and decisions slowly
became to require the rudimentary elements of fair play— that
23. 212 N.E. 2d 468 (1965)
24. Ibid
.
,
p. 472.
25. Ibid.
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of due process of law. As seen in Chapter II of this study
the expansion of the concept of due process of law which in-
corporated the Bill of Rights to prevent state governmental in-
trusion on these rights was a slow, step by step process. Ci-
tizens heretofore denied basic constitutional protection gra-
dually gained the fuller protection of the United States Con-
stitution. The process by which public school pupils also
have gained a measure of constitutional guarantees through the
idea of due process is closely analagous to the broader expan-
sion of due process to all. The Courts gradually recognized
the need for school rules to possess the fundamentals of fair
play, of due process of law. It was accomplished by using the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a vehicle to
broaden the scope of constitutional protection to include pub-
lic school pupils. This process can best be seen by examining
the most significant court decisions involving student legal
controversies in chronological order.
Landmark Student Suits 1923-1961
Meyer v. State of Nebraska, decided in 1923, has signifi-
cance for study because the Supreme Court in this decision
struck down a state statute forbidding the teaching of a for-
eign language to children below the ninth grade, on the grounds
it deprived citizens of their "liberty" without due process of
2 6law found in the Fourteenth Amendment. When a teacher was
26. 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923)
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prosecuted for teaching German in the eighth grade and the
Nebraska's Supreme Court ruled the statute a valid exercise of
the state's police powers, the teacher appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States for relief. In declaring the Ne-
braska law unconstitutional, the Supreme Court summed up its
reasoning by stating, "We are constrained to conclude that the
statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable rela-
tion to any end within the competency of the state. This
type of thinking, however, was not applied to lesser policies
and rules made by agents of the state, the school boards.
Another important school case came to the Supreme Court
in Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education
,
1942.
The Barnette decision struck down a West Virgina statute re-
quiring all public school pupils to salute the American flag.
Children who were Jehovah's Witnesses refused to salute the
flag in accordance with their religious beliefs and were ex-
pelled from school. Seeking readmission, the plaintiffs con-
tended, "...PTjhat the regulation amount 34. to a denial of re-
ligious liberty and [_wasd violative of rights which the First
Amendment to the Federal Constitution protects against impair-
ment by the federal government and which the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects against impairment by the States." The Court
agreed with the students reasoning, "To justify the overriding
27. Ibid
.
,
p. 628.
28. 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
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of religious scruples, however, there must be a clear justifi-
cation therefore in the necessities of national or community
life. Like the right of free speech, it is not to be over-
borne by the police power, unless its exercise presents a
clear and present danger to the community." 29 The Court went
on,
The salute to the flag is an expression of the hom-
age of the soul. To force it upon one who has con-
scientious scruples against giving it is petty ty-
ranny unworthy of the spirit of this Republic and
forbidden, we think by the fundamental law. This
Court will not countenance such tyranny but will use
the power at its command to see that rights guaran-
teed by the fundamental law are respected. 30
This case is clearly the first major victory for students'
constitutional rights. Also, the vehicle used to extend the
constitutional right of freedom of religion found in the First
Amendment to public school pupils was the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, Barnette did not have
a significant impact on broader aspects of students' constitu-
tional rights because the case was limited only to the issue
of religion.
31The landmark Brown decision has had a tremendous impact
on the constitutional rights of public school pupils even
though the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
not used in the ruling. Instead, the Supreme Court applied
29. Ibid
. t p Q 626
•
30. Ibid
.
,
p. 630.
31. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
,
Kansas
,
349
U.S. 294 (1954)
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the equal protection of the laws clause found in the Fourteen-
the Amendment to the Constitution to declare racial discrimina-
tion unconstitutional. What is significant, with respect to
the subject of students’ rights, is the overwhelming emphasis
placed by the Court on education. Chief Justice Warren,
speaking for the Court, asserted,
Today, education is perhaps the most important func-
tion of the state and local governments. Comoulsory
school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of
the importance of education to our democratic so-
ciety. It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in
the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in prepar-
ing him for later professional training, and helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. 32
Courts considering subsequent cases in the field of education
now have a precedent for viewing them in a more important light.
Anything thereafter, that might inder or dgny a child the op-
portunity to an education, would be a serious question before
the courts.
Bolling v. Sharpe
,
1954, decided on the same day as Brown
provides insight into the Supreme Court's rationale for later
expanding the due process of law concept to the field of pub-
lic education. The essential facts in Bolling centered around
the refusal of school officials to allow Negro children admit-
32 . Ibid
.
,
p. 493 .
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tance to a white segregated school in the District of Columbia.
Since federal laws apply in the District of Columbia, the
plaintiffs contended their Fifth Amendment rights of life li-
berty and property were being denied without due process of
33law. j.he plaintiffs in Brown
,
as mentioned, were successful
in their litigation through the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Since there is no equal protection of
the laws clause in the Fifth Amendment and the District of
Columbia was under federal jurisdiction, relief was sought
through the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The
Supreme Court, noting the difference between Brown and Bolling
,
considered the issue.
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, does not contain an equal protec-
tion clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which
applies only to the state. But the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclu-
sive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a more
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than
"due process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply
that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But
as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be
so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.
The Court in Bolling
,
thus, went on to declare school se-
gregation unconstitutional in the District of Columbia because
it denied the students attending racially segregated schools
due process of law.
34
33.
34
.
347 U.S. 497 (1954)
Ibid
.
,
p. 499.
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Of particular importance to the concept of student con-
stitutional rights was the declaration that, "The right of a
student not to be segregated on racial grounds in schools so
maintained is indeed so fundamental and pervasive that it is
embraced in the concept of due process." 35 The Supreme Court
made this declaration in a 1958 desegregation controversy in-
volving Little Rock, Arkansas. By stating that segregation in
a public school was a denial of a "fundamental" right, the
Supreme Court established a precedent where alleged violations
of any "fundamental" right might be taken to court.
The Brown^ Bolling
,
and Cooper decisions involved racial
segregation and discrimination and paved the way for a host of
suits where racial questions were raised. Racial questions
have centered essentially around the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the topic of this study. How
ever, these three decisions did provide a broad judicial frame
work for student suits to be considered under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brown emphasized the im-
portance of education for all, Bolling applied the concept of
due process of law in the public schools, and Cooper declared
segregation to be a violation of a fundamental right. All, as
mentioned, helped significantly to open the doors to litiga-
tion of "fundamental" rights that might be denied to students
as a matter of due process of law.
35. Cooper v. Aaron
,
358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958)
62
The Courts came to grips with the question of due process
regarding college student disciplinary action in 1961, with
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education
.
36
Six Negroes who
were involved in repeated civil rights demonstrations in Ala-
bama, were expelled from the State University without formal
charges or the chance to have a hearing. Dixon
.
considered by
many legal scholars as a major landmark decision paving the
way for students' constitutional rights, established the pre-
cedent that the fundamental right of procedural due process
found in the Fifth Amendment should be afforded college stu-
dents in tax-supported institutions prior to expulsion for mis-
conduct.
Deciding in favor of the six civil rightists, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of due pro-
cess of law, "Whenever a governmental body acts so as to in-
jure an individual, the Constitution requires that the act be
3 7consonant with due process of law." The Court reminded the
school officials by not giving the accused students notice of
the charges against them or the opportunity to be heard, vio-
38lated one of our "fundamental principles of fairness." They
made the distinction between student disciplinary problems and
criminal due process by pointing out that, "This is not to im-
36. 294 F. 2d 150 (1961)
3 7 . Ibid
.
,
p . 155.
38. Ibid
.
,
p. 157.
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Ply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to
cross-examine witnesses, is required." 39 Finally, Dixon
spelled out specific requirements that would meet the test of
procedural due process in future disciplinary actions against
college students. These requirements set forth by the Court
will be examined later in this study.
As students began to raise constitutional issues before
the courts in the nineteen-sixties, the problem of jurisdiction
became increasingly difficult. Traditionally, a federal court
would accept jurisdiction in student disputes only where a
constitutional issue was at hand or judicial relief had been
exhausted in state courts. Once the Supreme Court expanded
the scope of "fundamental freedoms" through the Fourteenth
Amendment, the federal courts were forced to accept controver-
sies where constitutional rights were being denied by state ac-
tion
.
Landmark Student Suits 1961-1969
The most significant cases thus far to be considered in
this study paving the way for public school pupils' constitu-
tional rights were decided by the Fifth Circuit Court on July
21, 1966. Burnside v. Byars4 °and Blackwell v. Issaquena County
39. Ibid.
40. 363 F. 2d 744 ( 1966 )
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Board of Education41 do, for the first time, extend to high
school students the constitutional rights to freedom of speech.
Both decisions centered about expulsion of students who per-
sisted in wearing "Freedom Buttons" in violation of school
rules. The students alleged their First Amendment right to
freedom of speech was being denied them for want of due pro-
cess of law found in the Fourteenth Amendment. Blackwell up-
held the suspensions because the students involved were caus-
ing suostantial disruption to the school. Burnside, on the
other hand, disallowed the suspensions for in their exercise
of free expression, the students did not disrupt the education-
al process.
Aside from the Barnette decision, Burnside is the first
major successful litigation of public school pupils against an
educational institution involving First Amendment rights. Just
. 42
as the Gi tlow decision in 1925 paved the way for future incor-
poration of the constitutional right of free speech to adult
citizens, Burnside extended this same First Amendment right to
public school pupils. To quote the Court: "The interest of
the state in maintaining an educational system is a compelling
one, giving rise to a balancing of First Amendment rights with
the duty of the state to further and protect the public school
41. 363 F. 2d 749 (1966)
42. Gitlow v. New York
,
268 U.S. 652 (1925)
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system .
"
The Fifth Circuit Court went on to declare the right of
free speech to be a constitutional right of high school pupils
saying
,
"They cannot infringe on their students' right to free
and unrestricted expression as guaranteed to them under the
First Amendment to the Constitution, where the exercise of
such rights in the school buildings and schoolrooms do not
materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
°f appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.
The limitations imposed on the right of a school pupil to free
speech outlined in the Blackwell and Burnside decisions will
be discussed in detail in a later section of this study.
One year later the Supreme Court considered the problem
of minors as non-citizens without constitutional rights in
45Re Gault
,
1967. Gerald Gault, age 15, had been on proba-
tion for six months when he and another boy made an obscene
phone call and were subsequently caught. After a hearing,
Gault was ordered confined to the State Industrial School in
Arizona for the period of his minority. The decision resulted
in a six-year sentence in the reformatory. The decision was
taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. Gault, be-
cause he was a minor, alleged he had been denied the basic
43. Burnside v. Byars
,
363 F. 2d 744, 748 (1966)
44. Ibid
.
,
p. 749.
45. 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
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rights of: notice of charges, right to counsel, right to con-
frontation and cross-examination, privilege against self-in-
crimination, the right to a transcript of the proceedings, and
the right to appellate review.
In overturning Gerald Gault's confinement order, the Su-
preme Court, in a most important pronouncement, declared
"Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for
46adults alone." The reasons the Supreme Court used in adjudi-
cating Ga_u]_t are important when considering constitutional
rights of public school pupils. By stating that Gerald Gault,
a minor of 15, had constitutional rights guaranteed by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the door was now
open to the expansion and elaboration of constitutional rights
through subsequent court decisions. The Court in Gault contin-
ued, "If a child is delinquent— the State may intervene. In
doing so it does not deprive the child of any rights, because
he has none. It merely provides the custody to which the child
47is entitled."
The Court also questioned the Juvenile Court system by
stating.
Juvenile court history has ... demons trated that unbri-
dled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is
frequently a poor substitute for principle and has
not always produced fair, efficient, and effective
procedures. Departure from established principles
46 . Ibid
.
,
p
.
47. Ibid.
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of due process have frequently resulted not in an
enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness.^®
As far as a juvenile is concerned, the Court said, "
. .
.
[t] he
essentials of due process may be more impressive than thera-
49
peutic. The same logic is being applied by the courts as
they consider school disciplinary policies today.
The essence of Gault rested on the dichotomy between jus-
tice for an adult and justice for a minor. In Arizona, for
example, an adult's maximum punishment would have been a fine
of five to fifty dollars or imprisonment for not more than two
months. Instead, Gault, a minor, received a six year sentence.
Also, defendants over the age of 18 would have federal consti-
tutional protection and Arizona constitutional and legal rights.
The Gault decision is most significant to this study of
students' constitutional rights for a number of reasons. First,
the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States announced
that constitutional rights were "not for adults alone," expands
constitutional protection to non-adults. This also strengthen-
ed the Fifth Circuit Court's ruling in Burnside which granted
freedom of speech rights to high school pupils. Secondly,
the Supreme Court reminded the State that it can no longer treat
minors arbitrarily however benevolently the State's intentions
are. This same reasoning applied to Gault in dealing with the
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
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Juvenile Courts could thereafter be applied to another agent
of the state acting as parens patriae , the public school sys-
tem. Thirdly, the decision paved the way for the Supreme
Court to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee public
school pupils a measure of constitutional protection.
In 1969 the most significant court decision to date in
the area of student constitutional rights was handed down by
50the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in this important case
first declared that, "First Amendment rights, applied in light
of the special characteristics of the school environment, are
available to teachers and students." 51 Justice Fortas, in de-
livering the opinion stated, "It can hardly be argued that ei-
ther students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 52
In holding that students have the constitutional right to free
speech and expression the court decided that the wearing of
armbands by public school pupils was a lawful exercise of the
right to free expression in school. The court reasoned, "In
order for the State in the person of school officials to justi-
fy prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must
be able to show that its action was caused by something more
50. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, 89 S. Ct. 733 ( 1969 )'
51 . Ibid
.
,
p. 736
.
52.
Ibid.
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than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint
The burden of showing material and substantial interfer-
ence with the educational process before denial of freedom of
speech or expression could be curtailed was placed on the
school officials in Tinker
. The boundaries of the Tinker de-
cision will be discussed in detail later in this study, but
the important thing to note here is that public school pupils
had been granted the First Amendment right of freedom of speech
bY the Supreme Court of the United States. As in previous de-
cisions, again the importance of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was evident, for it is used to expand the
scope of constitutional protection to persons heretofore not
covered by that protection, pubic school pupils.
SUMMARY
From Barnette
.
where the Supreme Court declared public
school pupils have First Amendment rights to the free exercise
of religion, to Dixon
,
where procedural due process rights
were granted to college students, to a federal court ruling in
Burnside
,
allowing high school students free expression, to
the Supreme Court's notion that constitutional rights "were
not for adults alone" in Gault
,
finally to the Tinker decision
which expanded constitutional protection to public school pu-
53. Ibid
.
,
p. 738.
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Pi 1 s by the SuPrerne Court, can be seen an evolutionary process
of the development of fundamental fairness or due process of
law for students. The process by which public school pupils
have gained a measure of constitutional protection is thus
closely analagous to the broader expansion of constitutional
rights to all citizens. Once the Supreme Court confirmed the
principle that constitutional rights should be afforded to pub-
lic school students, the inevitable began to occur. Courts,
through a broader interpretation of the concept of due process
of law found in the Fourteenth Amendment, began to extend
other constitutional rights in the Bill of Rights to public
school pupils just as the courts had done for adult citizens
as indicated in Chapter Two.
The major court decisions defining the boundaries and
scope of public school pupils' constitutional rights in the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Amend-
ments, as well as the judicial reasoning for their decisions,
will be the topics for subsequent chapters in this study. The
most significant area of student constitutional rights, that
of free expression in the First Amendment, will be examined
first.
CHAPTER I V
FREE EXPRESSION AS A STUDENT FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT
Symbolic Speech
There is no question today that public school pupils
have the First Amendment right of freedom of speech.
1
>
ss seen in the previous chapter, afforded students
this right. The task of the Courts today is to determine
the scope and boundaries of student First Amendment rights.
Interestingly enough, student suits alleging a violation of
freedom of speech have not involved speech per se but sym-
bolic acts of "expression" such as; armbands, buttons,
dress, hair and flag saluting. The Supreme Court has repeat-
edly held, that non-speech activities closely akin to "pure
speech" are entitled to comprehensive protection under the
2First Amendment. The systematic expansion of free speech
to cover non-speech activities can be seen in a number of
recent Supreme Court decisions.
In 1940, the right to picket became a constitutionally
3protected act of freedom of speech in Thornhill v. Alabama .
During a labor dispute, the constitutionality of an Alabama
law was challenged. The law stated:
1 . Tinker v . Des Moines Independent Community School
District . ' 89 S.Ct. 733“ll969)
2 . Ibid
.
,
p. 736
.
3. 310 U.S. 89 (1940)
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Loitering or picketing forbidden. Any person orpersons, who without a just cause or leJS ScS.
or'SfSV'S near t0 °r loiter about the premisesP business of any other person firmcorporation, or association of people eAaaaed’in
intent
U
to
bi^r S ' f°r the P-poIefor»nfluencing, or inducing other persons
dealinas
r
with
Wlth
'h
bUy f
T°
ra
'
Sel1 to
'
have bus inessg , or be employed by such persons firmcorporation, or associations of persons for the
’
purpose of hindering, delaying, or interfering withinjunng any lawful business or enterprise ofanother, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; but
nothing herein shall prevent any person from sol-iciting trade or business for a competitive bus-iness. 4 ^
Labor leaders in Alabama challenged the statute on
grounds it denied them the rights of free speech, assembly,
and petition. The right to peacefully picket, denied them
by the Alabama statute, they asserted, should be a consti-
tutionally protected act of free speech. The Supreme Court
agreed with the assertion and declared Section 3448 uncon-
stitutional. The Court first pointed out the importance
of protecting freedom of speech as follow:
The safeguarding of these rights to the ends that
men may speak as they think on matters vital to
them and that falsehoods may be exposed through
the process of education and discussion is essen-
tial to free government. Those who won our inde-
pendence had confidence in the power of free and
fearless reasoning and communication of ideas to
discover and spread economic truth. Noxious doc-
trines in those fields may be refuted and their
evil averted by the courageous exercise of the
right of free discussion. Abridgment of freedom of
speech and of the press, however, impairs those op-
portunities for public education that are essential
4. Alabama Code 1923 Section 3448
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to effective exercise of the power of correcting
error through the process of popular government.
5
We think that Section 3448 is invalid on its face.he freedom of speech and of the press guaranteedby the Constitution embraces at the least liberty
to discuss publically and truthfully all matters
of public concern without previous restraint orfear of subsequent punishment. 5
In the 1960
• s , court decisions resulted in the expansion
of freedom of speech to still other areas of non-speech ac-
tivities. Edwards v. .South Carolina
f
^ 1963, afforded civil
demonstrations First Amendment rights of freedom of
speech and assembly. In the Edwards decision, Negro high
school and college students peacefully marched to the State
House for the purpose of protesting laws discriminatory to
the citizens of South Carolina. The demonstrators sang pa-
triotic and religious songs, clapped their hands, and stamped
their feet outside the Capitol. They were ordered by the
police to leave the premises. When they failed to comply,
arrests were made on the grounds of breach of the peace.
The Supreme Court overturned the breach of the peace convic-
tions by the State of South Carolina on the grounds First
Amendment rights were violated; thus, the right of peaceful
demonstrations became an act of freedom of speech or expres-
sion .
Another form of freedom of speech was secured by the
courts in Brown v. Louisiana
.
1966. Brown, a Negro, sat
5 . Ibid
.
,
p. 95
.
6. Ibid., pp. 101-102.
7. 372 U.S. 229 (1963)
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down in a public library to protest its segregation rule.
Upon his refusal to leave the library. Brown was arrested
and convicted of breach of the peace and failure to disperse
or move on in a public building when ordered.
8
The Supreme
Court in declaring Brown's action as an expression of free
speech said.
We are dealing with an aspect of a basic constitu-
tional right— the right under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments guaranteeing freedom of speech
and assembly, and freedom to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievance... As this Court
has repeatedly stated, these rights are not con-
fined to verbal expression. They embrace appro-
priate types of action which certainly include
the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to
protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a 0place where the protestant has every right to be...
Other civil rights cases'1' 8 have strengthened the Supreme
Court's contention that demonstrations are symbolic speech
activities to be constitutionally protected.
Limits on Free Expression
An important point to consider in the study of First
Amendment rights of free expression is the extent to which
governments may restrict the exercise of that expression.
The past affords us with many examples where a governmental
8. 383 U.S. 131 (1966)
9. Ibid
.
,
p. 142.
10.
See: N.A.A.C.Po v. Alabama. 357 U.S. 449 (1958);
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button
,
371 U.S~ 415 Tl963); Cox v. Louisiana
.
379 U.S. 536 (1964);' and Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39
(1966)
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interest was compelling enough to restrict free speech. In
v * United States
,
1919, 11 the Espionage Act of 1917
was challenged on the grounds it violated the First Amend-
ment right of freedom of speech. The Supreme Court asserted
that free speech was not an absolute right and was never
intended to be so. Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck announced
the now famous "clear and present danger" test on free speech
activities. He stated, "The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire
in an theatre and causing a panic." In sustaining Schenck'
s
conviction and upholding the validity of governmental interest
in restricting his speech the Court went on to say, "When a
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance
will not be endured so long as men fight and that no court
1 3
could regard them as protected by any constitutional right."
Gitlow
.
mentioned earlier, is another significant deci-
sion where free speech was allowed to be restricted by a com-
pelling governmental interest. Even though the Supreme Court
expanded freedom of speech as against state as well as federal
intervention through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
llo 249 U.S, 47 (1919)
12 ‘ Ibid
-
,
p. 52
13. Ibid
.
,
p. 56
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Amendment, Gitlow's conviction for distributing a document
advocating the overthrow of the United States Government was
sustained.
However, the Court took a different view in Terminiello
v. Chicago, 14 1949, where it upheld a controversial case in-
volving the issue of free speech. Terminiello, in addressing
a Chicago group called the Christian Veterans of America,
condemned the conduct of some one thousand protesters outside
the auditorium and, at the same time, vigorously and vicious-
ly criticized various political and racial groups whose act
ivities he denounced as inimical to the nation's welfare.
He was arrested and convicted of disorderly conduct by the
City of Chicago. In the often quoted opinion overturning
Terminiello's conviction, the Supreme Court established guide-
lines for those who would restrict the First Amendment right
of free speech.
Accordingly a function of free speech under our sys-tem ^of government is to invite dispute. It may in-deed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging.
It may strike at unsettling effects as it presses
for acceptance though not absolute,... is neverthe-
less protected against censorship or punishment,
unless shown of a serious substantive evil that
rises far above public inconvenience annoyance
or unrest. 15 '
14. 337 U.S. 1 (1949)
15. Ibid
.
,
p. 4.
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The Court concluded its eloquent pronouncement by as-
serting that, "There is no room under our Constitution for
a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to
standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or
dominant political or community groups."^
However, in the decade that followed Terminiello the
courts became moie restrictive of free speech due largely
to the fear of communism. Dennis v. United States ,'*' 7 1951,
sustained the conviction of communist party members who sought
to overthrow the government by force and violence. The Court
said:
Overthrow of the Government by force and violence
is certainly a substantial enough interest for the
Government to limit speech. Indeed, this is the
ultimate value of society, for if a society can-
not protect its very structure from armed internal
attack, it must follow that no subordinate value
can be protected. If, then, this interest may be
protected, the literal problem which is presented
is what has been meant by the use of the phrase
'clear and present danger' of the utterances bring-
ing about the evil within the power of Congress to
punish.
The pendulum began to swing back to the "clear and pre-
sent danger" test advocated by Justice Holmes beginning with
19the Yates decision in 1957. The Courts today take a posi-
tion on restrictions of free speech more in line with the
16. Ibid
.
,
p. 4-5.
17. 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
18. Ibid
.
,
p. 867.
19. Yates v. United States
,
354 U.S. 298 (1957)
Terminiello decision of 1949. 78
By 1966 there were ample judicial interpretation that
would allow the courts to expand the scope of the First
Amendment to include symbolic speech activities, such as
black armbands in the public schools. Also, there were am-
ple precedents to determine under what circumstances acts
of expression could or could not be restricted by the state.
Burnside and Blackwell
Burnside and Blackwell
. mentioned briefly in Chapter
Three, were purposely decided on the same day by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In Blackwell students
were suspended from a public school for wearing "SNCC" but-
tons; they were forcing buttons upon unwilling receiptors,
disrupting classes, and displaying hostility and discourtesy
throughout the school. As a result, the students were not
allowed to wear the freedom buttons in school. Those refus-
ing to comply with the school rule were suspended, resulting
in the litigation.
The Court, stressing the importance of the issue, said,
"Cases of this nature, which involve regulations limiting
freedom of expression and the communication of an idea,
which are protected by the First Amendment, present a ser-
ious constitutional question. A valuable constitutional right
is involved and decisions must be made on a case basis,
keeping in mind always the fundamental constitutional rights
79
2.0
of those being affected." The suggestion that these issues
be decided on a case by case basis is a crucial one, for the
courts have done just that in litigation on student constitu-
tional questions.
In upholding the suspension of the students in Blackwell
,
the Fifth Circuit Court went on to say, "The constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech “does not confer an absolute
right to speak' and the law recognizes that there can be an
abuse of such freedom. In each case courts must ask whether
the gravity of the 'evil', discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
2
1
avoid the danger." The court concluded by stating that,
"In this case the reprehensible conduct described above was
so inexorably tied to the wearing of the buttons that the
22
two are not separable."
Burnside
,
on the other hand, was decided in favor of
suspended pupils for material or substantial disruptions were
not created by the wearing of the buttons in their school.
The Court went to great length to point out that school of-
ficials, as agents of the state, are responsible for maintain-
ing discipline necessary in the educational process.
The establishment of an educational program requires
the formulation of rules and regulations necessary
for the maintenance of an orderly program of class-
20. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education ,
363 F. 2d~~749~, 753 (1966)
21 o Ibid . , pp. 753-754.
22. Ibid.
,
p. 754
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™T^*rning: - In formulating regulations, includ-1
I!
g
T^
hOSe Pertaining to the discipline of school
children, school officials have a wide latitude ofdiscretion. But the school is always bound by the
requirement that the rules and regulations be rea-
sonable.
Thus school rules which assign students to a part-icular class, forbid unnecessary discussion in the
classroom and prohibit the exchange of conversationbetween students are reasonable even though these
regulations infringe on such basic rights as free-dom of speech and association, because they are
classroom activities. 23
In as opposed to Blackwell
. students were ex-
pelled for violating a no button regulation, not for causing
disruptions. The Court in an effort to abate the fears of
school officials that the judiciary might usurp their prero-
gatives, pointed out, "We wish to make it quite clear that
we do not applaud any attempt to undermine the authority of
the school. We support all efforts made by the school to
fashion reasonable regulations for the conduct of their
students and enforcement of the punishment incurred when
such regulations are violated. Obedience to duly constituted
authority must be instilled in our young people." 24
The Court concluded in Burnside
.
"They cannot infringe
on their students' rights to free and unrestricted expression,
as guaranteed to them under the First Amendment to the Consti-
23. Burnside v. Byars
,
363 F. 2d 744, 748 (1966)
24. Ibid
.
.
p. 749.
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tution, where the exercise of such rights in the school build-
ings and schoolrooms does not materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school." 25 The "material and substantial
disruption" test, used by the Fifth Circuit Court in noting
the differences between Blackwell and Burnside
.
was also a-
dopted by the Supreme Court in Tinker
.
Tinker
Ti.nk
.
e
.
r v « Des koines Independent Community School Dis-
t'.y,-*- « 1969 , arose from the suspension of public school pupils
,
one of them a junior high school student, from school until
their black armbands were removed. The students were wearing
the armbands to protest United States involvement in the Viet-
nam War. The protestors caused no disruptions and they did
not infringe upon the rights of others. They were not allowed
to enter the schools solely because of the black armbands.
Justice Fortas, in delivering the opinion of the Court,
first acknowledged that public school pupils do in fact have
constitutional rights. "First Amendment rights, applied in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment,
are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be ar-
gued that either students or teachers shed their constitution-
25. Ibid.
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al rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
26gate." After recognizing that students do have First Amend-
ment rights. Justice Fortas noted the obvious problems that
inevitably arise.
Our problem lies in the area where students in the
exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the
rules of the school authorities.... The problem
posed by the present cases does not relate to re-
gulation of the length of skirts or the type of
clothing, to hair style, or deportment. It does
not concern aggressive, disruptive action or even
group demonstrations... There is here no evidence
whatever of petitioners interference, actual or nas-
cent, with the rights of other students to be se-
cure and to be let alone. Accordingly, this case
does not concern speech or action that intrudes
upon the work of the schools or the rights of other
students
.
2 '
In upholding the right of the students to wear the black
armbands in this case, it is worth considering at length the
reasoning of the Court in reaching this landmark decision.
The judicial reasoning in Tinker closely follows the attitude
toward free speech found in Terminiello .
In our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehen-
sion of disturbance is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression. Any departure
from absolute regimentation may cause trouble.
Any variation may cause trouble. Any variation
from the majority °s opinion may inspire fear.
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or
on the campus, that deviates from the views of
another person may start an argument or cause a
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must
take this risk, and our history says that it is
this sort of hazardous freedom— this kind of
openness—that is the basis of our national
26. Tinker v. DesMoines Independent Community School
District, 8$ S.Ct, ?5T7 7T6 (19691
27 . Ibid .
.
p. 737.
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strength and of the independence and vigor ofAmericans who grow up and live in this rela-tively permissive, often disputatious society.^®
On the right of free expression the Court said,
In order for the State in the person of school of-ficials to justify prohibition of a particular ex-pression of opinion, it must be able to show thatits action was caused by something more than a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasant-
ness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.
...Our independent examination of the record fails
to yield reason to anticipate that the wearing of
the armbands would substantially interfere with
the work of the school or impinge upon the rights
of other students.
By promulgating the ban on armbands, the school officials
felt they were avoiding possible disruptions that might occur
in the future. As just noted, the school officials in Tinker
were mot justified in the prohibition of armbands because they
only anticipated disruptions. The Court asserted that, "Clear-
ly, the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion,
at least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid mat-
erial and substantial interference with schoolwork or dis-
cipline, is not constitutionally permissible." Since the
school officials offered no evidence that actual material and
substantial disruptions did, or would occur, the rule was held
unconstitutional.
The Court went on to make pronouncements that could
ultimately affect the fundamental relationship between the
public school pupil and his school.
N) CO • Ibid.
,
pp. 737-738.
29. Ibid
. P« 738.
30. Ibid
. P* 739.
84
In our system, state-operated schools may not beenclaves of totalitarianism. School officialsdo not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well as out of
school are 'persons' under our constitution. Thevare possessed of fundamental rights which the Statemust respect, just as they themselves must respecttheir obligations to the State. In our system
students may not be regarded as closed-circuit'
recipients of only that which the State chooses to
communicate. They may not be confined to the ex-pression of those sentiments that are officially
aPproved. In the absence of a specific showing of
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their
speech, students are entitled to freedom of expres-
sion of their views.
The reasoning in Tinker continues, "A student's rights,
therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When
he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the
campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opin-
ions, even in controversial subjects like the conflict in
32
Vietnam. ..."
The test used to determine if a student's rights may be
superseded by state action is outlined by Justice Fortas.
He said a student may be free to express his opinion,"... If
he does so without materially and substantially interfer/Tn^Z
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the oper-
ation of the school and without colliding with the rights of
33
others." Clearly, the Supreme Court accepted in Tinker
31. Ibid
.
32. Ibid
.
,
p. 740.
33. Ibid.
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the guidelines for regulating a student's constitutional
rights suggested by the Fifth Circuit Court in Burnside
.
The Court concluded Tinker by reminding all that, "The
Constitution says that Congress and the States may not
abridge the right to free speech. This provision means what
it says. We properly read it to permit reasonable regulation
of speech-connected activities in carefully restricted cir-
cumstances. But we do not confine the permissible exercise
of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four
corners of a pamphlet, or the supervised and ordained dis-
cussion in a school classroom." 34
Before considering the impact of Tinker and the cases
that have since followed in the lower federal courts, it is
worth noting the differences expressed by the minority on
the highest bench. Justice Stewart concurred in the Tinker
decision but added, "I cannot share the Court's uncritical
assumption that, school discipline aside, the First Amend-
ment rights of children are co-extensive with those of adults." 33
Justice Black, a foremost proponent of constitutional
rights for adults, dissented in Tinker
. He feared first
that the courts would be inundated with all sorts of suits
where students would seek to invalidate school rules on con-
stitutional grounds. The making of school rules and regula-
34. Ibid.
35 . Ibid
.
,
p. 741
.
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tions would be effectively transferred to the Courts. To quote
Justice Black in his Tinker dissent, "The Court's holding in
this case ushers in what I deem to be an entirely new era in
which the power to control pupils by the elected officials of
State supported public schools... in the United States is in
ultimate effect transferred to the Supreme Court." 36
He went on to point out that children, because of their
immaturity, do not possess the same fundamental rights as
adults. "It may be that the Nation has outworn the old-
fashion slogan that 'children are to be seen not heard,'
but one may, I hope, be permitted to harbor the thought that
taxpayers send children to school on the premise that at
their age they need to learn, not teach." 37 Black also remind-
ed the Court one of the realities of our society.
We cannot close our eyes to the fact that some of
the country's greatest problems are crimes commit-
ted by the youth, too many of school age. School
discipline, like parental discipline, is an in-
tegral and important part of training our children
to be good citizens - to be better citizens... One
does not need to be a prophet or the son of a pro-
phet to know that after the Court's holding today
some students in Iowa schools and indeed in all
schools will be ready, able, and willing to defy
their teachers on practically all orders. 38
Justice Black concluded his dissent with a warning.
"This case, therefore, wholly without constitutional reasons
36 . Ibid .
37. Ibid
.
,
p. 745.
Ibid
.
,
p. 746
.
38
.
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in my judgment, subjects all the public schools in the coun-
try to the whims and caprices of their loudest-mouthed, but
maybe not their brightest, students." 39 Justice Black's
dissent raised some very real problems for the future of pub-
lic education. Those who have been skeptical of the Supreme
Court's wisdom in extending constitutional rights to public
school pupils, have also echoed Black's criticism. However,
litigation involving public school pupils resulted because
of abuses—abuses that Justice Black would be the first to
condemn if adults were the victims of the constitutional
abuses in public education. Ultimately, adult citizens, whom
Justice Black so vigorously insisted should be scrupulously
afforded constitutional protection of the Bill of Rights,
possessed a basic right to effect change denied to school
pupils, the ballot box. Since public school pupils had no
say in the institution so important in their lives, why
shouldn°t the Courts insist that students be guaranteed the
very rudiments of justice, fair play, and due process?
At any rate, a close examination of subsequent litiga-
tion reveals that the Tinker decision still leaves many un-
answered questions concerning First Amendment, rights.
Critics assail Tinker on a number of points. First the
circumstances surrounding the black armband controversy in
Des Moines were almost completely devoid of disruptions—dis-
39. Ibid.
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ruptions that might have impaired the educational process.
In cases that have followed Tinker the lower courts have
considered the merits of individual cases on the grounds of
real or potential threats that disrupt school order. Acknow-
ledging that students do have First Amendment protection
courts have been inconsistent at times in applying some sort
of uniform material and substantial disruption test. Although
Tinker offers little more than the material and substantial
disorder formula as a guideline for the courts to follow, the
court ruled that public school pupils are guaranteed consti-
tutional protection through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Using the due process clause, courts
have begun to determine the scope and boundaries of student
constitutional protection in cases since the 1969, Tinker
decision. This study will now examine the significant post-
Tinker^ freedom of speech cases which have helped to determine
to what extent student free speech is guaranteed by the
United States Constitution.
Recent Decisions Upholding Student Acts of Free Expression
40Two recent Federal District Court decisions have up-
held students 0 free speech rights involving the Pledge of
Allegiance in a public school. In Frain v. Baron
,
1969, a
40. 307 F. Supp. 27 (1969); Banker v. Board of Public
Instruction of Dade County
,
314 F. Supp. 285 (1970T; See
Sheldon v. Fannin
,
221 F. Supp. 766 (1963)also:
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student refused to leave his homeroom during the daily Pledge
of Allegiance. School officials gave him the option of
standing silently or leaving the room while the Pledge was
taking place. These options were granted to prevent dis-
order in the classroom. The plaintiff felt the words "with
liberty and justice for all" were not true in America and he
considered his exclusion from the room a punishment for exer-
cising his constitutional rights. He urged not only a right
of non-participation but a right of silent protest by remain-
ing seated.
The Court first acknowledged the student’s new legal
status by pointing out, "The original concern with limita-
tion of the State a s power to compel a student to act contrary
to his beliefs has shifted to a concern for affirmative pro-
41tection of the student's right to express his beliefs."
They continued by asserting that, "The student is free to
select his form of expression, so long as he does not mater-
ially infringe the right of other students or disrupt school
42
activities." In deciding in favor of the student, the Court
concluded by stating, "The right in a peaceable and orderly
manner to protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a
43place where the protestant has every right to be," is his
41. Frain v. Barron
,
307 F. Supp. 27, 30 (1969)
42 . Ibid
.
,
p. 32
.
43. Ibid.
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constitutionally protected right. The Federal District
Court in New York followed pretty much the reasoning in
Tinke r to reach its conclusion to allow a public school pupil
to sit in silent protest during the Pledge of Allegiance.
The situation was similar in a Florida decision where
Andrew Robert Banks, a high school student, refused to stand
during the Pledge of Allegiance. Because of Banks 0 violation
of "School Board Policy" Regulation 6122 which stated: "Stu-
dents who for religious or other deep personal convictions,
do not participate in the salute and Pledge of Allegiance to
the flag will stand quietly," 44 he was suspended from school.
As in the previous Frain decision the Federal District
Court in Florida felt Banks was exercising his First Amend-
ment right of free expression. The Court in Banks explained,
"The conduct of Andrew Banks in refusing to stand during the
Pledge ceremony constituted an expression of his religious
beliefs and political opinions. His refusal to stand was no
less a form of expression than the wearing of the black arm-
bands was to Mary Beth Tinker. He was exercising a right akin
45to pure speech." In concluding, the Court said, "The right
to differ and express one ' s opinions, to fully vent his First
Amendment rights, even to the extent of exhibiting disrespect
to our flag and country by refusing to stand and participate
44. Banks v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade Country ,
314 F. Supp. 285, 294 119707
45. Ibid
.
,
p. 295.
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in the Pledge of Allegiance, cannot be suppressed by the
imposition of suspension.
"
46
Successful litigation in a Federal Court by high school
students in 1970, expanded the scope of constitutional pro-
tection of off-campus literature. In Hatter v. Los Angeles
City Hi^h Schoo l District
.
47
Shasta Hatter and Julie Johnson,
two high school pupils, passed out leaflets off the school
grounds urging students to boycott the annual chocolate candy
drive. The two girls were protesting the school's dress code.
Shasta Hatter was subsequently suspended by school officials
for violating a rule, "requiring all matter distributed or
exhibited on school property to be authorized by a responsible
member of the administration." 48 The Federal Court in Cali-
fornia ordered Shasta Hatter reinstated on grounds that the
school policy violated free speech and due process because
it had a chilling effect upon a student's right of free ex-
49pression.
50A recent Federal Court decision included the right of
peaceful demonstration as a constitutional right of expres-
sion afforded public school pupils. The litigation grew out
of racial problems in John Tyler High School over the selec-
46. Ibid
.
.
p. 296.
47. 310 F. Supp. 1309 (1970)
46. Ibid
.
,
p. 1310.
49. Ibid .
50. Dunn v. Tyl er Independen t School District
.
327 F.
Supp. 528 0^71)
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tion of cheerleaders. The principal of the school arranged
names on the ballots so that four white and two black cheer-
leaders would be elected. The blacks, numbering 38% of the
school protested the way the names were arranged. The prin-
cipal refused to change the ballots. Fires, vandalism, de-
monstrations and counter demonstrations followed. Things
came to a head on March 21, 1971 when 250 to 300 blacks walked
out of the school. When school officials asked the demonstra-
tors to leave the school grounds they complied. The adminis-
tration sought to prevent further disturbances by requiring
each black student involved in the walkout to submit to an
individual conference with his parents present in order to
be re—admitted to school. Some of the black demonstrators
refused to comply and remained excluded from school. These
students sought court intervention because they alleged their
First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly were being
violated by the schools because the action for all practical
purposes would prevent students from demonstrating their be-
liefs .
The Federal District Court in upholding the actions of
the students said, "The regulation. .. arbitrarily prohibits
all boycotts, sit-ins, stand-ins, and walk-outs without
limiting its proscription to such activities involving mis-
51
conduct or the educational environment." The Court went
51. Ibid
.
,
p. 533.
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on to explain its reasoning. "it is apparent that all such
activities are not materially and substantially disruptive
2erse. Even in the context of the educational environment,
such speech-related activity, while traditionally subject to
greater regulation of time, place and manner than is pure
speech, cannot be completely prohibited. Free speech cannot
be a right that is given only to be so circumscribed that it
exists in principle but not in fact. To hold otherwise would
be to limit a student's free speech rights to inappropriate
settings as to make an exercise of those rights ineffectual." 52
The Federal District Court also reminded school officials
that demonstrations could still be limited under certain cir-
cumstances. "Thus, while the school officials can certain-
ly prohibit disruptive activity in the nature of boycotts,
sit-ins, stand-ins, and walk-outs that materially interfere
with the educational environment, they must do so in a manner
that strikes at the very evil they wish to prevent rather
than making all such activities, per se illegal." 53 The
Duirn decision rendered by a lower Federal Court extended the
boundary of First Amendment free speech rights to include
peaceful demonstrations by high school pupils. This was
accomplished through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Dunn also reflects a trend in judicial philosophy
52 . ikid * t p # 534.
53. Ibid
.
,
p. 535
.
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especially evident since the 1969, Tinker decision. The
District Court illustrated this trend by summarizing its po-
sition on First Amendment rights to freedom of speech..." and
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievance, are held by minors
as well as adults, and that these rights must be respected by
governmental authority even in the context of the educational
54
environment.
"
Public school pupils also gained the constitutional right
to distribute anti—war leaflets in 1971. A junior high
school student, who was denied permission by the Quincy School
Committee to distribute an anti-war leaflet and "A High School
Bill of Rights", appealed to the courts on the basis that his
First Amendment rights were violated. The lower court sus-
tained the school committee's rule but ordered the school not
to interfere with the distribution of the material off the
school grounds if it did not materially disrupt the school.
The student appealed the lower court's decision upholding
the committee's rule banning the distribution of his mater-
ial inside the school.
The Appeals Court said, "
. . .
fwe
]
find it unlikely that
a court, on completion of this case on the merits, could
uphold this attempt at regulating student conduct. ... !Aj s to
54. Ibid o
55. R.iseman v a School Committee of City of Quincy, 439
F. 2d 148 Cl9 71
)
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be applied to First Amendment activities it is vague, and does
not reflect any effort to minimize the adverse effect of
56prior restraint...."
A case quite similar to Tinker arose in Texas when a
group of Mexican-American children wore brown armbands to
school protesting various educational policies and practices
relating to their minority. The students were suspended
until they removed their armbands for violating a dress code
which stated in part, "Any act, unusual dress, coercion of
other students, passing out literature, buttons, etc., or
apparel decoration that is disruptive, distracting, or pro-
vocative so as to incite students of other ethnic groups will
58
not be permitted." In defense of the suspension, "...Sev-
eral of the school officials offered their conclusions or
opinions that wearing of the armbands in violation of school
59policy was a disruption in of itself." The Federal District
Court in Texas, however, followed the Tinker decision and
found the threat of potential disruptions from the brown
armbands not to be such to warrant restriction of this act
of symbolic speech.
56. Ibid
.
,
p. 149.
57. Aquirre v. Tahoka Independent School District , 311
F. Supp. 664 (1970)
58. Ibid
.
,
p. 665.
59.
Ibid
.
,
p. 666.
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The decisions reviewed in this section show how the
courts have expanded the scope of a public school pupils'
right of free expression since Tinker
. Other recent decisions
have, however, been decided against students thereby placing
certain limitations on free expression.
Recent Decisions Limiting Student Acts of Free Expression
Baker v. Downey City Board of Education
. 1970, 60 affirm-
the right of school officials to exclude obscene material
from the school environment. In Baker, a student was sus-
pended from school for distributing admittedly profane and
vulgar material to other pupils outside the main gate of the
campus. The plaintiff alleged his First Amendment rights were
violated by the school's action. The Federal District Court
hearing the case declined to use Tinker or Burnside to sup-
port the plaintiff °s claim. Since the issue in Baker was
profanity, Tinker and Burnside
.
which advocated the use of
the material and substantial disruption test to determine to
what extent government may regulate a student's First Amend-
ment rights, was not a controlling precedent. The Court, in
dealing with the profanity issue said, "First Amendment rights
to free speech do not require the suspension of decency in
6
1
the expression of their views and ideas." The District
60
.
61 .
307 F. Supp. 517 (1970)
Ibid
.
,
p. 527
.
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Court concluded by pointing out that high school students do
not have the same comprehensive constitutional protection as
adults. The right to critize and to dissent is protected
to high school students but they may be more strictly cur-
tailed in the mode of their expression and in other manners
of conduct than college students or adults." 62
Another case similar to Baker arose from student pos-
session of obscene materials in school. In Vought v. Van
f) ^Buren Public Schools
.
1969
,
a high school student had been
previously warned by the school principal not to bring obscene
material to school. When he did a second time, expulsion
resulted. In the course of the trial, the plaintiff admitted
some of the words in the material in his possession were ob-
scene, however, he alleged his First and Fourteenth Amendment
free expression rights were being violated because of the
expulsion. The Court was not in sympathy with the student
and sustained the expulsion saying, "The exercise by the
defendants here of their obligation to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools 8 must be held to encompass the pro-
mulgation of rules concerning the extent to which and the
conditions under which obscene materials may or may not be
64properly on the school premises." In conclusion, the
62. Ibid .
63. 306 F. Supp. 1388 (1969)
64. Ibid .
, p 0 1392.
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Federal District Court in Michigan said, "...[VJe are con-
strained to conclude that the type of regulation here cannot
be considered violative of this plaintiffs First Amendment
rights." 65
It would appear that Baker and Vought
. although adjudi-
cated by Federal District Courts, leave to school officials
the discretion to determine what is and is not obscene on
school property. Whether or not the material causes a dis-
ruption is not the test used to determine if this is a sub-
stantial governmental interest to restrict the use of the
material. School officials can restrict a student's First
Amendment right of free expression if, in the their view,
the material is obscene. However, cases reviewed in the
following section on the press show that materials on the
school grounds must be judged by certain criteria before
being excluded by school administrators as obscene.
A federal Circuit Court of Appeals in Katz v. McAulav
.
66
1971, upheld a New York Board of Regents regulation prohi-
biting the solicitation of funds from the pupils in the
public schools. Students challenged this rule when they
were threatened with expulsion for distributing leaflets near
the school and soliciting funds from their fellow students.
65. Ibid.
66. 438 F. 2d 1058 (1971)
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They alleged the rule violated their First Amendment right
of fiee speech. The Court did not feel a student's freedom
of speech was violated, stating:
Pupils are on school premises in response to the
statutory requirement that they attend school for
the purpose of formal education. Where outside
organizations or individuals espousing various
causes seek to take advantage of the required as-
semblage of secondary pupils, as a captive audience,
to solicit funds, either directly or through the
agency of some of the pupils, for their particular
project or cause, they are in effect in competition
for the time, attention and interest of the pupils
with those who are seeking to administer, its ef-
fect is not so limited in time and it is plainly
harmful to the operation of the public schools.
If there is no regulation against it, literally
dozens of organizations and causes may importune
pupils to solicit on their behalfs and is fore-
seeable that pressure groups within the student
body are likely to use more than polite requests
to get contributions even from those who are in
disagreement with the particular cause or who
are, in truth, too poor to afford a donation. 67
The Court in Katz points out that the rule focused on a
demonstrable harm and was constitutional. Therefore the right
of pupils to solicit funds from school pupils even in the
vicinity of the school grounds was not considered an act of
"expression" protected by the Tinker decision.
68Lipkis v. Caveney
, 1971, decided by the California
State Supreme Court placed limits on when and where a public
school pupil may exercise his right of free speech. Tom Lip-
kis sought a writ of mandate to compel Van Nuys High School
67. Ibid
.
,
p. 1061.
68. App. 96 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1971)
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officials to grant him a permit to stage a rally in a lunch
area during the noon hour. The school officials declined
the permit because they felt a rally would materially disrupt
the order in the school. The principal pointed out that Lip-
kis had the opportunity, as did any student, to express his
opinions in recognized campus activities such as the Noon
Forum and Discussion Group. They did not want to provide
Lipkis with a captive audience while students were eating
their lunches. in declining to issue the writ of mandate,
the California Court reasoned, "We emphasize that appellant
had adequate and concededly readily available forum in which
to exercise his right to free speech and to ventilate views
he entertained relative to any problems of his school, his
country or the world. Puerile, abrasive and contemptuous
behavior cannot be whitewashed by constitutional incantations,
which, if we understand them, gave appellant the right to
expose in non-obscene language even the most unpopular views
but which do not require Van Nuys High School or the school
system to guarantee to him on the school grounds a captive
audience at the specific times he elects to address them.
.
.
Our Constitution extends no such guarantees to appellant or
, „
69
anyone else."
Black high school students in Indiana, took a First
Amendment complaint to a Federal Circuit Court without suc-
69. Ibid
.
, pp Q 782-783.
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70cess m 1970. The litigation resulted when Negro students
who comprised 13% of the high school population sought to ban
what they consider symbols offensive to their race. They
protested their school flag resembled a Confederate Flag, the
athletic team called "Rebels", the glee club named the "South-
ern Aires" and homecoming queen the "Southern Bell." The
Federal Distract Court rejected their contention that their
First Amendment right of free speech was being impinged upon
by the use of the offensive symbols. "P; aintiffs allege that
the use of these symbols is offensive to the Black students
at Southside, who comprise thirteen per cent of the enroll-
ment, is flammatory, and has discouraged Blacks from parti-
cipating in the various extracurricular activities of the school.
They claim that due to the effect on the Black students, the
symbols violate their First Amendment right of free speech." 7 ^
The Court pointed out that, "We fail to find any evidence in
the i ecord that the Black students' right of free speech and
expression is being abridged by use of the Confederate symbols." 72
As a result of racial strife in a Chattanooga high
school, the school board adopted a rule forbidding students
from wearing "provocative symbols" on clothing. Melton v.
7 3Young, 1971, challenged this regulation on First and Four-
70. Banks v. Muncie Community School. 433 F. 2d 292 (1970)
71. Ibid.
,
p. 297.
72. Ibido
.
p. 298.
73. 328 F. Supp. 88 (1971)
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teenth Amendment grounds. Racial tension grew in the high
school after successful protests by students resulted in the
school athletic team's name "Rebels" and the school flag, the
Confederate Flag, being changed. Police at one point were
called in to restore order. In the midst of the charged
atmosphere, Rod Melton insisted on wearing a Confederate Flag
on his clothing. He was suspended for breaking the rule bar-
ring provocative symbols. The Federal District Court was
not sympathetic to Melton's cause, citing the potentially ex-
plosive atmosphere at the high school as sufficient reasoning
to abridge First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free ex-
pression. The Court first reminded school officials of the
scope of limits on First Amendment rights by saying, "... The
Fi^st Amendment does not speak eguivocally, but rather is
broad and explicit in its scope. Regulatory measures, no
matter how well intentioned or how sophisticated, cannot be
employed by public bodies if their purpose or effect is to
stifle
,
penalize, or curb the exercise of rights guaranteed
n A
by the First Amendment." Continuing, the Court pointed
out, "The exercise of free expression must on occasion be sub-
ject to some limitations, otherwise such institutions as
churches, schools, and other places of public assembly, not
to mention courtrooms themselves would become Towers of Ba-
75bel." Citing the reasoning in Tinker, the Court said. "Fin-
74. Ibid o
, p c 96.
75 . Ibid .
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ally it should be noted that 'symbolic speech,' although not
always readily distinguishable from conduct and accordingly
somewhat ill-defined in the law, is accorded First Amendment
protestion the same as 'pure speech.' 76 Dispite the fact that
symbols worn on clothing is an exercise of free expression
protected by the Constitution, the Court in Melton did allow
the ban on "provocative symbols" to stand because similar sym-
bols had caused disruptions in the past. Tinker's "material
and substantial" test applied in Melton did warrant a suffi-
cient governmental interest to restrict First Amendment
rights
.
A recent Federal Court opinion. Hill v. Lewis
.
77
1971,
illustrates to what extent the Tinker decision can be used as
a controlling factor in student exercise of free expression.
Plaintiffs
,
students in 71st High School, Cumberland County,
North Carolina, were suspended for wearing armbands in protest
of United States policies in Vietnam. The situation was po-
tentially explosive in the high school since 40% of the stu-
dents' parents were military personnel stationed at Ft. Bragg,
North Carolina. Before the students were suspended, counter-
demonstrations produced red, white, and blue armbands, that
caused chanting, congregating in hallways, and disruptions.
Polarization between the two groups, the anti-war and pro-war
76. Ibid.
77. 323 F. Supp. 55 (1971)
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students, resulted in a tense school situation. The Court
in sustaining the suspensions and the rule banning armbands,
offered its interpretation of the Tinker decision.
The Court in Tinker found that the wearing of arm-bands was entirely divorced from any actually or
potentially disruptive conduct by those participat-
ing in it, under the circumstances of that case.
Tinker did not involve aggressive, disruptive action
or group demonstrations. Tinker did not concern
speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the
school or the rights of other students. In Tinker
the fear of disruption did not motivate the prohi-
bition of armbands. The regulation was directed
against the
.
principle of the demonstration itself.
The record in Tinker failed to disclose evidence
that school officials had reason to anticipate that
the wearing of armbands would substantially inter-
fere with the work of the school or impinge upon
the rights of other students. In Tinker the pro-
hibition was directed at the wearing of black arm-
bands. Tinker involved a small number of partici-
pants, and students were dismissed for the sole
reason they wore the proscribed armbands. 78
Looking at the situation in 71st High School as a whole,
the record showed clearly there was reasonable apprehension
that the threat of violence would produce a substantial and
material interference on the rights of others.
Free Expression in a Racially Tense School Situation
Cases thus far considered on free expression, using the
material and substantial formula in Tinker fall in line with
the Supreme Court 11 s interpretation of student First Amendment
79
rights. However, one recent case that upheld a school board's
78. Ibid
.
,
p. 58.
79. 305 F. Supp. 742 (1969) sustained in Guzick v. Pre-
bus
,
431 F. 2d 594 (1970)
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right restrict a student *s .tirst Amendment right of free
expression, could place several limitations on that right if
the precedent is followed by other courts. Guzick v. Drebus
decided in 1969, and later sustained by a Federal Circuit
Court in 1970, upheld a school board regulation that prohi-
bited students from wearing buttons, emblems or other insig-
nia not related to a school activity. The rule had been in
effect for 40-years in an East Cleveland, Ohio high school.
As in many other northern urban areas, population shifts re-
sulted in a change in the ethnic make-up of the student body.
A once predominately white school, Shaw High School, by the
time of the Guzick decision, had become a 70% black and had
been the scene of racial violence. School officials, fearing
potential disorders, kept the rule in force resulting in the
Guzick litigation.
Thomas Guzick, was suspended for wearing a botton that
said:
April 5 Chicago
GI - Civilian
Anti-V7ar
Demonstration
Student Mobilization Committee
Both the District and the Circuit Courts used Blackwell
in sustaining the rule prohibiting all buttons in the high
school. The District Court pointed out that, "The presence
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of these emblems, badges, and buttons are taken to represent,
define and depict the actual division of the students in var-
ious groups." 80 The Court continued, "... The buttons tend
to polarize the students into separate, distinct, and un-
friendly groups." 81 in concluding, the Court said, “
. .
.
fr] hat
if this policy of excluding buttons and other insignia is not
retained, some students will attempt to wear provocative or
inciting buttons and other emblems," 8 ^ Therefore, they felt
all buttons must be excluded. The material and substantial
test was used as the lower Federal Court said, "The wearing
of buttons and other insignia will exacerbate an already tense
situation.
..
[which] will disrupt and interfere with the normal
operation of the school.
"
8j
The reasoning of the Federal Circuit Court followed that
of the lower court in Guzick o "In our view, the potentiality
and the immenseness of the admitted rebelliousness in the
Shaw students support the wisdom of the no-symbol rule." 84
Here the Court applied a sort of "clear and present danger"
test to the public school setting. The Appeals Court pointed
out the realities of the situation. "We will not attempt
an extensive review of the many great decisions which have
80 * Guzick v. Prebus
.
J05 F. Supp. 472, 476 (1969)
81. Ibid o
82. Ibid
.
.
p. 477.
83 c Ibid
.
,
p. 479.
84. Guzick v 0 Prebus, 431 F. 2d 594, 600 (1970)
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forbidden the abridgement of free speech. We have been
thrilled by their beautiful and impassioned language. They
are a part of our American heritage. None of these master-
pieces, however, were composed or uttered to support the
wearing of buttons in high school classrooms. We are not
persuaded that enforcement of such a rule as Shaw High School's
no-symbol proscription would have excited like judicial
classics. Denying Shaw High School the right to enforce this
small disciplinary rule could, and most likely would, impair
the rights of its students to an education and the rights of
its teachers to fulfill their responsibilities." 85 The Cir-
cuit Court went on to conclude that,
We must be aware in these contentious times that
America's classrooms and their environs will loose
their usefulness as places in which to educate our
young people if pupils come to school wearing thebadges of their respective disagreements, and pro-
voke confrontations with their fellows and their
teachers... The buttons are claimed to be a form
of free speech. Unless they have some relevance
to what is being considered or taught, a school
classroom is no place for the untrammeled exercise
of such right. ob
The decision in Gu z i ck creates a dilemna for future free
expression litigation involving public school pupils. Black-
wg.ll
>
Hi 1
1
and Melton
.
offered substantial evidence that stu-
85. Ibid.
86
. Ibid.
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dents
,
in expressing themselves, would or did cause material
and substantial disorders. The school officials in Guzick
could only predict substantial disorders would result for but-
tons had never before been allowed in the school.
An article in the Cleveland State Law Review points out
the inconsistencies between Tinker and Guzick
. "The right to
express one's point of view on a politically controversial
issue such as the Vietnam War
,
in an orderly fashion, is
constitutionally protected in a racially homogenous high school
in Des Moines, Iowa; the same right is prohibited to students
in a high school in racially tense East Cleveland, Ohio." 87
The article thereby asserts that, "Racial refinement will have
been engrafted onto the holding in Tinker
.
1,88 if the Guzick
decision is upheld by the Supreme Court.
Summary
Students in the public schools today have been accorded
First Amendment protection by virtue of the Tinker decision
in 1969. Court decisions following Tinker have sought to
define the scope and boundaries of student free expression.
Within the permissible boundaries of free expression, public
school pupils are allowed to speak, demonstrate, perform acts
87. Ann Aldrich and Jo Anne V. Sommers, "Freedom of
Expression in Secondary Schools," Cleveland State Law Review
,
vol. 19 (January, 1970)
,
169.
88o Ibid .
,
p. 170.
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of symbolic protest, and wear things that denote symbolic
speech.
However, limits have been placed on a student "s consti-
tutional right to free expression by the courts. The most
important limitation has been offered by the Supreme Court
in Tinker. If, in the exercise of his right to express him-
self freely, a student materially and substantially disrupts
the educational process, his free expression may be restrict-
ed. The courts have also restricted student free expression
because of obscene material.
Still unresolved is the question of what causes a mater-
ial and substantial disruption and whether or not First
Amendment activities can be restricted if there is a threat
of a potential disruption. The courts will have to decide
these issues in the future.
Student First Amendment rights have also been expanded
to include freedom of the press, the topic of the next chapter.
CHAPTER V
PUBLIC SCHOOL PUPILS AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Legal Guidelines for the Press in General
As seen in the previous chapter of this study the ju-
diciary through various court decisions has expanded the
scope of free speech in the First Amendment to include sym-
bolic acts of expression. The printed word certainly falls
into this category. The printed word also has a measure of
constitutional protection under freedom of the press in the
First Amendment.
Students involved in controversies relating to printed
matter in the public schools have therefore alleged, in ad-
dition to encroachment on their right to free expression,
violations of their right to a free press. With the excep-
tion of some specific limitations to be examined later, a
student's right to a free press is governed basically by
the same guidelines spelled out for the press in general.
The major Supreme Court decisions establishing the guide-
lines for the national press will be examined first.
A landmark case in which the Supreme Court began to
define the boundaries of freedom of the press was Near v.
Minnesota . ^ 1931, considered earlier in this study. As
1. 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
Ill
the landmark case holding a state law unconstitutional for
violating freedom of the press. Near prohibited states from
exercising "prior restraint" over the press. The Supreme
Court said that a state may, of course, properly forbid the
publication of "lewd, lascivious, salacious, obscene and
filthy" matter. However, a restriction of the press that
in effect constituted prior censorship as in Near would not
be allowed. The Supreme Court also pointed out in Near that
whatever wrongs were published could appropriately be pun-
ished through the state °s libel laws.
Another important freedom of the press decision was
v * Sullivan 2 adjudicated in 1964. Civil
rights activists had published a full page advertisement in
the New York Times called "Heed Their Rising Voices" accus-
ing the police of promulgating a "wave of terror" in Mont-
gomery, Alabama. Written in rhetorical language the ad,
if taken literally, was essentially untrue. Sullivan, a
Montgomery public official responsible for the police de-
partment, sued the Times for libel. An Alabama Court award-
ed Sullivan damages. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States, however, the judgment was reversed.
In overturning the Alabama decision, the Supreme Court
said: "The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a
federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
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damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
•actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
3
By requiring a public official to prove "actual malice" the
role of the press as a watchdog over public officials' con-
duct in the performance of his job was effectively streng-
thened.
A 1957 case, Roth v. United States . ^ defined the rela-
tionship between First Amendment rights of free speech and
press to the topic of obscenity. The litigation grew out of
a federal statute prohibiting the use of the mail for the
distribution of obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy mater-
ials. Roth was convicted under the statute in a federal
court for using the postal system to mail obscene litera-
ture to his customers. The Supreme Court in upholding the
trial court's conviction asserted that obscenity was not an
expression protected by the First Amendment. The Court
also agreed with the instructions the trial court offered
to the jury in Roth
.
The test in each case is the effect of the book,
picture or publication considered as a whole, not
upon whom it is likely to reach. In other words
you determine its impact upon the average person
3. Ibid., pp. 279-280.
4. 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
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in the community. The books
,
pictures and cir-
culars must be judged as a whole, in their entire
context, and you are not to consider detached or
separate portions in reaching a conclusion. Youjudge the circulars, pictures and publications
which have been put in evidence by present-day
standards of the community. You may ask your selfdoes it offend the common conscience of the com-
munity by present-day standards.
The highest Court went further to define what might be
obscene by stating, "It is therefore vital that the standards
for judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of
speech and press for material which does not treat sex in a
manner appealing to prurient interests." 6
The Supreme Court in Roth therefore established a three
part test to determine what materials might be considered ob-
scene. First, if the material offends the common conscience
of the community, secondly, if the matter in question is with-
out redeeming social value and thirdly, if the material treats
sex in such a way that appeals to prurient interest, restric-
tions may be imposed on the press by the state on the grounds
of obscenity. The Roth test is still used by the courts to-
day in determining what is obscene.
Another important free press case centered around the
problem of licensing. A 1964 decision in Maryland estab-
lished guidelines where a state could be allowed to censor
5 . Ibid
.
,
p. 490
.
6. Ibid
.
.
p. 488.
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free expression. The controversy in Maryland centered around
the State's refusal to license certain films it considered to
be obscene. A statute required films to be submitted to a
censor prior to their release. The Court, recognizing the
difficulty in issuing licenses, pointed out that, "In the
area of freedom of expression it is well established that
one has standing to challenge a statute on the ground that
delegates overly broad licensing discretion to an admin-
istrative office, whether or not his conduct could be pro-
scribed by a properly drawn statute, and whether or not he
. 7
applied for a license."
The Supreme Court offered guidelines by requiring a
censor to provide for procedural safeguards that would pre-
vent the danger of a censor's decision from being final.
Three such rules emerged from Freedman v. Maryland in the
area of censorship.
1. The burden of proof must rest with the censor.
2. The censorship must be administered in such a way
to insure the censor's decision is not final.
3. There must be procedures requiring judicial de-
termination in order to impose valid final re-
straint.
These three rules are basic guidelines today for ag-
encies to follow when censorship of material is being con-
7 • Ibid
.
,
p. 56
.
8. Ibid
.
,
p. 58.
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sidered.
Ginsberg v. State of New York
.
9
1968, raised the que-
stion of what might be obscene to minors. Ginsberg, an op-
erator of a New York luncheon counter, was convicted under
a New York criminal obscenity statute which prohibited the
sale of obscene material to persons under seventeen. The
charge resulted after Ginsberg had sold a •girlie" maga-
zine to a sixteen year old boy. The magazine, however, was
not considered obscene for adults. Ginsberg contended that
the constitutional freedom of expression did not depend on
a citizen being an adult or a minor. The Supreme Court re-
jected Ginsberg “s contention and offered specific guidelines
where material considered harmful to minors would be pro-
hibited.
Harmful to minors means that quality of any de-
scription or representation, in whatever form, of
nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sa-
domasochistic abuse, when it:
(i) predominately appeals to the prurient, shameful
or morbid interests of minors, and
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in
the adult community as a whole with respect to
what is suitable material for minors, and
(iii) is utterly redeeming social importance
for minors.
Controversies involving college presses have resulted
in important judicial pronouncements on a student's right
9.
10.
88 S ct. 1274 (1968)
Ibid
.
,
p. 1284
.
to a free press. Dickey v. A1 abama . ^ ^ 1967, affirming a
college student’s right to a free press has directly in-
fluenced a similar expanse of this right to public school
pupils. In Dickey the Court said that, "A State cannot
force a college student to forfeit his constitutionally
protected right of freedom of expression as a condition
to his attending a State supported institution."^ Dic-
key had been refused readmittance to one of Alabama's
schools because of his controversial editorial in support
of the University of Alabama's President’s stand on the
right of a free press in a university. Dickey ordered his
reinstatement as a student. These cases provide the jud-
icial framework by which litigation involving a public scho
ol pupil's right to a free press were decided upon by the
courts in the late 1960's.
Student Suits Alleging Violation of Free Press
There are a sufficient number of court decisions now
on a public school pupil's right to a free press estab-
lishing guidelines for school officials to follow when at-
tempting to regulate student printed matter. Taken in
11. 273 F. Supp. 613 (1967); see also: Lee v. Board
Regents of State Colleges
,
306 F. Supp. 1097 (1969); An-
tonelli v. Hammond
,
308 F. Supp. 1329 (1970); Trujillo v.
Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (1971)
!2. Ibid
.
.
p. 618.
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chronological order
,
these decisions follow a pattern that
firmly shows that students today have the constitutional right
to freedom of the press.
A landmark case where public school pupils gained re-
cognition of First Amendment rights directly related to the
printed word was Zucker v. Panitz
.
13
1969. Zucker, a high
school student in New York, was denied the right to publish
a paid advertisement in the school newspaper opposing the
war in Vietnam. He challenged the decision on the grounds
he was being denied his First Amendment right to freedom of
speech. The defendant sought to advance the theory, "...
That the publication is was not a newspaper in the usual
sense but is was a beneficial educational device developed
as part of the curriculum and intended to insure primarily
to the benefit of those who compile, edit and publish it." 14
School officials contended that only purely commercial ads
would be accepted in the newspaper.
It is important to note here that the Federal District
Court in New York viewed a high school newspaper as an in-
strument for students to express their opinions. The Court
stated, "We have found, from review of its contents, that
within the context of the school and educational environ-
15
ment, it is a forum for the dissemination of ideas." As
13. 299 F. Supp. 102 (1969)
14. Ibid
.
,
p. 103.
15. Ibid
.
,
p. 105.
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a result, the Court took the view that to prohibit the pol-
itical ad would deny Zucker the right to express his opinion
on the Vietnam War in a recognized "forum for the dissemina-
tion of ideas". Holding in favor of Zucker, the Court rea-
soned, "It would be both incongruous and dangerous for this
Court to hold that students who wish to express their views
on matters intimately related to them, through traditionally
accepted non—disruptive modes of communication, may be pre-
cluded from doing so by that same adult community." 16 The
Zucker decision established a precedent that subsequent
courts have followed regarding the status of high school
newspapers, mainly that they are vehicles open to students
for the expression of their opinions.
Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District
.
1969
is an equally important landmark decision in the area of a
student's right to a free press. The litigation resulted
when two pupils from Sharpstown Junior/Senior High School
in Houston, Texas were expelled because of their involvement
in the production and distribution of a "newspaper" called
the Pflashlyte which criticized school officials. School
officials were particularly upset by Pflashlyte
.
since as
an underground newspaper, it was not under the control of
the school. Sullivan and Fisher, the two high school students
16. Ibid.
17. 307 F. Supp. 1328 (1969)
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involved, had been distributing the publication across the
street from the school and in various shops and stores fre-
quented by students. Some students took the paper into class
thereby causing minor disruptions. Upon guestionina by the
principal and the assistant principal, the two students ad-
mitted to distributing the newspaper. They were advised
they were in serious violation of school regulations, espec-
ially because of their involvement in a "secret" organiza-
tion, namely the Students For a Democratic Society. At the
time of questioning by the school officials, neither student
was informed that disciplinary action would be taken. Five
days later, Sullivan and Fisher were both expelled for the
remainder of the school year. In spite of the students® pro-
mise to stop the newspaper if readmitted, the expulsion re-
mained in effect.
Using Tinker as the controlling influence, the Federal
Court broadened the scope of the First Amendment protection
to include newspapers in the public schools. The Court
asserted, "...Freedom of speech, which includes publication
and distribution of newspapers, may be exercised to its
fullest potential on school premises so long as it does not
1
8
unreasonably interfere with normal school activities."
However, the Court pointed out that a newspaper is subject
18. Ibid .
,
p. 1340
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to some control by school officials even if it does not ma-
terially and substantially disrupt the normal process of ed-
ucation. Reasonable
,
non-discriminatory regulations regard-
ing the time, place, manner, and duration of distributing
a non-disruptive publication on school premises would be
19
valid. ^
The action taken by the school administration against
Sullivan and Fisher was considered even more questionable
since they were distributing the newspaper off the school
grounds. On this point the Court said, "In this Court's
judgment, it makes little sense to extend the influence of
school administration to off-campus activity under the the-
ory that such activity might interfere with the function of
education. ... School officials may not judge a student's be-
havior while he is in his home with his family nor does it
seem to this Court that they should have jurisdiction over
20his acts on a public street corner." They reasoned that,
"A student is subject to the same criminal laws and owes the
same civil duties as other citizens, and his status as a
student should not alter his obligations to others during
21his private life away from the campus."
19. Ibid .
20. Ibid.
21 . Ibid.
,
p. 1341
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The Federal District Court in Texas did leave room for
possible exceptions to controlling off-campus activities.
"Arguable, misconduct by students during non-school hours
and away from school premises could, in certain situations,
have such a lasting effect on other students that disruption
could result during the next school day. Perhaps then ad-
ministrators should be able to exercise some degree of in-
fluence over off—campus conduct. This Court considers even
this power to be questionable." 22 The Court continued, "How-
ever under any circumstances, the school certainly may not
exercise more control over off-campus behavior than over
23
on-campus conduct."
The fact that the Pf lashlyte was primarily intended for
discussions and comments affecting student-administrator re-
lations, the disruptions were only minor, and the two stu-
dents were subject to the laws governing libel, slander,
and obscenity, the District Court held in favor of the two
students. Sullivan effectively "incorporates" a public
school pupil's right to a free press by stating, "..Ex-
cepting only oral expression, the publication of a 'news-
paper' is First Amendment activity in its purest form." 24
A case similar to Sullivan resulted when a student was
suspended for writing an off-school newspaper critical of
22 . Ibid .
23. Ibid.
24.
Ibid
.
,
p. 1342.
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school policies and authorities. 25 Scoville, the student in-
volved, was suspended for the remainder of his second sem-
ester for "gross disobedience and misconduct". The school
noted that Scoville 1 s suspension was not because he
published and distributed an unauthorized newspaper on the
school grounds, but because of the objectionable content of
the paper. "Grass High", the publication in question, was
a newspaper of fourteen pages containing poetry, essays,
movie and record reviews, and a critical editorial. The
school officials objected to parts in "Grass High" that cal-
led upon students to destroy material given to them by the
school for their parents. Also considered objectionable
were comments alluding to the Dean as a man possessed with
a "sick mind" and a statement, "Oral sex may prevent tooth
decay"
.
In using Tinker
.
the Circuit Court posed the question
at hand as, "...Whether the writing of "Grass High" and its
sale in school to sixty students and faculty members could
reasonably have led the boarcJ to forecast substantial dis-
26
ruption of a material interference with school activities."
The Court felt it did not and decided in favor of Scoville.
In doing so, the school officials were reminded of one of
their primary functions in an educational institution. "While
25. Scoville v. Board of Education of Joliet Town-
ship High School District 204
,
etc
.
,
111
. ,
425 F. 2d 10 (1970)
26. Ibid
.
,
p. 12
.
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recognizing the need for effective discipline in operating
schools, the law requires that the school rules be related
to the State interest in the production of well-trained in-
tellects with constructive critical stances, lest students'
imaginations, intellects and wills be unduly chilled.
Dealing with the objectionable parts of the newspaper,
the Appeals Court did not condone its content but considered
it within the confines of a student's right to free expres-
sion. "The 'Grass High' editorial imputing a 'sick mind' to
the Dean, said the Court, "reflects a disrespectful and taste-
less attitude toward authority. 11 The Court further said
about the statement, "Oral sex may prevent tooth decay",
This attempt to amuse comes as a shock to an older genera-
tion but today's students in high school are not insulated
from the shocking but legally accepted language used by dem-
onstrators and protestors in streets and on campuses and by
authors of best-selling modern literature."
It is clear from Sullivan and Scoville that exclusions
of student newspapers could only be allowed where Tinker's
material and substantial disruption test could be met. The-
refore, the First Amendment rights to a free press, is in
fact, a student constitutional right. Scoville is also in-
fluenced by New York Times v. Sullivan for the "sick mind"
27. Ibid
.
,
p. 14
.
28. Ibid.
29.
Ibid.
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statement, although in poor taste, would not meet the test
of "actual malice". Finally, Scoville also used the formula
suggested by the Supreme Court in Roth where the publication
in question was judged by present-day standards of the par-
ticular community involved to determine if it was objection-
able. As seen, the Appeals Court judged that "Grass High"
was not obscene by present-day standards.
Another important case in the area of a students' right
to a free press reaching the Federal Appeals Court system is
30
the recent Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education , 1971.
Before deciding the case, the Circuit Court suggested the
complexity of the problems involved in this particular area
of constitutional law by saying, "The problems raised by
this case defy geometric solutions. The best one can hope
for is to discern lines of analysis and advance formulations
sufficient to bridge past decisions with new facts. One must
be satisfied with such present solutions andcannot expect
a clear view of the terrain beyond the periphery of the im-
mediate case. It is a frustrating process which does not
31
admit of safe analytical harbors."
The Eisner controversy resulted when students in the
Stamford, Connecticut school system challenged a school
board rule requiring newspapers that were to be distributed
30. 440 F. 2d 803 (1971)
31. Ibid,
,
pp. 804-805.
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in school would first have to be submitted to the adminis-
tration for approval. The lower court32 held the adminis-
tration's rule to be an unconstitutional abridgment of the
students' First Amendment rights. The Federal District Court
relied heavily on Near v. Minnesota
, a decision, as seen, that
held prior restraint of speech and press unconstitutional.
The Federal Appeals Court sustained the lower court's dec-
ision and the reasoning in the case has important implica-
tions for public school pupils and freedom of the press.
The rule in question promulgated by the Stamford School
Board stated:
The Board of Education desires to encourage free-dom of expression and creativity by its students
subject to the following limitation:
No person shall distribute any printed or written
matter on the grounds of any school or in any
school building unless the distribution of such
material shall have prior approval by the school
administration.
In granting or denying approval, the following
guidelines shall apply.
No material shall be distributed which, either
by its content or by the manner of distribution
itself, will interfere with the proper and orderly
operation and discipline of the school, will cause
violence or disorder, or will constitute an in-
vasion of the rights of others.
In affirming the lower court's decision in Eisner
.
the
Appellate Court first expanded on the Stamford Board's rule
32. Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 314 F. Supp.
832 (1970)
33. Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education.
803, 805 (1971)'
440 F. 2d
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on school newspapers. They said, "Unless the policy.
. .pur-
ports to delegate greater power to restrain the distribution
of disruptive matter that Tinker allows, or unless it other-
wise unreasonably burdens students 0 First Amendment activity,
34it is valid." The Court went on to say that, "The policy
does not in any way interfere with students' freedom to dis-
seminate and receive material outside school property; nor
does it threaten to interfere with the predominate respon-
sibility of parents for their children's welfare. The state-
ment [the board's regulation] is, therefore, in many ways nar-
rowly drawn to achieve its permissible purposes, and indeed
may fairly be characterized as a regulation of speech, ra-
35ther than a blanket prior restraint." The problem with the
rule was that the Board did not make specific the kinds of
disruptions it considered illegal, the criteria for censor-
ship and where material could be distributed.
However, in affirming the District Court's decision in
Eisner, the higher court did so with significant reserva-
tions. The difference in the judgment of the Appeals Court
centered around the lower court's belief that all prior re-
straints are unconstitutional as seen in Near v. Minnesota
,
and that censors must follow the procedures stipulated in
Freedman v. Maryland
.
Near
,
the Appellate Court pointed out,
34. Ibid
.
.
p. 808.
35. Ibid.
36.
Ibid
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did not invalidate all previous restraint and that restraints
on student newspapers would be constitutional if the "mater-
ial and substantial" disruption test could be met. The Court
further felt that requirements set forth for censorship in
should not necessarily apply to student newspapers.
Freedman, for example, required judicial action before a fin-
al restraint by a censor could be legal.
Since the purpose of the Stamford School Board's rule
was not to suppress but to prevent disorders, the Federal
Circuit Court had this to say. "We do not regard the Board's
policy as imposing nearly so onerous a 'prior restraint'
,
as
was involved in Freedman
. Also, we believe that it would
be highly disruptive to the educational process if a second-
ary school principal were required to take a school news-
paper editor to court every time the principal reasonably
anticipated disruption and sought to restrain its cause. Thus,
we will not require school officials to seek a judicial de-
cree before they may enforce the Board's policy." Eisner
.
however, suggested that "...If students choose to litigate,
school authorities must demonstrate a reasonable basis for
interference with student speech, and that courts will not
rest content with officials' bare allegation that such a
3 8basis existed." The procedure requiring expeditious
37. Ibid
.
,
p. 810.
38 Ibid.
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review in Freedman, however, was held to be valid in censor-
ing student newspapers.
Details were further given why other aspects of the
board's policy made it invalid.
This policy is also deficient in failing to spec-ify to whom and how material may be submitted for
clearance. Absent such specifications, students
unreasonably proscribed by the terms of the
policy statement from distributing any written
material on school property, since the statement
leaves them ignorant of clearance procedures.
Nor does it provide that the prohibition against
distribution without prior approval is to be in-
operative until each,school has established a
screening procedure."0
As a result of the details spelled out by the Court for
the Stamford School Board on regulating student newspapers,
Eisner is particularly important for it offers any school
board guidelines for making rules and regulations on this
sensitive topic.
In the previously mentioned controversy over the stud-
ent newspaper Pf lashlyte a Federal District Court in Texas
offered specific guidelines for the Houston School Board to
follow when regulating student printed matter.^ The guide-
lines stated:
1. The rule must be specific as to places and
times where possession and distribution of
published materials is prohibited.
39. Ibid
.
.
p. 811.
40. Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District
.
307 F. Suppo 1328 (1969)
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2. The rule must be understandable to persons of
the age and experience of covered students.
3. The rule must not prohibit or inhibit conduct
which is orderly, peaceful and reasonably qui-
et and which is not coercive of any other per-
son's right to accept or reject and written
material being distributed subject to the rule.
4. The rule may prohibit such distribution at
times and in places where normal classroom
activity is being conducted. Such rule may
not prohibit such distribution at other times
and places unless such prohibition is neces-
sary to prevent substantial and material in-
terference with or delay of normal school fun-
ction.
The student press controversy in Houston was again in
court two years later in a second Sullivan v. Houston In-
dependent School District .^ The facts in the more recent
Sullivan decision were these. Paul Kitchen, a junior at
Waltrip Senior High School, was selling a publication called
Space City to students off the school grounds. The principal
bought a copy of the underground newspaper and later in the
day, suspended Kitchen for breach of school board policy un-
til a conference could be scheduled with his father. The
principal heard the word "goddamn" as Kitchen was leaving
his office after being notified of his suspension. The sus-
pension hearing was scheduled six days later. On the day of
the suspension hearing Paul was once again selling Space
City near the school grounds. During a confrontation with
41. Ibid .
,
p. 1152.
42. 333 F. Supp. 1149 (1971)
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the principal the student used the word "fuck" after he was
threatened with arrest. Subsequently
,
the police were called
in to arrest Kitchen and he was later released. A hearing
was held in the principal's office and an expulsion was or-
dered for remainder of the semester. The assistant superin-
tendent later affirmed the expulsion order leading to the
litigation. The principal explained that he suspended the
student because he deemed the newspaper to be obscene. This
decision was based on the fact an editorial used the phrase
"High School is fucked up"
.
The regulations governing student publications adopted
by the board after the injunction in the first Sullivan de-
cision said essentially that: "A copy of the publication...
will be taken... to the principal, who may take up to one school
day for the purpose of reviewing such publication before its
general distribution". The regulation also provided for the
board's attorneys to review the publication in question to
determine if it "contains libelous or obscene language or
advocates illegal action or disobedience to published rules
on student conduct adopted by the Board of Trustees".
The principal, however, did not follow the rules estab-
lished by the board for he suspended Kitchen the same day
because in his opinion, the publication was obscene. Fur-
ther, it was not reviewed by an attorney as the rules re-
quired when the issue of obscenity was raised. The Court,
in dealing with the obscenity question held that the phrase
"High School is fucked up" was not obscene. The phrase did
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not meet the Roth test of treating sex in a manner appeal-
ing to prurient interests since, according to present-day
standards, the expression meant the school was in bad shape
and had nothing to do with sex. Furthermore, the phrase was
taken out of context, something forbidden in Roth
,
for the
publication, judged as a whole by experts, was considered
to have substantial educational value. The Baker and Vought
decisions in the previous chapter upholding the school of-
ficial's judgment that the materials in question were obscene
differs from Sullivan because the students themselves admit-
ted in these two cases that parts of their publications were
obscene. Finally, the regulations that allowed a school prin-
cipal to review publications prior to distribution and for
attorneys to determine if a student publication might be ob-
scene, was declared unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
The Court in the second Sul 1 ivan decision did make a
significant point by asserting that school officials could
take immediate action in a "special emergency situation",
43
suggested m Crews v. Clones
. They spelled out when such
a "special emergency situation" might arise.
The Court recognizes that exceptions necessarily
delimit every rule. In the emotionally charged
area of public school policy, a greater-than-
usual degree of flexibility is perhaps essential...
in times of crisis, where lives and property are
seriously threatened, customary constitutional
protections may be temporarily curtailed in order
43. 303 F. Supp. 1370 (1969); Crews v. Clones
.
432 F.
2d 1259 (1970)
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to prevent the distruction of the system which
confers those rights. ^
Under this concept, similar to the clear and present dan-
ger theory and Tinker's material and substantial test, First
Amendment rights of a free press might be curtailed.
Summary
The cases reviewed here point out quite clearly that in
addition to the constitutional rights of free speech and ex-
pression, the Courts have recognized the extension of the
First Amendment right of free press to public school pupils.
Basically, subject to relatively minor restrictions noted in
the cases reviewed in this chapter, students have the same
constitutional rights to a free press as adults and this
right can be impinged upon only if the exercise of the right
results in a material and substantial disruption of the ed-
ucational process.
44. Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District ,
333 F. Supp. 11497 1170 (1971)
CHAPTER VI
REGULATION OF OFF-CAMPUS SECRET SOCIETIES
Introduction
As seen in Chapter Four, Tinker v. Des Moines Independ-
ent. Community School District . 1969, and subsequent court de-
cisions, mostly by the federal courts, have firmly establis-
bod that public school pupils are guaranteed the constitution-
al right of free expression, symbolic or otherwise. If in
the exercise of their constitutional right of free expression,
students assemble, petition or use the press, as long as it
does not materially and substantially disrupt the normal pro-
cess of education, these three additional First Amendment
rights are also protected. There is, however, one area of
freedom of assembly, membership in secret societies, frat-
ernities, and sororities, that is now questionable in light
of recent decisions by the courts.
As long ago as 1912, the courts in California upheld
the suspension of a student for violating a state law designed
to prevent the formation and to prohibit the existence of
secret, oathbound fraternities in the public schools.'1' On
the subject of secret societies in the litigation that chal-
lenged the law, the Court said, "It has been said of such
societies that they tend to engender an undemocratic spirit
1 . Bradford v . Board of Education of City and County
of San Francisco
.
18 Cal. App. 19, 21 p. 929 T^lTT
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of caste, to promote cliques, and to foster a contempt for
school authority."
2
The reasoning in Bradford that allowed
college fraternities and sororities to exist and at the same
time disallowed similar organizations in elementary and sec-
ondary schools, has been followed in a number of subsequent
decisions down to the present time. Acknowledging the dif-
ference between college and high school students, the Cal-
ifornia Court contended that, "Normal schools and colleges
are attended by students who are preparing for the serious
affairs of life; and being older in years and with wider ex-
perience are better fortified to withstand any possible hurt-
ful influence attendant upon membership in secret societies
and clubs than the younger pupils attending elementary and
secondary schools, who are less experienced and more impres-
3
sionable.
"
Until the 1960 °s such cases banning secret societies
were not primarily challenged by students alleging viola-
tions of their lirst Amendment right to free assembly. When
the issue was raised, the courts dismissed the notion with-
4
out discussion as being irrelevent. Burkitt v. School Dis-
5trict No.
_1, Mul tbinah County , 1952, for example said, "As
far as the federal constitution is concerned, the validity
2 . Ibid .
3 . Ibid .
4. Alison M. Grey, "First Amendment Right of Association
for High School Student," California. Law Review , vol. 55
(August, 1967), 914.
5. 264 P. 2d 566 (1922)
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of such state legislation has been authoratively deter-
£
mined..." by the Supreme Court. As late as 1962 a
state court dismissed any consideration of the First
Amendment for the reason that no debatable constitutional
guestion was involved in secret societies.^
In 1966, a California law disallowing secret soc-
ieties in the public schools was challenged by students.
^
Judy Robinson, a member of the "Manana Club" in a Sacra-
mento high school, sought to have the act declared uncon-
stitutional on the grounds it encroached on her First Am-
endment right of free assembly. She had been suspended
from school because of her membership in the club. The
Court, in refusing to declare the act unconstitutional,
subscribed to the earlier Bradford decision. The Court
judged secret societies to be detrimental and inimical to
the best interests of the public schools of the district
and to the government, discipline and morale of the pupils. 9
It was alleged by Miss Robinson that the Mariana Club
fostered charity, democracy, and literary activities and
6. Ibid
.
,
p. 568.
7. Holroyd v. Eibling
,
186 N.E. 2d 200 (1962)
8. Robinson v. Sacaramento City Unified School District,
53 Cal. Rptr . 781 (19661
—
9 . Ibid
.
,
p. 782
.
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was not a secret society. However, the Court, upon an ex-
amination of the club, did indeed declare it a secret soc-
iety since its new candidates were chosen solely upon a
secret ballot by the existing members. Similar restraints
upon adult citizens, the Court implied, would not be con-
stitutional. The right of adults freely to join together
socially and to assemble for lawful purpose may be conceded
include the right to form and maintain clubs, secret or
non—secret, the right to be as snobbish as they choose, and
any attempt at interference with that right be legislative
or administrative mandate may well be said to be arbitrary,
unreasonable and therefore in violation of the First Amend-
ment. The Court avoided dealing directly with the issue of
free assembly by stating, “The First Amendment guarantee of
the right of free assembly as applied to adults (or even to
college students, concerning whose rights under the circum-
stances here involved we express no opinion) is not involved
here.
. .
.
“ ^° In avoiding the constitutional question of as-
sembly, the Court continued, "Here the school board is not
dealing with adults but with adolescents in their formative
years.... It is dealing under express statutory mandate with
activities which reach into the school and which reasonably
may be said to interfere with the edcuational process
,
with
the morale of high school student bodies as a whole and which
Ibid
.
,
pp. 789-790.
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also may reasonably be said not to foster democracy (as the
Manana constitution preaches) but to frustrate democracy
(as the Manana Club by its admitted activities practice)." 11
As seen m Robinson, the California state court declared
a rule prohibiting secret societies for adult citizens would
clearly be an abridgement of First Amendment rights. School
children, however, would not necessarily be afforded the
same constitutional protection as adults since they are in
their "formative years" and thus, subject to the discre-
tion of the school boards. The fact that secret societies,
even though off-campus, tend to foster undemocratic ideals
which might lower the morale of other students was consid-
ered by the court reason enough to reject the claim that
the students' First Amendment rights were being violated
by the state. Incidentally, the Robinson decision has a
good review of cases up to 1966 that have upheld state rules
prohibiting secret societies.
The most recent court decision the writer has been able
to find wherein students have alleged abridgement of their
right to freedom of assembly by the public schools is in
Pass el v. Fort Worth Independent School District
.
1968. 13
In the Passel litigation, students sought to enjoin the
school's officials from enforcing a rule adpoted by the
H . Ibid
.
.
p. 790.
12. Ibid
.
.
pp. 788-789.
13. 429 S.S. 2d 917 (1968)
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Houston Board of Education in 1966 requiring parents of all
students entering a junior or senior high school in Sep-
tember, 1967 to sign a "Supplementary Application for En-
rollment" form certifying that the student was not a member
and that he or she would not become a member of a high school
fraternity, sorority, or secret society. The rule, the stu-
dents alleged, deprived them of their right to freedom of
association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.
The Texas Court, however, rejected the students' con-
tention saying, " 0 ..The legislative purpose is not to include
any educational organization which has standards or rules by
which... it is admitted that the basis for membership is by
the secret ballot of the clubs themselves rather than upon
rules which any student could qualify." 14 The Court went on
to add another dimension to the arguments prohibiting secret
societies in public schools declaring that such societies
promote invidious discrimination abhorred by the Supreme
Court of the United States. In concluding that promoting
racial discrimination can be lawfully banned by public school
boards, Passel stated, "We think it well within the police
power of the State to adopt standards to guide the adminis-
tration of our public school system and we will not substitute
our judgment for that of the Legislature or the School Board
14. Ibid
.
,
p. 923.
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unless there is some element of willful or intentional dis-
crimination or some real threat of injury to vested property
rights.
"
15
School Board Regulations Prohibiting
Secret Societies and Recent Court Decisions
Granting Students First Amendment Rights
In view of the Tinker decision in 1969 which granted pub-
lic school pupils First Amendment rights, the legality of re-
gulating off-campus secret societies by school boards ap-
pears highly questionable today. Alison M. Grey in an art-
icle, "First Amendment Right of Association for High School
Student", "The right of association like other First Amend-
ment rights, "he stated, "should be restricted only to fur-
ther a strong state interest, only in the absence of equally
effective alternative means of protecting the state inter-
est, and only to the extent necessary to maintain the state
16
interest involved." High school clubs and organizations
should thus be evaluated. Grey feels, on these terms.
Tinker offers the material and substantial formula as
a pragmatic and legal test to determine when a student's First
Amendment rights may be abridged by school authorities. Ro-
binson
,
for example, showed no evidence of actual disruption
or a potential material and substantial disruption to the
educational process. Organizations, on the other hand, that
15. Ibid.
16. Grey, p. 919
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foster deliberate, invidious racial discrimination bring
in a strong state interest and could be disallowed on the
grounds they violate the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as seen in Passel
.
^,1 .1 .ivan v * Houston Independent School District, dis-
cussed in the previous chapter on the press, a post-Tinker
decision, hinted at what attitude a federal court might
take toward the regulation of off-campus societies today.
The Court in Sullivan stated, "In this court's judgment,
it makes little sense to extend the influence of school ad-
ministration to off-campus activity under the theory that
such activity might interfere with the function of educa-
17tion." On the regulation of off-campus activities that
might interfere with school discipline, the Court spec-
ulated, "Perhaps then administrators should be able to ex-
ercise some degree of influence over off-campus conduct.
This court considers even this power to be questionable." 18
Court decisions involving the regulation of off-campus ex-
pression by school boards also have been held unconstitutional
as seen in the previous two chapters.
Marc A. Sheiness in an article in the Baylor Law Review
.
"Fraternities, Sororities, and Secret Societies in Public
School", alleges that the Theta Omega Phi sorority in the
Houston area has not been disallowed by school officials
17. 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1340 (1969)
18. Ibid
.
,
p. 1341.
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because the society is not in school, does not bring dis-
credit on the school, and that the members are daughters of
school officials. 19 He points out that inconsistencies exist
m which societies are allowed and not allowed. Sheiness con-
eludes his article by offering the Tinker formula as a more
consistent guide in regulating secret societies. "
. . .[Thus),
the students' right to attend school and his right to par-
ticipate in extracurricular activities should not be denied
him unless, he himself, by his own acts, has acted incor-
rigibly so as to materially and substantially interfere
with the proper maintenance of the school." 20
The P
a
,s ft r 1 litigation over the Houston secret society
did not end in 1968. The higher court in Texas remanded
the judgment back to the district court for further pro-
ceedings on legal technicalities saying, "The case has not
been tried on its merits, and is not ripe for the rendition
21
of a final judgment." The district court once again ren-
dered an unfavorable judgment against the students seeking
to have the ban on their club exempted from the Houston
School Board's determination that they were a secret society.
In addition to the reasoning offered in the initial Passel
decision it is significant to note that the Court of Civil
19. Marc A. Sheiness, "Fraternities, Sororities, and
Secret Societies in Public Schools," Baylor Law Review, vol.
XXII, (Summer, 1970), 374.
20. Ibid
.
,
p. 378.
21 o Passel v. Fort Worth Independent School District ,
440 S.W. 2d 61 (1969)
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Appeals of Texas in affirming the judgment of the lower
court agreed that the activities "substantially and mat-
erially disrupted and affected the orderly operation of
the school ." 22
It appears that the Texas Court saw the necessity of
applying the Tinker First Amendment test in rendering the
second Pass el decision. Even though the students were un-
successful in their litigation against the Houston School
Board
,
they established the precedent that secret socie-
ties would be considered on the basis of the material and
substantial test. How influer. tial Passel will be in de-
termining future litigation involving secret societies
remains to be seen.
Summary
It is clear today that students are guaranteed all
the First Amendment rights by virtue of Tinker and subsequent
court decisions reviewed in this study. Most likely, in
spite of the second Passel decision, if a student today
brought litigation into a federal court seeking to declare
regulations prohibiting off-campus, secret societies uncon-
!
stitutional for breach of free assembly, would be successful.
The courts undoubtedly will apply the Tinker material and
substantial test as the controlling factor to determine if
22. Passel v. Fort Worth Independent School District,
453 S.W. 2d 888 '(1970T~
.
the secret society should be allowed. Courts might, as
seen in Passel
.
justify regulations prohibiting secret
societies that encourage invidious racial discrimination.
However
,
that still leaves guestionable the status of non
disruptive off-campus secret societies and its relation-
ship to a public school pupil "s right to free assembly.
CHAPTER VII
FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Introduction
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states that it
is
,
"The right of the people to be secure ... against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures." The amendment further re-
quires a search warrant to be issued upon probable cause
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
The question of whether or not students are afforded
Fourth Amendment protection has been raised thus far in
only a few instances. The cases where students have al-
leged violations of their Fourth Amendment rights are quite
similar. In these cases, school officials or law enforce-
ment officers conducted searches and seized materials in
public schools without adhering strictly to Fourth Amend-
ment requirements. The seized materials were later placed
in evidence during criminal prosecutions of the students in-
volved. The courts in each instance have rejected the stu-
dents' contention that evidence seized in school should not
be admitted due to alleged violations of their Fourth Am-
endment rights o However, in the few cases that have raised
the Fourth Amendment issue the courts have not completely
rejected the notion that students in the public schools be
afforded some measure of Fourth Amendment protection.
Charles M. Wetterer in his article, "Search and Seizure
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in Public Schools," raises a number of questions that exist
between a public school and a pupil's relationship to his
Fourth Amendment rights. He states, "Suppose the student
objects stenuously to the search and protests his innocence
and is, indeed, innocent of any wrong doing. In conduct-
in a search, has the administrator violated the student's
rights? May a student be later accused of a crime on the
basis of evidence uncovered in the search, will such evid-
ence be admitted in court if procured without a search war-
rant? If an administrator uncovers drugs or other contra-
band, must he call the police? If police arrive a school
without a search warrant, must school authorities co-
operate and permit a search? When a student agrees to a
search after being ordered to do so by a teacher or prin-
cipal has he waived his right of freedom from unreasonable
1
search?"
Because of the Supreme Court's insistance that states
2conform to federal consi tutional standards, and recent
court decisions holding certain types of searches and sei-
3
sures unconstitutional and judicial recognition of students'
constitutional rights, litigation on the questions posed by
Mr. Wetterer has resulted.
1. Charles M. Wetterer, "Search and Seizure in Public
Schools," N. 0 . L P . E School Law Journal
,
vol I (Spring, 1971)
2 . Mapp V. Phil
,
365 U. S. 743 (1961)
3. Bumper v. North Carolina
,
391 U.S. 543 (1968)
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The massive drug problem prevalent in the public schools
makes it necessary for immediate judicial guidelines invol-
ving search and seizure. A public school obviously is the
most readily available place where masses of young people
are in close proximity to one another. The public school
therefore affords drug pushers and user s a place to conduct
their transactions. Parents, police, and school officials
in an effort to curb drug use and abuse, see as a major
goal the discouragement of harmful drugs on school premises.
This, of course, has implications for search and seizures.
Student Suits Raising the Fourth Amendment
The beginning of what turned out to be a lengthly and
complex judicial proceeding resulted when three detectives
bearing a search warrant directing the search of two high
school students, confronted Dr. Adolph Panitz, the vice-
principal of Mount Vernon High School in New York. 4 Dr.
Panitz summoned the two students to his office and they were
searched. After questioning the students at length, Car-
los Overton, one of the students who were being questioned,
responded with "I guess so" or "Maybe" when asked if he
had marijuana in his locker. The detectives, the vice-
principal, and a custodian proceeded to open Overton's
locker where marijuana cigarettes were discovered. Later
4. People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 360 (1967), 283
N.Y. 2d 20 (1967)
14 7
it was determined the search was not legal for the warrant
did not authorize the search of Overton's locker. In the
litigation that followed, Overton moved to have the evid-
ence suppressed in a youthful offender proceeding.
The case raised a number of important questions re-
lating to Fourth Amendment rights of public school pupils.
First, did Overton give his consent to the search? Should
he have been advised of his rights? Could his locker be
s^^^ched without a search warrant? Finally, does a school
official have the right to search and seize contraband
from a school locker?
The trial judge dismissed Fourth Amendment consider-
ations and ruled that the evidence against Overton could be
admitted on the ground that the board of education retained
dominion over school lockers through the vice-principal. The
Appellate Term later reversed the trial court. However,
the Court of Appeals of New York reversed the Appellate de-
cision and allowed the evidence admitted, concluding that
Dr. Panitz consented to the search and that such consent was
binding on Overton.
The Court of Appeals of New York reasoned, "Not only
have the school authorities a right to inspect but this
right becomes a_ duty when suspicion arises that something
of an illegal nature may be secreted there. [Emphasis supplied]
5. Ibid
.
,
p. 25
.
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The Court further asserted that, "When Dr. Panitz learned
of the detectives 8 suspicion, he was obliged to inspect the
locker
. This interest, together with the non-exclusive nat-
ure of the locker, empowered him to consent to the search by
the officers." {Emphasis supplied]
Overton argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were
abridged because the vice—principal opened the door of his
locker, not because he was exercising a free supervisory
control over the locker in the interest of the school pro-
gram, but because the invalid search warrant compelled him
to do so. A petition for certiorari was filed in the Supreme
Court and in October, 1968, the highest court granted the
writ in a Per Curiam opinion, vacated the judgment and re-
manded the case for further consideration in light of the
7
recent Bumper decision.
gBumper v. North Carolina
.
held that where coercion
was evident in a search, it would be unconstitutional on
the ground it is unreasonable. Isolated on a mile-long
dirt road in North Carolina, a sixty-six year old Negro
grandmother, when confronted by four law enforcement of-
ficers who announced, "I have a search warrant to search
your house," said, "Go ahead," and opened the door. A war-
rant was never shown Mrs. Bumper and in the search that
6 . Ibid
.
,
p. 25
.
7. Overton v. New York
.
393 U.S. 85 (1968)
8. 391 U.S. 543 (1968)
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followed, a .22 caliber rifle instrumental in Bumper's con-
viction of rape was seized. The Supreme Court, in holding
the search to be an unreasonable one, said, "When a law en-
forcement officer claims authority to search a home under
a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no
right to resist the search, jjf] The situation is instinct
with. .. coercion there cannot be consent.
By remanding the Overton case back to the New York
Court in light of their recent Bumper decision, the Supreme
Court was asking the judges to consider the possibility of
coercion in the search of Overton's locker. Upon review of
the facts in Overton
.
the Court of Appeals of New York de-
clared there was no evidence of coercion at Mount Vernon
High School. They concluded that the desks and lockers
were assigned to students for their use, under predetermined
conditions, one of which prohibited the storage of materials
which violate the law."^ Overton strongly asserted that it
was the school official's duty to make the search.
In a case of similar circumstance in California, the
courts revived the concept of iri loco parentis to authorize
a search of a student's locker in a public school. The idea
that a school official has control and responsibilities sim-
ilar to that of a parent while the student is in school has
9 . Ibid
.
, p 0 560
.
10. People v. Overton
,
301 N.Y.S. 2d 479, 482 (1969)
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been eroded by the advent of student constitutional rights.
Arnold Taylor, in the Kentucky Law Journal declares "in loco
_£arent_is_ largely irrelevant." However, in the case, In
Donaldson
,
1969, the Court judged the vice-principal
stands iri loco parentis and is not a governmental official
subject to Fourth Amendment requirements when conducting a
search. Therefore, they viewed, the Fourth Amendment not to
be an issue in the case.
A student in Ponderosa High School in Placeville, Cal-
ifornia approached the vice-principal of the high school and
told him a purchase of speed could be easily made in the bui-
lding. The vice-principal advised the student to make the
purchase. Later, after the purchase of the drugs was made,
the locker of the student who sold the pills was searched
and four-and-one-half packs of marijuana and a plastic bag
containing marijuana was seized. Fifteen year old Donaldson
sought to have the evidence in court against him suppressed
on the grounds the search and seizure was unreasonable and
in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
in a criminal proceeding.
The Court was not in sympathy with Donaldson saying in
part, "We find the vice-principal of the high school not to
11. Arnold Taylor, "With Temperate Rod: Maintaining
Academic Order in Secondary Schools," Kentucky Lav; Journal,
vol • 58 (1969-1970), 624.
12. 75 Cal. Rptr . 220 (1969)
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be a governmental official within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment so as to bring into play its prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Such school official is
one of the school authorities with an obligation to main-
tain discipline in the interest of a proper and orderly
school operation, and the primary purpose of the school of-
ficial's search was not to obtain convictions, but to se-
cure evidence of student misconduct. That evidence of a
crime is uncovered and prosecution results there from should
1
3
not of inself make the search and seizure unreasonable."
It would appear here in Donaldson the Court is stretching
the point when it considers the search of a known drug
pusher's locker in a school to be only for evidence of
breach of school rules. Obviously, the vice-principal, in
this case, acting in the best interest of the school, fully
intended to have the pusher arrested. The Court concluded
in Donaldson by saying, "...Principals and teachers are di-
rected to exercise careful supervision over the moral con-
ditions in their respective schools, the use of narcotics
is not to be tolerated, and students are required to comply
with the regulations and submit to the authority of the tea-
chers . "'1' 4
The Court in effect in the Donaldson decision viewed
13. Ibid
.
,
p. 222
.
14. Ibid
. ,
pp. 222-223
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the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to public school officials
subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment. This
view, however, as mentioned, is impractical for in the event
of a search, evidence seized, if admissible in a court of
law could lead to the conviction of serious crimes. The
California Court further saw no reason why the school offic-
ials could not search the lockers from time to time without
a warrant if they suspected something illegal to be there.
Other courts have not taken the same view of searches and
seizures as the California Court.
In a Kansas case^ not involving drugs, Madison Stein,
a high school student, was charged and convicted of second
degree burglery and grand larceny. A motion to suppress the
evidence used to convict him was made alleging the search
and seizure conducted in his high school violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. The facts of the case are these: On Jan-
uary, 1968, a music store was robbed and the next day two
police officers visited the principal of Stein's school.
With Stein's consent and in his presence, his locker was
searched and a key to a bus depot locker was found there.
The bus depot locker, the key to which was found in Stein's
locker, turned out to contain the goods stolen from the music
store. The Court turned down Stein's contention that the
search in school was illegal, and also ruled that there was
15. State v. Stein , Kan., 456 p. 2d 1 (1969)
153
no coercion involved. The Court further concluded that Stein
did not need to be informed of his rights since he consented
to the search.
The argument that Stein 's Fourth Amendment rights were
not impinged upon because of the nature of a high school looker
was upheld as the Court stated
,
"... It does not possess all
the attributes of a dwelling, a motor vehicle, or a private
locker .... The possessor's right of possession is exclusive;
it is protected from unwarranted intrusion as against the
world. The principal of Ottawa High School testified that
he has custody and control of, and access to, all lockers
at the school; that he has a master list of all combinations
to all combination padlocks, and a key which will open every
locker. He testified also that he opened Stein's locker on
his own judgment."
Concerning the nature of high school lockers, the Kan-
sas Court said, "Although a student may have control of his
school locker as against the school and its officials, a
school does not supply its students with lockers for illicit
use in harboring pilfered property or harmful substances.
We deem it a proper function of school authorities to in-
spect the lockers under their control and to prevent their
use in illicit ways or for illegal purposes. We believe this
right of inspection is inherent in the authority vested in
16. Ibid
.
, p c 3
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school administrators and that the same must be retained
and exercised in the management of our schools if their ed-
ucational functions are to be maintained and the welfare of
the student bodies preserved." 17
Overton
,
Donaldson
,
and Stein all essentially agree on
one basic premise—
—that school officials have the right if
not the duty, to search school lockers upon probable cause
that something illegal might be there and the searches do
not infringe on a student's Fourth Amendment rights.
Can a school official search a student off the school
grounds without violating his Fourth Amendment right to be
secure from an unreasonable search? The courts in New York
ruled that a school official could conduct a search and sei-
zure three blocks from the school in People v. Jackson
.
18 1971.
The Coordinator of Discipline went to a classroom and asked
Andre Jackson to follow him to his office. On the way the
school official noticed a bulge in Jackson's pants pocket.
Upon arriving at the office, Jackson bolted out the door
and down the street. Three blocks from the school the Co-
ordinator of Discipline caught the student who had his hand
inside his pocket. As the Coordinator of Discipline held
his wrist, he ordered Jackson to give the contents to him.
The bulge turned out to be a set of narcotics "works".
17. Ibid.
18. 319 N.Y.S. 2d 731 (1971)
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syringe, eyedropper, needle, etc. The "works" were turned
over to a police officer who was also pursuing Jackson at
the request of the school administrator.
In the litigation that followed, a lower New York court
suppressed the evidence on the grounds that the Coordinator
of Discipline, as a government official, had searched Jack-
son without probable cause in violation of his constitu-
tional rights. The Appeals Court however, reversed the judg-
ment citing the idea that the school officer was acting in
loco parentis . The Court said, "A school official, standing
in loco parentis to the children entrusted to his care, has,
inter alia, the long honored obligation to protect them while
in his charge, so far as possible, from harmful and danger-
our influences, which certainly encompasses the bringing to
school by one of them of narcotics and 'works 0 whether for
sale to other students or for administering such to himself
19
or other students." The reasoning followed pretty much
that used by the courts in Overton and Donaldson as the New
York Court stated, " . . Jj]t would not be unreasonable and un-
warranted that he [the Coordinator of Discipline] be permitted
to search the person of a student where the school official
has reasonable suspicion that narcotics may be found on the
person of his juvenile charge. Such action, of an invest-
igatory nature, would and should be expected of him. Being
justified, he would still be performing this important fun-
19. Ibid . , p. 733.
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ction, though three blocks from school, necessitated by the
flight of this errant boy. As I view the incident, the Co-
ordinator's function and responsibility went with him during
the chase that took him and the boy away from the school.
The Court thus allowed the Coordinator, who was in "hot
pursuit" of the student to conduct the search three blocks
from the school building.
Jackson also raised the point that he was coerced by
the school official in the search of his person, prohibited
by Bumper
. This contention was dismissed also on the premise
that since the school official was acting in. loco parentis
the force he applied was legal. The Court said of the co-
ercion issue:
A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with
the care and supervision of a minor or an incom-
petent person, and a teacher or other person en-
trusted with the care and supervision of a minor
for a special purpose, may use physical force, but
not deadly force, upon such minor or incompetent
person when and to the extent that he reasonably
believes it necessary to maintain discipline or
to promote the
^
yolf are of such minor or incom-
petent person /'^ [Emphasis supplied]
-
A lengthy, but important conclusion offered by the
Court in Jackson illustrates the genuine concern of the
courts over the problem of searches and seizures in schools.
As noted, the rigid standard, probable cause, may
not be imposed upon a school official if he is
expected to act effectively in loco parentis
.
20. Ibid
.
,
p. 733-734.
21. Ibid
1 57
While we are far advanced from the days of the
Little Red Schoolhouse, such advancement has
also brought great ills. Rampant crime and drug
abuse threaten our schools and the youngsters ex-
posed to such ills. Much could be written about
the ponderous problems that beset parents and
school authorities in their efforts to prevent
and stave off the conditions all about us. We
are well aware of the gravity of these conditions.
There is no need for enlargement. In consequence,
greater responsibility has fallen upon those charged
with the well-being and discipline of these child-
ren. What they may do in that regard should be
weighted, on balance, with the full appreciation
of their duties and the nature of that greater
responsibility. Only then can reasonableness be
concluded in the context of the prevailing cir-
cumstances relating to the Fourth Amendment. Rea-
sonable restraint is imposed, less what the school
officials do shall take the form of authoritarian
behavior, trammeling the rights of the students
entrusted to them. Toward that end, a basis found-
eclat least upon reasonable grounds for suspect-
ing that something unlawful is being committed or
about to be committed shall prevail before just-
ifying a search of a student when school of-
ficial is acting in_ loco parentis . ^
An important point to consider in this study of student
constitutional rights is the fact that the lower New York
Court held in favor of the student of the grounds his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by the search of a school of-
ficial. Even in reversing the lower court, the Appeals Court
in New York implied that a student does have the constitu-
tional right ot be secure from unreasonable search and se-
izure by stating, "What the Constitution forbids is not all
searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.
22. Ibid
.
,
p. 736.
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Each search must be determined in its own setting." 23 Fin-
ally, in Jackson
,
the Court did suggest that a school of-
ficial could not stop a student on the street at any time
and conduct a search which does to a degree grant a mea-
sure of protection to students against unreasonable searches.
Summary
Students in the public schools today have yet to be
accorded the full constitutional protection found in the
Fourth Amendment. Mainly because of the drug problem the
courts have granted school officials wide discretion to
conduct searches of students and their lockers by reviving
the eroding in. loco parentis doctrine. A school official
acting in place of the parent may, upon probable cause, le-
gally search a student or his locker. The courts point out
that the Constitution does not say a person shall be free
from any search but an unreasonable search. In the few
decisions to date the courts have stated that searches by
other students or a random search by a school official on
the street would be unreasonable and therefore unconstit-
utional. Otherwise, the provisions in the Fourth Amendment
that are mandatory in adult searches and seizures, the
courts have held, are not applicable in a public school.
23. Ibid .
.
p. 733.
CHAPTER VIII
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Introduction
The Fifth Amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capitol
otherwise infamous crime
,
unless on a pre-
sentment or indictment of a grand jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces
°r the militia, when in actual service in
time of war or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any case to be a witness against
himself, not be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use with-
out just compensation.
The Sixth Amendment states:
In the criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously as-
certained by law, and to be informed of the nat-
ure and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense.
There are two kinds of due process in constitutional
law today, substantive and procedural. Substantive due pro-
cess consists of a judicial review of the substance of a
state or federal act to determine if an individual has been
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law 0 The expansion of substantive due process mentioned
in Chapter Two came about through a broader interpretation
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
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beginning in the late Nineteenth Century.
Procedural due process is found in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments and is designed to prohibit the government from
limiting m any way the individuals personal or property
rights without following certain procedures. As shown in
Chapter Two, through a number of significant court decis-
ions, the procedures found in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
have come to cover actions by the states
„
Nowhere has the expansion of constitutional protection
to public school pupils been more important than in the area
of procedural due process 0 In a number of recent decisions
relating to the suspension and expulsion of students, the
courts have determined that many of the procedural require-
ments set forth in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are now
binding on school officials,. Students at the present time
are not accorded the full guarantees found in the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments 0 However, the courts have stated that school
officials must follow certain procedures before expelling or
suspending students in order to guarantee them fundamental
fairness o This chapter will show to what extent procedural
due process has been granted to public school pupils by the
courts
.
As a result of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the im-
portance of education in Brown v. Board of Education of To-
peka , ^ 1954, education came to be considered by the courts
lo 347 UoSc 483 (1954)
as a "right" of American children* In Brown
. Chief Justice
V7arren said,
Today, education is perhaps the most important fun-
ction of state and local governments. Compulsory
school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of
the importance of education to our democratic soc-iety o It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation
of good citizenship* Today it is a principal in-
strument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his ev-'
vironment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an educa-
tion
.
Courts thereafter began to examine public school sus-
pensions in light of procedural due process requirements.
Practically speaking, the threat of permanent expulsion from
a high school today could ultimately be more serious to an
adolescent than many sentences imposed by the courts in crim
inal cases.
A most significant landmark decision that led to the
granting of procedural due process to public school pupils
was In_ Re Gault
.
Gault
.
previously mentioned in Chapter
Three of this study, had a significant impact on student
rights in general, but more importantly because the decision
"incorporated" parts of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
include protection for juveniles. Following the precedent
in Gault
.
these procedures have since been expanded to pub-
lic school pupils in subsequent litigation 0 Gerald Gault,
a minor involved in a juvenile proceeding, was ordered con-
2 ° Ibid
.
'
p 0 49 3.
fined to a state industrial school for a period of six years
without a notice of charges, right to counsel, right to con-
frontation and cross-examination, privilege against self-
incrimination, right to a transcript of the proceedings and
the right to appellate review,, ^
The Supreme Court saw in the juvenile proceeding a de-
nial to Gerald Gault of fundamental fairness and due process
of law. Since the consequences of the juvenile proceeding
were so severe, six years of incarceration, Gault, even though
he was 15 years old, should have been guaranteed the rudiments
of procedural due process. Regarding the Sixth Amendment re-
quirement that the accused be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, the Supreme Court in Gault said,
"Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be
given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings
so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded
and it must set forth the misconduct with particularity."^
On the right to counsel, the highest court contended
that, "A proceeding where the issue is whether the child
will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss
of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a
felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the assistance of
5
counsel to cope with the problems of law."'' Gault also
3 o 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
4. Ibid p , p„ 33.
5 Ibid
.
, p 0 36
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added other rights for juveniles. In the words of the Court
"It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-
incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not
to children. The language of the Fifth Amendment is unequ-
ivocal and without exception.
Because of the serious consequences in the juvenile
proceeding against Gault, procedural due process was deemed
necessary. The same reasoning, previously mentioned, is be-
ing applied in litigation arising out of public school sus-
pensions and expulsions— that the seriousness of an expul-
sion warrants some measure of procedural due process to pro-
tect public school pupils.
Procedural Due Process and College Students
In a number of instances, court decisions relating to
constitutional rights of college students helped pave the
way for later expansion of these same rights to public
school pupils. The expansion of procedural due process
rights to students in the secondary level is no exception.
7A 1943 case raised the due process issue when stu-
dents from the University of Tennessee were expelled for
selling final examinations. The plaintiffs sought judicial
intervention because they were not confronted by or informed
of the witnesses against them. The Tennessee Court rejected
6 o Ibid
.
, p 0 47
o
7c State v. Hyman , 171 S.W. 2d 822 (1943)
the students 0 contention saying, "The due process clause of
the Constitution
... can have no application where the govern-
ing board of a school is rightfully exercising its inherent
authority to discipline students." 8
Two decades later, however, a Federal Circuit in Ala-
bama made the concept of due process applicable to college
student suspensions in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Edu-
9
cation
,
1961. Six Negro students in the Dixon litigation
were summarily expelled from an Alabama State college for
participating in a civil rights demonstration without the
consent of the college president. Formal charges were not
placed against the students nor were they granted a hearing
prior to their expulsions 0 In this landmark decision, the
Court saw the problem as, "Whether due process requires not-
ice and some opportunity for hearing before students at a
tax-supported college are expelled for misconduct. We an-
swer that question in the af firmative 0 The Court con-
tinued, "Whenever a governmental body acts so as to injure
an individual, the Constitution requires that the act be
consonant with due process of lawo"^ With this pronounce-
ment, college students were afforded constitutional pro-
tection of due process in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
8° Ibid .
.
p. 827.
9. 294 F. 2d 150 (1961)
10. Ibld o
,
p. 151.
11 . Ibid Q
. p 0 154
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The almost unlimited authority of school officials over col-
lege students regarding expulsions was thus ended with Dixon
.
The fundamental principles of fairness would now require no-
tice and a right to be heard in college expulsions.
Realizing the far-reaching implications of their de-
cision, the Court said, "We are confident
.. .[fhat due process
requires notice and some opportunity for hearing before a
student at a tax-supported college is expelled for misconduct." 12
The Circuit Court went on to offer some important guidelines
college administrators to follow that would insure stu-
dents faced with the possibility of expulsion the rudimentary
elements of fair play. "They should.
. .comply with the follow-
ing standards. The notice should contain a statement of the
specific charges and grounds ... and an opportunity to hear
1
3
both sides." The Court finally pointed out that all of
the procedural safeguards in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
are not accorded students as they stated, "This is not to
imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to
14cross-examine witnesses, is required c " Dixon is mentioned
12. Ibid
.
.
p. 158.
13. Ibid .
14. Ibid 0
,
p. 159.
See also: Due v. Florida A . &H . University
.
233 F» Supp Q
393 (1963); Woody v. Burns
.
Fla., 188 So Q 2d 56 (1966); Es-
teban v 0 Central Missouri State College
.
45 F.R.D. 133 (1968);
Scoggln v c Lincoln University
.
291 F c Supp Q 161 (1969); Str -
icklin Vo Regents of University of Wi scons in , 297 F. Supp.
416 (1969)
;
Scott v 0 Alabama State Board of Education . 303
F. Supp. 163 (1969); French v. Bashful. 303 F c Supp D 1333 (1969)
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here because recent court decisions on secondary student ex-
pulsions refer to the guidelines offered in this important
case
.
When considering Brown
,
Gau 1
1
and Dixon
,
the jucicial
precedents were therefore available in the late I960 's that
the courts to proclaim that certain aspects of procedural
due process should be afforded public school pupils 0 What
specifically the courts have decided are procedural rights
of students will be considered next 0
The Right to Counsel
Madera v c Board of Education of City of New York
,
15
raised the issue of the right to counsel in a public school
pupil °s guidance conference. After more than a year of
continuous behavioral problems
,
Victor Madera was suspended
from the seventh grade. Victor's parents were notified of
the suspension and were requested to be present in a Guid-
ance Conference fifteen days later, with regard to their
son's suspension. The parents sought to have an attorney
present at the Guidance Conference. However, the school
officials denied the request citing a school board rule
that provided: "Inasmuch as this is a guidance conference
for the purpose of providing an opportunity for parents,
teachers, counselors, supervisors, et al
. ,
to plan educa-
tionally for the benefit of the child, attorneys seeking
15 386 F 0 2d 778 (1967)
to represent the parent or child nay not participate.- 16
The Waderas successfully obtained a temporary restrain-
ing order from a district court which would allow them re-
presentation by counsel. However, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the decision on the grounds that the con-
sequences of the Guidance Conference were not serious enough
to warrant representation by counsel in order to protect
Victor Madera's interests. The Court pointed out that the
most that could happen to a student after a Guidance Con-
ference would be to have him transferred to another class or
school. He could, but only with parental permission, have
been transferred to a school for the socially maladjusted.
The District Superintendent after the Guidance Conference
also could have referred the student's case to the Bureau
of Child Guidance, another social agency, or the Bureau of
Attendance for court action. In any case, these agencies
would afford Victor procedural due process when dealing with
him.
The Court said, "At the most, the Guidance Conference
is a very preliminary investigation, if it can be consid-
ered an investigation at all. After the conference, aside
from a school reassignment, if any, a whole series of fur-
ther investigations, hearings and decisions must occur be-
fore the child is subjected to any of the serious consequ-
16° Ibid
.
,
p. 780
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ences which the district court suggested follow for the juv-
enile involved in a District Superintendent's Guidance Conf-
17
erence.
"
There was, however, another important point considered
by the Court in Madera—if a student was not allowed counsel
at a Guidance Conference should he still be afforded the pro-
tection of due process? On this question, the Court answered
in the affirmative saying, "The right to representation by
counsel is not an essential ingredient to a fair hearing in
all types of proceedings 0 - 1
8
Thus, the importance of Madera
is twofold. First, even though the student did not gain the
right to counsel in a "guidance conference", the Court did
recognize the Gault reasoning that counsel would be guaran-
teed if the outcome of a school hearing could have serious
consequences for a student and that in any type of hearing
involving a student, he should be accorded fairness. Sec-
ondly, the Court recognized the necessity to limit the use
of counsel for very pragmatic reasons stating, "Law and
order in the classroom should be the responsibility of our
respective educational systems 0 The courts should not usurp
this function and turn disciplinary problems, involving sus-
pension, into criminal adversary proceedings—which they are
17. Ibid
.
.
p. 785.
18 0 Ibid .
, p 0 786.
19. Ibid
o , £>p. 788-789.
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Cosme v. Board of Education of City of New York
.
20
1968,
followed pretty much the reasoning in Madera by upholding
the Board of Education's refusal to permit a student's par-
ents to be represented by counsel at a conference called to
discuss the student's temporary suspension from school be-
cause of misconduct. Permanent exclusion from school how-
ever would allow the assistance of counsel.
Notice and Hearing
A year after Madera, in still another New York case, the
state courts expanded the concept of procedural due process
to a controversy involving the State Regents Examinations.
2
1
Goldwini v « Allen, resulted when Marsha Goldwin was ac-
cused of cheating on the New York State Regents Examination
by the Acting Principal of her high school. She broke down
and confessed to cheating when confronted with the evidence
against her 0 The next day Marsha recanted her confession
but the Acting Principal reported to the State Regents any-
way that she had cheated on the examination 0 The Regents,
acting on the letter, suspended Marsha's privileges related
to the examination. Marsha brought suit claiming she was
denied her constitutional rights because the action against
her was taken without a hearing.
The Court found in favor of Marsha because the suspension
20. 270 N.Y.S. 2d 231: aff’d without opinion 281 N.Y.S.
2d 970 (1968)
21 o 281 N.YoS. 2d 899 (1968)
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of her examination privileges was certainly serious for a
student in the New York public schools 0 She would have pro-
blems being admitted to a college, she would be ineligible
for a scholarship and would not receive a state diploma.
Without a diploma Marsh’s future job prospects would also
be questionable. The Court also commented on Marsha's "con
fession "
.
It is not the intention of the court to set out
guidelines pursuant to which school authorities
may interview a student with regard to cheating
and under no circumstances does the court be-
lieve that the rules defined in Miranda v Q State
of Arizona
.
384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct 0 1602, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 694, apply here. However, it has been
held that one involved in an administrative pro-
ceeding may not be deprived of rights under the
Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution 0 [Ci-
tations omitted] This court questions the effic-
acy of the statements elicited from infant petiti-
oner's initial explanation was intended to dis-
prove that statement
?
which the school authorities
found not credible.
The Court pointed out that a student is not afforded all
the judicial proceedings mandatory in a criminal case. How-
ever, the New York Court questioned the fairness of using
Marsha's "confession" as the sole basis for the action taken
against her. The Court, in fact, reminded school officials
they did not want to interfere in school affairs, but if
students were not accorded fundamental fairness when the
consequences of administrative action are serious, the courts
would intervene.
22 o Ibid., pp. 905-906
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Two cases where the plaintiffs alleged violations of
First Amendment right in 1969, also raised the question of
a denial of procedural due process rights. In both Sullivan
v. Houston Independent School Di strict
.
23
and Vought Vo Van
~~ -
n Schools
.
24
students were successful in their
claim that school officials had violated their procedural
due process rights. The Federal District Court in Vought
said that suspended students must be afforded procedural due
process provided in Dixon
. Therefore, he should have been
given a statement of charges, a hearing, confronted by the
witnesses against him and an opportunity to present his own
defense before the school officials expelled him for pos-
sessing obscene materials.
A Federal Court in Sullivan spelled out standards of
procedural due process a school board must follow before it
could suspend students involved in an underground newspaper.
The Court said the requirements were:
1. A formal written notice of charges and of the
evidence against him must be provided to the
student and his parents or guardian.
2. A formal hearing affording both sides ample
opportunity to present their case by way of
witnesses or other evidence Q
3. Imposition of sanctions only on the basis of
23. 307 F. Supp. 1328 (1969)
24. 306 F. Supp. 1388 (1969)
25 c Ibid .
.
p. 1393.
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substantial evidence,, 26
H°bson_ v. Dailey
,
27
1970, is an example of gross abuse
of fairness by school officials in the expulsion of a student,,
Deborah Lynn Cleves, seventeen, was excluded from her high
school in Tennessee after participating in a civil rights de-
monstr ation
. Initially she was suspended for three days for
cutting class and leaving school without permission while de-
monstrating in Memphis in support of a local Black labor
union's efforts to win recognition*. In a protest over her
three day suspension, Deborah picketed her school the next
day o As a result, she was given a Board Suspension for pick-
eting in front of the school and inciting students not to en-
ter the building. After a conference involving the Assistant
Superintendent, Deborah, and her mother, Deborah was expelled
for the remainder of the year. At this point Deborah thought
she had no further recourse and began picketing the school
again where she was subsequently arrested. A Juvenile Court
Probation Officer told Deborah during her arrest that if she
would sign a form admitting to the offense of disorderly con-
duct, of which she was not guilty anyway, she would be allow-
ed to go back to school. Deborah willingly signed the form
and later appeared back at school. This time the school de-
nied her readmission citing also the reason that she admitted-
26. Sullivan v e Houston Independen t S chool District ,
307 F. Supp 0 1328, 1346 (1969)
2 7 o 309 F. Suppo 1393 (1970)
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ly was disorderly in a demonstration outside the school.
Deborah then sought counsel. Her attorneys were later ad-
vised she could go to a different school in the city. She
attended the new school c However, after a short time Deborah
sought readmission into her former school resulting in the
litigation
.
Deborah claimed the school officials had violated her
due process and equal protection rights of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Federal Court, recognizing the obvious abuses
of due process in the case, ordered Deborah back to her ori-
ginal school. They said the school officials had not given
her a hearing, had suspended her without prior notice, had
obtained inaccurate information, had not informed her she
could appeal and had not substantiated the charges against
u 28her
.
A federal court in Illinois added a fourth procedural
requirement, a fair and impartial decision, in Whitfield v.
29Simpson o Marquitta Whitfield was expelled by a school
board for one year for gross disobedience and misconduct.
The Court upheld the expulsion and pointed out what proce-
dures should be made available to public school pupils by
stating, "The test of whether or not one has been afforded
procedural due process is one of fundamental fairness in the
light of the total circumstances. No particular method of
28. Ibid .
.
p. 1401.
29. 312 F. Supp. 889 (1970)
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procedure is required for due process, but what is required
is: (1) Adequate notice of the charges; (2) Reasonable op-
portunity to prepare for and meet them; (3) An orderly hear-
ing adopted to the nature of the case; and (4) A fair and
impartial decision." The Court here in Whi t fi eld is not
prescribing any one particular formula for procedural due
process but does say that the four essentials just mentioned
are necessary to insure fairness.
One of the most important decisions thus far adjudica-
ted on student procedural due process rights is the recent
V/illiams v. Dade County School Board
.
31 1971. Other Federal
Courts have in the last few years ruled that various aspects
of Dixon should apply to public school pupils. V/illiams v.
Dade County School Board
.
1971, decided by a Federal Court,
made the Dixon procedural safeguards applicable to public
school students. The litigation grew out of a challenge to
Regulation 5114 of the Dade County, Florida Board of Educa-
tion which allowed the superintendent of schools to give a
thirty-day suspension to school pupils in addition to a prin-
cipals ten-day suspension without benefit of hearing.
Tyrone Williams, a senior at Miami Killian Senior High
School, was charged with participating in a mob attack. He
was given a ten-day suspension by his principal and later the
30. Ibid
.
.
p.894.
31. 441 F. 2d 299 (1971)
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superintendent imposed an additional thirty dav suspension
on the student. Williams alleged his procedural due pro-
cess rights were violated by the lengthy suspension because
he was not afforded a hearing.
In Williams the Court made Dixon applicable to public
school long-term suspensions by saying, "Though Dixon dealt
with the expulsion of college students, we feel that to de-
prive even a high school student, 'in these days”, of 40
school days may indeed cause serious harm O o 0 we see no reason
why these Dixon procedural safeguards ought not be required
before adding an additional 30-days." 32
These decisions clearly demonstrate that students in
the public schools today facing possible long-term suspen-
sions or expulsion do have the constitutional right to writ-
ten notice of the charges and a hearing.
Confrontation
The Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness against
the accused became a right of public school pupils in a re-
cent New Jersey decision, Tibbs v. Board of Education of
3 3Township of Franklin 0 In the Tibbs decision, Tanya Tibbs
was accused by others, not identified, of physically as-
saulting another student. Due to the fear of possible
32 0 Ibid .
,
p. 302.
33 o 276 A. 2d 165 (1971)
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recriminations the board of education, in the subsequent
hearing, withheld the names of those making the accuation
against Tanya. The board suspended Tanya and the New Jersey
Commissioner of Education affirmed the suspension. The de-
cision was then taken to the New Jersey Courts where it was
overturned.
The New Jersey Superior Court would not accept the argu-
ment that presenting the witnesses against the accused in the
school board hearing would be too dangerous. The Court went
on to add, "I therefore conclude that in the context of such
a case as this not only should the accusing witnesses be id-
entified in advance but also, as a general matter and absent
the most compelling circumstances bespeaking a different
course, be produced to testify and to be cross-examined." 34
The Length of Suspensions and Procedural Due Process
A number of decisions in this chapter demonstrate that
certain procedural safeguards are guaranteed to students
facing expulsion from school. Suspensions however, part-
icularly short-term suspensions, pose a different legal pro-
blem. 3ould a student be afforded procedural safeguards if
he is facing a one or two week suspension? Recent court de-
cisions have dealt specifically with this problem 0 Conflict-
ing decisions however, have made the guidelines unclear 0
34„ Ibid,
,
p. 170.
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A Federal Court in Baker v. Downey Ci ty Board of Educa-
tion 35 1970, already mentioned in connection with First
Amendment rights, pointed out that, "Due process is not a fix-
ed, inflexible procedure which must be accorded in every si—
3 6tuation." The Federal District Court in California went
on to say, regarding a ten day suspension, that "
. 0 . I f the
temporary suspension of a high school student could not be
accomplished without first preparing specifications of char-
<3es
,
giving notice of hearing, and holding a hearing, or any
combination of these procedures, the discipline and ordered
conduct of the educational program and the moral atmosphere
required by good educational standards, would be difficult
37to maintain."
Later in the same year a ten-day suspension without a
hearing was allowed by a Federal District Court in Florida.
3RBanks v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County
,
1970,
upheld a Florida statute which permitted principals to sus-
pend students for ten days without affording prior notice or
a hearing. The Court said the right to a hearing is subject
to limitations imposed in order to insure the orderly admini-
35. 307 F. Supp. 517 (1970)
36 0 Ibid .
,
p. 522.
37. Ibid . t pp. 522-523.
38. 314 F. Supp. 285 (1970)
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stration of education,, In order to remove a disruptive stu-
dent immediately
,
in some cases, the teacher would have to
leave the classroom for the hearing. If a teacher could not
remove a disruptive student immediately, all would suffer,,
In Banks the Court contended, "Public school children sus-
pended for misconduct are not criminals „ The legal processes
due them are less exacting than that due one who is accused
under a criminal statute." 39 The Court rejected the Dixon
requirements pointing out that a college suspension is far
more serious than a public school suspension. 49 Therefore,
a ten-day suspension without hearing did not, in the view of
this Court, impinge upon a student's right to due process.
A Federal Circuit Court of Appeals41 in 1971 also upheld
a ten-day suspension of a student in Connecticut without a
hearing. Molly Farrell, a high school sophomore in Clinton,
Connecticut, was suspended for ten days after being involved
in a "sit-down" protest,, She alleged her suspension denied
her procedural due process because there was no written no-
tice, hearing, or the confrontation of witnesses against her 0
Molly was, however, well aware of a rule that automatically
allowed a ten-day suspension of students who disrupted the
school. The school board first authorized a fifteen day sus-
39. IfcLcL
. Po 291.
40. Ibid .
f p. 292.
41. Farrell v. Joel
.
437 F. 2d 160 (1971)
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pension then lowered it to the proper ten-day limit, but up-
held the suspension stating, "
,
0
0
Appelants 9 actions were clear-
ly improper and prompt discipline of some sort was justified. 1,42
Ihe Federal Circuit Court went on to reason that, "...In cases
of minor discipline particularly, parent, student, and admin-
istrator should remember that substitution of common sense
for zealous adherence to legal positions is not absolutely
prohibited. 1,43
A more recent Federal Court ruling was made regarding
another ten-day suspension in Florida. 44 in 1968, the school
board in Port Myers, Florida adopted a policy that automati-
cally suspended students for participating in demonstrations
and walkouts at school. Later, in February, 1970, one-hun-
dred Black students walked out of school to voice their gri-
evances over school policies » The group was orderly and well
behaved. They were subsequently suspended by the principal
for ten days.
In this particular instance the Federal Court saw a
denial of due process in the suspensions even though they
were temporary. The Court declared, "The nature of the walk-
out—whether it was non-violent or tumultuous—is irrelev-
ant to the due process issue, although it would be relevant
to the First Amendment issue. Whether the students walked
out peaceable or riotously, they were still entitled by due
42. . Ibid
.
.
p. 163.
43. Ibid
.
.
pp. 163-164
44. Black Students
.
Etc
., Ex Rel . Shoemaker v. Williams ,
317 F. Supp. 1211 (1970)
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process to a hearing. Due process protects the orderly and
disorderly
,
even as it protects the innocent and the guilty.'*45
The Court also took the position that, "Due process requires
that an accused be offered an opportunity to have his guilt
determined by a fair hearing prior to the imposition of pe-
nalties for the alleged misconduct." 46 Further, the Court
concluded in the decision "...Oflhat due process prevents de-
fendants from suspending a student for a substantial period
of time without first affording the student an adversary hear-
ing. A suspension for ten days is a suspension for a sub-
stantial period of time." Evidently in this situation,
the courts saw the necessity for a hearing regarding the sus-
pension of a student for ten days because of involvement in
a First Amendment question. Automatic suspension for ten
days in the exercise of expressing an opinion could here have
a "chilling effect" on a student's First Amendment rights.
Williams v. Dade County School Board
.
46
already mention-
ed previously in this chapter, upheld a ten-day school sus-
pension that did not provide for a hearing. However, the
Court would not allow the superintendent of schools to impose
an additional thirty-day school suspension without procedural
45. Ibid.
. pp 0 1214-1215.
46
.
Ibid.
. p. 1215.
47 o Ibid.
. p 0 1216 o
•
CO 441 F. 2d 299 (1971)
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due process safeguards. The Appeals Court upheld the princi-
pal's right to impose a ten school day suspension because it
realized the need in a public school situation for the admini-
stration to act quickly in some cases to prevent further se-
rious disorders. To deny a student the right to a hearing
for an additional thirty days, however, was to deny a student
fairness. The Court said of the additional suspension,
We feel we must state, at the outset, that we are
not dealing with the power of the school to disci-pline its students. Nor are we concerned with theguilt or innocence of appellant. We focus only ont e school's procedure for the disposition of the
case. further, we note that though the record indi-
cates there may have been considerable disruptionm the school at the time appellant was first sus-pended (for ten days), we are concerned with theimposition of the additional 30 day suspension which
was given without benefit^ of an effective hearing
and at a later time.^9 |_Emphasis suppliedj
The Court continued by pointing out that the suspension,
an eight week loss of school time, was a serious penalty for
a public school pupil today.
We realize, of course, that it is not necessary
that students be given the kinds of procedural pro-
tections reserved for those accused of serious
crime. Nevertheless, we feel that a penalty of this
magnitude ought not be imposed without proper no-
tice of the charges, and at least an attempt to as-
certain accurately the facts involved and to give
the student an opportunity to present his side of
the case. 5(J
At the present time it is not clear whether students
should be afforded procedural due process in suspensions that
49. Ibid o
. p 0 301.
5°. Ibid
.
.
pp. 301-302.
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do not exceed ten days. The Williams decision does make it
clear that suspensions of students for thirty school days
without notice and a hearing violates a student's constitu-
tional rights „
Summary
Public school pupils today
/ through the extension of
procedural due process to them, have considerable constitu-
tional protection when facing possible long-term suspensions
and expulsions. Since the denial to an adolescent of the op-
portunity to attend school is viewed in a very serious light
by the courts, certain constitutional safeguards have been
deemed necessary to protect the student's interest. Although
the courts have not included all the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment procedural due process requirements, the courts have
stated that many aspects of these two amendments are student
constitutional rights. The courts have held that students
facing long-term suspensions or expulsions shall be allowed:
1. Counsel
2. Formal written notice of the charges.
3. A formal hearing.
4. Adequate time for both sides to prepare,,
5 0 To be confronted by the witnesses against him„
6 0 The right to cross-examine witnesses.
7. A fair and impartial decision,.
These safeguards listed above have been determined by the
courts to be student constitutional rights „ They offer public
183
school pupils today substantial protection that was practi-
cally nonexistent only a few years ago.
CHAPTER IX
STUDENT RIGHTS UNDER THE EIGHTH, NINTH AND
TENTH AMENDMENTS
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." Students in two 1971 cases al-
leged that school officials inflicted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment upon them thereby violating their Eighth Amendment
rights
.
In Ware v Q Estes
,
a high school student sought to
restrain the Dallas Independent School District from admin-
istering corporal punishment without the permission of the
student or parent. The school system provided for corporal
punishment through a rule that stated:
Principals are authorized th administer and re-
asonable punishment, including detention, corporal
punishment, suspension for a period not to exceed
ten school days at a time, or recommendation for
expulsion from school.
The students alleged that the rule in question violated
the Eighth Amendment by allowing the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment of students 0 The students also asserted
that the rule had been abused by Dallas school officials in
the pasto The Federal District Court hearing the case, how-
lo
2
.
328 F 0 Supp. 657 (1971)
Ibid
.
,
p. 658.
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ever
,
rejected the students' contention by pointing out that
even if the policy was abused in Dallas it did not mean the
policy was unconstitutional.
Corporal punishment, as it was being administered in
Dallas, meant that a student would be hit on the buttocks
with a wooden paddle. The Court avoided the issue of the
value of corporal punishment in the educational process
stating that it was not within the Court's competence or
function to pass on the merits of corporal punishment.
4
The
District Court concluded in VJar
e
that a student is adequately
protected because if the punishment is unreasonable or ex-
cessive, the perpetrator will be criminally and civilly
5liable. "The law and policy," said the Court, "do not
0
sanction child abuse."
A case previously reviewed in conjunction with First
Amendment rights also raised the question of cruel and un-
usual punishment,, Press v. Pasadena Independent School
7District
,
1971, sought to have an eighth grade girl re-
admitted to school after she had been suspended for par-
ticipating in a disruptive demonstration 0 She alleged her
suspension for the remainder of the spring term was cruel
3. Ibid o
4. Ibid o
. p 0 659 0
5 0 Ibid
.
, p 0 660.
6 o Ibid.
7 326 F 0 Supp 0 550 (1971)
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and unusual punishment and therefore violated the Eighth Am-
endment.
The Federal District Court in California hearing the
case rejected the student's argument and held that the Eighth
Amendment only applied to criminals. In the words of the
1 plaintiff has not been the subject of any crim-
inal sanction, and has not been abused, tortured, or other-
wise brutalized, she is clearly not within the... [Eighth] Am-
0
endment." The application of the Eighth Amendment to pub-
lic school pupils was therefore rejected by the Court in
Press .
The Eighth Amendment has also been raised in a number of
"long hair" cases. Students seeking the removal of school
rules requiring them to cut their hair have alleged the rules
promulgate cruel and unusual punishment. Thus far, the
courts have refused to recognize the cutting of a student's
hair to be cruel and unusual punishment subject to the pro-
tection of the Constitution.
Efforts by students to have the constitutional protec-
tion of the Eighth Amendment extended to them have to this
day not been successful. Courts have taken a position that
the Eighth Amendment only applies to criminals. They further
view corporal punishment in schools to be legal and if abused
by school officials, state criminal and civil statutes are
available for remedies.
8 . Ibid
.
,
p. 564.
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The Ninth Amendment, which states, "The enumeration in
f
^Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage other retained by the people", and the
Tenth Amendment, "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people", have both been raised in connection only with "long
hair" cases. The central point in these cases is the con-
tention that a student's right to wear his hair long is an
individual right not subject to regulation by any government.
It is a right, students allege, that is "reserved to the
people". Students cite as a controlling precedent, Gris-
g
wold v. Connecticut
,
and its "penumbra doctrine
"
0 The
"penumbra doctrine", mentioned earlier in this study, es-
tablished "zones of privacy" in the Bill of Rights that are
guaranteed constitutional protection. Students seeking the
right to wear long hair in the public schools claim a "zone
of privacy" extends to their grooming preferences 0 Until
very recently the courts have rejected the application of
the Ninth Amendment as a Griswold right in "long hair" con-
troversies stating that Griswold was limited to the privacy
10between husband and wife in the home."' Griswold . held
9 o 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
10. King v. Saddleback Junior College , 445 F. 2d 932 (1971)
108
unconstitutional a Connecticut statute that made the use of
birth control devices illegal 0
However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in a "long
hair" case just decided, reversed Bishop v. Colaw
.
310 F.
Supp 0 445 (1970), on the grounds that a public school pupil
did possess a constitutional right to govern his appearance
under the Ninth Amendment. 11 The Court stated:
"...Some have referred to the right to govern ap-
perance as 'fundamental' others as 'substantial',
others as 'basic', and still others as simply as
a 'right'. The source of this right has been found
within the Ninth Amendment, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the privacy pen-
umbra of the Bill of Rights. A close reading of
these cases reveals, however, that the differences
are more semantic than real. The common theme un-
derlying decisions striking down hair style regul-
ations is that the Constitution guarantees rights
other than those specifically enumerated and that
the right to govern one's personal, appearance is
one of those graranteed rights."
The Bishop decision, rendered in 1971, extends Ninth
Amendment protection to public school pupils. The Court
felt school regulations governing personal appearance tran-
scended a right to privacy guaranteed by the Ninth Amend-
ment. The implications of this decision are yet to be seen
since it is so recent. The following chapter in this study
will show that other Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have
rejected the reasoning the Eighth Circuit Court followed
11 .
12
450 F. 2d 1069 (1971)
Ibid
.
,
p. 1075.
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in deciding Bishop
. In any case
;
Bishop should not have too
much influence on the broad perspective of student constit-
utional rights since it was adjudicated on a narrow issue,
the right of students to wear long hair. While the pro-
tection of the Ninth Amendment has been granted to students
in at least one instance, as seen in Bishop
,
the Tenth Am-
endment, raised by students only in conjunction with "long
hair" controversies, has up to now been rejected by the courts.
CHAPTER X
"LONG-HAIR" AND PUBLIC SCHOOL PUPILS
Introduction
So voluminous are court cases involning "long hair" in
the public schools, the topic warrants a separate chapter in
this study of student constitutional rights. This study has
reviewed no less than seventy-five court decisions on long
hair which far out number all other suits in which students
have sought constitutional relief through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cases are so nu-
merous that only appellate decisions will be reviewed here.
The inability of the courts to provide a clear and consis-
tent ruling on the status of "long hair" applicable on a
nationwide scale has generated a controversy far in excess
of its importance. The cases, by and large, seek to prevent
school officials from suspending students who choose to
wear their hair long in violation of adopted dress codes.
On occasion, students have alleged in court that rules pro-
hibiting "long hair" in the public schools violate constitu-
tional rights in as many as the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
1
2
Some courts have rejected the whole controversy as a
1. Bouse v. Hipes , 319 F. Supp. 515 (1970)
2. Freeman v. Flake . 448 F. 2d 258 (1971)
i9i
constitutional issue viewing the problem as one that should
loft strictly for school administrators to resolve.
3Other courts
,
realizing the importance of "long hair" to
public school pupils
,
have conscientiously sought to adjud-
icate the litigation on sound constitutional principles.
The inconsistencies of the court decisions promulgated by
"the long hair" dispute have generated confusion and con-
sternation among educators, not only on the status of hair,
but over the whole area of student constitutional rights in
general
.
Undoubtedly, many school officials view the regula-
tion of student grooming as an area of no concern of the
courts, state or federal. They feel judicial intervention
on such a "minor" controversy is an infringment of their
administrative prerogratives
. However, the "long hair"
controversy takes on a very serious note where students
are denied attendance in schools that promulgate rules ban-
ning excessively long hair. The courts, therefore, became
involved in the controversy because of the serious con-
sequences imposed on students who insisted on wearing their
hair long.
Can a male student wear his hair as long as he wants
to in a public school? The answer to the query depends
upon where the student lives. The First, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuit Courts have ruled in favor of the student
3. Richards v. Thurston , 424 2d 1281 (1970)
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while the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuit
Courts have upheld school regulations prohibiting long
hair.
The beginning of this legal controversy can be traced
back to the 1965, Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro
4
decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Leonard, a high school student who claimed his "Beatle-
type" hair cut was essential to his performance in a band,
was suspended by Attleboro school officials until he cut
his hair shorter. Leonard contended the school’s action
was unreasonable and arbitrary, and that "long hair" was
in no way connected with the successful operation of a
public school.
The Massachusetts Court, however, ruled in favor of
the board’s action stating, "The Court’s function in re-
viewing this type of ruling is limited in the light of
the broad discretionary powers which the law confers upon
a school committee. We will not pass upon the wisdom or
5desirability of a school regulation." The Court concluded
its reasoning by saying that, "We are of opinion that the
unusual hair style of the plaintiff could disrupt and im-
pede the maintenance of a proper classroom atmosphere or
decorum. This is an aspect of personal appearance and
hence akin to matters of dress. Thus as with any unusual,
4. 212 N.E. 2d 468 (1965)
5 . Ibid c
,
p o 472.
immodest or exaggerated mode of dress, conspicious depart-
ures from accepted custom in the matter of haircuts could
g
result in the distraction of other pupils."
As male long hair styles became more and more common
in the late sixties, suspensions began to increase. Re-
cognition by the federal courts of student constitutional
rights through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment resulted in appeals by suspended students to
hear their cases on constitutional grounds. As a result,
Federal District Courts have been inundated with "long
hair" cases. A significant number of "long hair" cases
have also reached Circuit Courts of Appeal, the court level
directly below the Supreme Court of the United States. The
highest court has yet to rule on "long hair" in the public
schools and they specifically ruled out long hair and dress
codes as an issue on the landmark Tinker decision in 1969.
The decisions rendered by the Appellate Courts, pro and con
will now be reviewed.
Appellate Court Decisions Favoring Students
Court decisions holding in favor of students in "long
hair" disputes have centered essentially around two points.
The most recent First Circuit Court of Appeals decision,
Richards v. Thurston
,
1970, on "long hair" rejected the
6. Ibid.
notion that a student’s right to wear long hair is a con-
stitutionally protected act of symbolic expression under
the First Amendment or a Griswold "right to privacy". In-
stead, the Court, in ruling against school officials" re-
strictions on hair length, stating that, "We believe that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment estab-
lishes a sphere of personal liberty for every individual,
subject to reasonable intrusions by the state in further-
7
ance of legitimate state interest."
The Court went on to say that regulating the style of
one’s hair was not a legitimate state interest. The Court
continued by pointing out that, "...Liberty seems to us an
incomplete protection if it encompasses only the right to
do momentous acts, leaving the state free to interfere with
those personal aspects of our lives which have no direct
Q
bearing on the ability of others to enjoy their liberty."
Finally, in Richards the Court said, "We conclude that
within the commodious concept of liberty, embracing free-
doms great and small, is the right to wear one’s hair as
9he wishes."
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in its most re-
cent "long hair" decision,
10 followed an earlier Seventh
7 . Richards v. Thurston , 424 F. 2d 1281, 1284 (1970)
8. Ibid.
9 Ibid
.
,
p. 1285
.
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Circuit decision,
.
Breen v. Kahl
,
11
1969. Because of his
long hair, Tyler Crews was denied admission to North Cen-
tral High School in Marion County, Indiana. Holding in fa-
vor of the student, the Court reasoned, "
. . .[sjince the im-
pact of hair regulations extends beyond the schoolhouse
gate, the degree of state infringement on personal rights
is significantly greater than in many other areas of school
discipline." In Crews
.
the school officials failed to
satisfy a burden of substantial justification reguired be-
fore a state may impinge upon a person's liberty. The
fact that one's hair could not be worn short in school and
long out of school was an important factor in a favorable
decision for Tyler Crews.
Another reason used by a Federal Circuit Court where
litigation was favorable to a student in a "long hair"
controversy has been the extension of the Griswold right
to privacy found in the Ninth Amendment. The Eighth Cir-
cuit recently rejected both the First and Seventh Circuit
Courts 0 arguments and applied the Griswold formula which
would not allow school rules to regulate a student's hair
style because it violated his constitutional right to pri-
vacy. Bishop v. Colaw
,
mentioned earlier in Chapter Nine,
stated, "We believe that, among those rights retained by
11 . 296 F. Supp. 702 (1969); Aff'd 419 F. 2d 1034 (1969)
12 . Crews v. Clones , 432 F. 2d 1259, 1264 (1970)
the people under out Constitutional form of government, is
the freedom to govern one's personal appearance." 15 Lower
federal courts, in addition to the Federal Appeals Courts,
have applied the First Amendment14 and the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment15 in striking down
rules and regulations prohibiting "long hair" in the public
schools
.
Appellate Court Decisions Favoring School Boards
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal that have ruled in
favor of school officials in the "long hair" dispute cen-
ter their reasoning essentially around the points that the
regulation of grooming codes should be resolved by school
administrators, not the courts, and any evidence of dis-
ruption justifies upholding the school board rule in order
to protect the orderly process of education. In a 1S70
1
6
decision, Jackson v. Dorrier
.
the Sixth Circuit Court
upheld a suspension of a high school pupil in Nashville,
13. 450 F. 2d 1069, 1075 (1971); see also: Crews v.
Clonces
,
432 F. 2d 1259 (1970)
14. See: Finot v. Pasadena City Board of Education
,
250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 5 2 0 (19 6 777" Meyers v.
Areata Union High School District, 269 Cal. App. 2d 549,
65 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969)
15. See: Zachry v. Brown
,
299 F. Supp. 1360 (1967);
Griffin v. Tatum. 300 F. Supp. 60 (1969); Westley v. Rossi .
305 F. Supp. 706 (1969)
16. 424 F. 2d 213 (1970)
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Tennessee for wearing long hair, stating:
In the absence of infringement of constitutional
rights, the responsibility for maintaining proper
standards of decorum and discipline and a whole-
some academic environment at Donelson High Schoolis not vested in the federal courts, but in the
principal and faculty of the school and the Met-
ropoliton Board of Education of Nashville and Dav-
idson County, Tennessee.
Jackson, the high school pupil involved in the contro-
versy, denied his long hair was an act of expression, there-
by removing any question of First Amendment protection.
In a more recent decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals said, "The argument that the right of a student to
determine his own hair length is a matter of substantive due
I O
process is without merit 00 .„"
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals saw '.'long hair" as
a minor problem compared to the awesome difficulties invol-
• 19ving southern schools recently ordered to desegregate 0
Concerning litigation reaching the Fifth Circuit Court over
the suspension of three Negro students who refused to shave,
they said, "The case is such that the District Court felt
somewhat put-upon by having to fit a controversy over shaving
into an inordinately busy schedule 0 It was viewed as a pro-
blem for school administrators. We share this view a The
17 0 Ibid .
, pp. 218-219 0
18 0 Gfell Vo Rickelman , 441 F 0 2d 444, 447 (1971)
19 o Stevenson v. Board of Education of Wheeler County ,
Georqi
a
.
426 F 0 2d 1154 ( 19 70l
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entire problem seems miniscule in light of other matters in-
volving the school system. The rule in question is founded
on a rational basis, and that it was not arbitrarily appliedo
It follows that no substantial federal constitutional que-
stion was presented. There the matter ends 0 " 2 ^ The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently used the same rea-
soning in other "long hair" cases they have adjudicated. 21
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also recently ruled
in favor of upholding regulations restricting the length of
male students • hair. Their reasoning is basically the
same as other Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal that have
ruled in favor of school boards. The Court in Freeman v.
Flake stated, "We are convinced that the United States Const-
itution and statutes do not impose on the federal courts the
duty and responsibility of supervising the length of a stu-
dent's hair. The problem, if it exists, is one for the states
2 3
and should be handled through state procedures Q " In dis-
missing the litigation in Freeman
,
the Court declared, "The
hodgepodge references to many provisions of the Bill of Rights
and the Fourteenth Amendment show uncertainty as to the
20 o Ibid p
. p 0 1150.
21. See: Farrell v. Dallas Independent School District .
392 F. 2d 697, 393 U.S. 856, 89 S. Ct 0 98 (Certiorari deniedT
(1968); Davis v. Firment , 408 F. 2d 1085 (1969); Griffin v.
Tatum
,
425 F» 2d 201 (1970)
;
Wood v 0 Alamo Heights Indepen-
dent School District
,
433 F. 2d 355 (1970)
22 0 Freeman v 0 Flake , 448 F. 2d 258 (1971)
23. Ibid p , p. 259 o
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existence of any federally protected right ." 24 Finally, the
Tenth Circuit Court said of
-long hair- cases,
-Complaints
which are based on nothing more than school regulations of
the length of a male student's hair do not directly and sharp_
ly implicate basic constitutional values and therefore, should
not be subject to constitutional protection. 25 The Tenth Cir-
cuit Court followed similar reasoning of the Ninth Circuit
in Kina v. Saddleback Junior College
.
26
1971, in deciding
against students in the "long hair" dispute.
Summary
Unfortunately, both for public school administrators and
the courts, the "long hair" problem continues to grow. Beards,
sideburns, and longer hair seem to be an acceptable norm in
some parts of the country. The pressure on schools seeking
to prevent these styles of grooming is mounting. The courts,
as seen, are still unable to resolve the controversy. Students
are still suspended from school for violations of grooming
codes and the courts are hearing more cases. It would appear
the Supreme Court will have to step in and resolve the dil-
emma one way or the other for the federal courts are so sharply
divided on the whole "long hair" issue.
24. Ibid
.
.
p. 260.
25. Ibid
.
.
p. 262.
26. 445 F. 2d 932 (1971)
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The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, re-
cently complained that the Supreme Court has on several occas-
ions refused to review the constitutional question of "long
2 7hair" regulations. The justices further stated, "What little
guidance we have from the Court in this area is conflicting." 28
A clear-cut ruling on the status of "long hair" would be of
great benefit to the area of student constitutional rights
for it would end a well publicized legal controversy the
courts have thus far been unable to settle.
27. Bishop v. Colaw , 450 F c 2d 1069, 1071 (1971)
28 o Ibid
CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION
Impact on Students
The growth and expansion of constitutional rights to in-
clude students is having a broad impact on public schools
today. Students, by virtue of various court decisions, may ex-
ercise their right to free expression in school. Symbolic acts
of protest, demonstrations, and speech are all constitutionally
protected rights of public school pupils. Limits on these rights
will be determined by the material and substantial disruption
test proscribed by Tinker in most cases. If in the exercise
of free expression a student materially and substantially dis-
rupts the educational process then such expression may be re-
stricted .
The right of a student to be guaranteed freedom of the press
has also become a student constitutional right. Students today
may print and distribute in and around schools pretty much what
they choose. The courts have consistently held that student
expression in a newspaper is their constitutional right and that
student newspapers should be governed by the same guidelines
as all newspapers.
Constitutional protections such as these are allowing
students to voice their concerns over things they do not like.
In addition to broad social and political issues, students are
expressing discontent over the schools they attend. They aie
making their voices effectively heard on such things as dis-
cipline, dress, teachers, physical environment and the cur-
riculum. One result has been more student participation in
the decision making process in public schools.
Judicial recognition that students have certain rights,
places an additional measure of responsibility upon the stu-
dents. In the exercise of a pupil's right to free expres-
sion, for example, he now has the responsibility of not in-
^ringing upon the rights of others. Also, in the exercise
of the right to a free press, students have the responsibility
of maintaining the recognized ethics of journalism. Any
means that would allow students the opportunity of assuming
a greater burden of responsibility should be welcomed by ed-
ucators. What other way can best prepare adolescents to make
the tremendous decisions of choosing a mate for marriage, a
college, or an occupation? Students used to responsibil-
ities will be able to make sounder, more mature decisions
upon the termination of their public school experience.
The inclusion of procedural due process rights to be
constitutionally protected rights of students has also had
a tremendous impact on students. Students today have been
afforded rights that give them considerable protection be-
fore they can be expelled or suspended for long periods of
time from school. Legal counsel is also being made available
to students by organizations such as the American Civil Lib-
erties Union to insure that a student's constitutional rights
are not violated when they are suspended. No longer can
203
public school pupils be summarily expelled at the arbitrary
will of school officials. The Fifth and Sixth Amendment pro-
cedural due process rights guarantee students facing expul-
sion and long term suspensions today fundamental fairness.
Impact on School Officials
The impact of student constitutional rights has cer-
tainly been evident to school officials. A main concern of
teachers, administrators, and school board members is the
feeling that court decision granting students constitutional
rights will undermine their authority and control over stu-
dents. Discipline in a public school is necessary, many
maintain, before the educational process can even begin.
A close examination of court decisions on student rights
indicates clearly the justices have gone at great length to
point out that they are not trying to usurp the powers of school
administrators. The courts realize the tremendous problems
school administrators have today in running the public schools.
They have taken great care to emphasize that any attempts to
disrupt the ed ucational process will not be tolerated. Many
courts have commented on the merits of control and discipline
in the public schools as a necessary part of the educational
process. What the courts are saying, however, is that all
pupils must be treated justly, fairly, and reaanably by school
officials
.
Pedagogical and legal philosophies clash, not on the
fundamental idea that there must be authority, control, and
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discipline in public schools, but on the degree of authority
authority that can allow arbitrary restrictions on a student's
fundamental rights.
If school officials treat students justly, fairly, and
reasonably the courts, organization such as the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Am-
erican Civil Liberties Union and various neighborhood legal
aid groups will be satisfied. Recommendations by the Am-
erican Civil Liberties Union, tyie American Association of
University Professors, The National Association of Secondary
3School Principals, and the Massachusetts State Department
4
of Education suggest a reexamination of attitudes by school
administrators toward student rights. Thus, a conscientious
effort by public school administrators to foster, not merely
tolerate student rights will go a long way in keeping them out
of court.
Recognition of student constitutional rights has dir-
ect implication for the classroom teacher. Students who
1. Academic Freedom in the Secondary Schools , Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union [New York, 1969).
2. "Joint Statement of Rights and Freedoms of Students",
American Association o_f University Professors Bulletin , vol.
54 (June, 1968).
3. Robert L. Acker ly, The Reasonable Exercise of Au -
thority
,
National Association of Secondary School Principals
(Washington
,
1969).
4. Guidelines for Student Rights and Responsibilities ,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Education (Bos-
ton
,
1971 )
.
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choose to voice their opinions in a constructive manner in
the classroom can no longer be considered as recipients of
a one-way education. The idea that education is totally
teacher directed and teacher oriented is being replaced by
free and open discussions and an exchange of ideas. The
result should be a better education for students and tea-
chers seeking this process.
The advent of student constitutional rights also raises
the issue of accountability. Students with the constitutional
right to criticize, protest, and demonstrate can point out to
the general public problem areas in the schools. Administra-
tive decisions are now subject to free and orderly discus-
sion by students which makes the administrator more account-
able for his actions. Teachers, too, feel the pressure of
accountability due to students voicing their concerns. Such
things as poor teaching have come under constant attack by
students. Notwithstanding, the general public becomes aware
of these concerns through the media, thereby keeping them
better informed of what is happening in the public schools.
The extension of procedural due process rights has had
broad administrative implications regarding student expul-
sions and long term suspensions. School officials may no
longer expel or suspend students without following certain
procedures designed to guarantee students fundamental fair-
ness. Now administrators seeking to expel a student must
conduct an investigation, gather evidence on both sides,
give notice of the charges, and provide for a fair hearing.
206
School boards will have to devote time hearing expulsion cases
and judge them fairly and impartially,, Adherance to these
due process procedures will inevitably be time consuming to
school officials. However, the courts feel the inconvenience
to school officials is worth protecting the students' rights.
A federal judge in a recent decision suggested that
school officials should not just tolerate student constitution-
al rights but that they should foster them. Hopefully, in
the future with a greater understanding of this body of law,
school officials will choose to foster rather than to resist
or merely tolerate student constitutional rights, and this,
in turn, may lead to a more meaningful and satisfying ex-
perience for all those involved.
The Need for Further Research
The number of court decisions in the field of student
constitutional rights has been increasing substantially each
year. Continued research on this topic will be necessary
just to keep abreast of the judicial interpretations of the
various controversies.
There is also a need for research in closely related
areas to the expansion of student constitutional rights to
public school pupils through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, for example, has important implications
for student constitutional rights and should be examined.
20 7
In the last four years President Nixon has made four ap-
pointments to the Supreme Court. The President has made it
clear that he has sought justices whose legal philosophies
are "conservative" or "strict constructionist " as opposed to
the "liberal" ideals of the Court in the Warren Era. it re-
mains to be seen what impact, if any, the recent appointees
will have on student constitutional rights. Further research
will be necessary to answer this question.
Finally, further research is needed on the topic of stu-
dent constitutional rights that will contribute to a better
understanding of this whole area of law, an understanding that
is becoming more necessary for those in the field of public
education today.
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